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ABSTRACT
The present dissertation examined why people adopt or endorse certain political
ideologies (i.e., liberal or conservative). According to a motivated social cognition
perspective (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a; Kruglansl<i, 1996), individuals
adopt political ideologies to fulfill dispositional and situationally induced needs or
motivations. Previous research has found that political conservatism is related to a
number of psychological needs (e.g., Jost, Glaser et aI., 2003a). However, there is
minimal research examining why individuals adopt political liberalism. By focussing on
the political right and not considering the political left, there might be other motivational
underpinnings of political orientation that have been overlooked. In four studies, the
present dissertation ail)1ed to fill this gap by investigating what chronic and situationally
induced needs underlie political orientation, with a focus on political liberalism. Based on
psychological the9ries of ideology, research examining political conservatism, and
experimental research examining differences between liberals and conservatives, it was
proposed that four social-cognitive needs (Need for Inclusiveness, Need for
Understanding, Need for Change, and Avoidance of Decisional Commitment) would be
associated with liberalism. Moreover, research suggests that the relations between the
needs and liberalism might be moderated by political sophistication (e.g., Converse,
1964). University students (Study 1; n == 201) and community adults (Study 2; n == 197)
completed questionnaires assessing political liberalism, political sophistication, and
individual differences 're~ective of the four proposed needs. As predicted, correlation and
hierarchical regression analyses in both Studies 1 and 2 indicated that political liberalism
was related to Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, and Need for Change.
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Avoidance of Decisional Commitment uniquely predicted political liberalism in Study 2;
however, contrary to predictions, it was unrelated to political liberalism in Study 1.
Furthermore, some of these relations were moderated by political sophistication, such
that among individuals with a greater knowledge of politics, the relation between certain
needs and liberalism was positive. To explore the role of situationally induced needs on
political liberalism, each of the four proposed needs were manipulated in Study 3.
Participants (n == 120) completed one of five scrambled-sentence tasks (one for each need
condition and control condition), measures of explicit and implicit political liberalism,
political sophistication, and state and trait measures indicative of the four proposed needs.
The ~anipulation did not successfully prime participants with the needs. Therefore, a
replication of the analyses from Studies 1 and 2 was conducted on the dispositional
needs. Results showed that Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, and Need
for Change were linked with greater explicit and implicit political liberalism. Study 4
examined the effect of manipulated Need for Inclusiveness on participants' endorsement
ofpolitical liberalism, independent of conservatism. Participants (n == 43) were randomly
assigned to a Need for Inclusiveness or control condition, and completed separate
measures of political liberalism and conservatism, and political sophistication.
Participants in the Need for Inclusiveness condition reported greater liberalism than those
in a control condition; this effect was not moderated by political sophistication.
Generally, the findings from this dissertation suggest that there might be other needs
underlying political ideology, especially political liberalism. Thus, consistent with others'
(Jost, Glaser et aI., 2003a), individuals might adopt political liberalism as a way of
gratifying certain psychological needs. Implications and future research are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
"All of us, liberal or conservative, feel as though we've reached our
political opinions by carefully weighing the evidence and exercising
our best judgment. But it could be that all of that careful reasoning is
just after-the-fact self-justification" (Klein, 2006).
Klein was reflecting on a longitudinal study by Block and Block (2006) that
examined the relation between participants' preschool personality and their political
orientation assessed 20 years later. Results of the longitudinal study showed that
preschool children described as autonomous, expressive, and resourceful tended to be
politically liberal in their 20s. In contrast, preschool children described as uncomfortable
with uncertainty, inhibited, and rigid tended to be politically conservative two decades
later. The implications of Block and Block's (2006) findings, as articulated in the above
quote, are that one's political ideology might be, at least in part, independent of ones'
controlled, purposeful thoughts. Building on previous research (e.g., Block & Block,
2006; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a; Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling,
Palfai, & Ostafin, 2007; Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007), the primary
objective of the present dissertation is to investigate the role of chronic as well as
situationally induced psychological needs or motivations in predicting political ideology,
in particular, political liberalism.
Overview
The present research will investigate why people adopt certain political ideologies
(i.e., liberal vs. conservative). To address this issue, four studies will examine what
chronic social-cognitive needs or motives relate to ideological preferences and whether
situational influences that heighten these needs can motivate people to gravitate in favour
of liberalism versus conservatism.
1
2Previous research examining political ideologies has found that political
conservatism is associated with a number of social-cognitive needs (e.g., Altemeyer,
1998; Fibert & Ressler, 1998; Jost etaI., 2007; Kemmelmeier, 1997; Tetlock, 1984;
Thorisdottir et aI., 2007). In a meta-analytic review, Jost, Glaser et al. (2003a) employed
a motivated social cognition approach in order to examine the influence of both
individual differences and situational factors on conservatism. These researchers
hypothesized that individuals embrace conservative ideologies to fulfill a number of
social-cognitive needs or motives. While their review demonstrates the substantial body'
of evidence concerning political conservatism, it is clear that individual differences and
situational factors reflective of social-cognitive needs or motives associated with political
liberalism have largely been unexplored in the literature. That is, by focussing on the
political conservatism side of the spectrum, and not considering the political liberalism
side, there might be other needs of political orientation that have been overlooked.
The first two studies in this dissertation aim to fill this gap in the research by
investigating- chronic individual differences reflective of social-cognitive needs or
motives that might relate to political liberalism. Psychological theories of ideology,
research examining political conservatism, and experimental research examining
differences between liberals and conservatives suggest that there are four main groups of
psychological needs associated with political liberalism: Need for Inclusiveness, Need for
Understanding, Need for Change, and Avoidance of Decisional Commitment. Findings
from the first two studies will help illuminate the types of needs related to political
liberalism.
3To adequately understand why people embrace particular ideologies, it is essential
to examine the effects of situational factors that heighten social-cognitive needs or
motives associated with liberalism, in addition to chronic individual differences reflective
of these needs. To investigate this issue, the needs proposed to be associated with
liberalism will be used as manipulated independent variables in Studies 3 and 4. I predict
that situations characterized by needs associated with liberalism will elicit greater
endorsement of liberalism. For example, if a Need for Inclusiveness is related to
liberalism, then a situational manipulation producing high versus low Need for
Inclusiveness should be associated with increased endorsement of a liberal ideology in
the high need condition. Therefore, the aim of the third and fourth studies is to examine
the effects of situational factors indicative of needs associated with liberalism on the
endorsement of a liberal ideology. Study 4 will address this question by employing
separate measures ofpolitical liberalism and political conservatism in order to test
whether Need for Inclusiveness is distinctly linked with political liberalism. In summary,
the present research will provide insight into how political ideologies, especially
liberalism, fulfill chronic individual difference as well as situationally induced needs.
This dissertation will first review psychological theories associated with
liberalism and conservatism. Then, a motivated social cognition perspective, which is
used as a framework for investigating the dispositional (Studies 1 and 2) and situational
(Studies 3 and 4) needs that influence individuals' endorsement of liberalism, will be
discussed. Hypotheses concerning the needs related to political liberalism will then be
generated from psychological theories of ideology, empirical research on conservatism,
4and experimental research on differences between liberals and conservatives. Finally, an
overview of the potential moderating role ofpolitical sophistication will be presented.
Psychological Theories of Political Ideology
This section will focus on psychological theories of political ideology that
propose reasons for why individuals adopt liberal or conservative ideologies. Ideology
can be defined as, "an interrelated set of moral and political attitudes that possesses
cognitive, affective, and motivational components ... ideology helps to explain why
people do what they do; it organizes their values and beliefs and leads to political
behaviour" (Jost, 2006, p. 653; Tedin, 1987). According to Kerlinger (1984),
conservatives typically value ideals such as religion, tradition, freedom (excluding
equality), private property, established institutions, stability, and authority. In contrast,
liberals tend to value change, social reform, equality, rights of minorities and women,
internationalism, and government aid. More specifically, Kerlinger defined liberalism as,
a set of political, economic, religious, educational and other social beliefs that
emphasizes freedom of the individual, constitutional participatory government
and democracy, the rule of law, free negotiation, discussion and tolerance of
different views, constructive social progress and change, egalitarianism and the
rights of minorities, secular rationality and rational approaches to social problems,
and positive government action to remedy social deficiencies and to improve
human welfare (Kerlinger, 1984, p. 15).
And defined conservatism as,
a set of political, economic, religious, educational, and other social beliefs
characterized by emphasis on the status quo and social stability, religion and
5morality, liberty and freedom, the natural inequality of men, the uncertainty of
progress, and the weakness of human reason. It is further characterized by distrust
of popular democracy and majority rule and by support of individualism and
individual initiative, the sanctity of private property, and the central importance of
business and industry in the society (Kerlinger, 1984, p. 17).
The present dissertation will employ a motivated social cognition approach in an
attempt to understand why individuals adopt liberal ideologies. However, to understand
why this approach is most suited for the present research, an examination of other
psychological theories of ideology is necessary. Thus, this section will begin with a
discussion of psychological theories explaining both liberalism and conservatism, then
move to a discussion of theories of conservatism, and conclude with an overview of the
approach to be employed in the present dissertation, a motivated social cognition
approach.
General Psychological Theories ofPolitical Ideology
Few psychological theories investigating ideology examine the origins of
ideologies in general. Kruglanski's (1989) lay epistemic theory, a cognitive theory, is one
exception. According to lay epistemic theory, subjective knowledge and beliefs are
formed in a two stage process of active information-seeking consisting of information
generation and testing. The process by which knowledge and beliefs become more
permanent depends on epistemic motivations. According to Kruglanski (1989), there are
four types of epistemic motivations. The first is a need for non-specific closure
representing a desire for a concrete and final belief regardless of what that belief might be
(e.g., need for cognitive closure). Second, the need for specific closure represents the
6desire for a concrete belief about something in a specific direction (e.g., want to believe
you did well on the test). Next, a need to avoid non-specific closure represents a desire to
avoid forming any concrete beliefs (e.g., prefer ambiguity, confusion, or open-
mindedness; Kruglanski, 1990). Lastly, a need to avoid specific closure represents the
desire to avoid accepting something specific (e.g., want to avoid believing that you did
poorly on a test). Many factors could foster these motivations and these factors could
vary depending on the person, the situation, and the culture. Although lay epistemic
theory could be applied to either liberalism or conservatism, this theory and its emphasis
on a need for cognitive closure has been primarily explored in explaining political
conservatism (e.g., Jost, Glaser et aI., 2003a; Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999;
Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Specifically, according to lay epistemic theory, individuals
high in a need for cognitive closure should prefer an ideology that provides clarity and
definitive answers. A conservative ideology might provide this definitiveness.
Tomkins' (1963,1965,1987,1995) theory of ideo-affective polarity also
examines the origins and implications of both left- and right-wing ideologies. The theory
emphasizes the importance of affect and motivation in ideology formation. Tomkins
(1965, 1995) maintained that ideological belief systems pertain to all areas of peoples'
lives and knowing how they think about one area (e.g., education) allows you to predict
how they think about another (e.g., health care). According to this theory, individuals
who believe that people are essentially good and that society should help people grow,
develop left-wing ideologies, assessed with the, humanistic subscale of Tomkins' Polarity
Scale. In contrast, individuals who believe people are essentially bad and that societies
should set rules and demand responsible behaviour, develop right-wing ideologies,
7assessed with the normative subscale of Tomkins' Polarity Scale. In support of Tomkins'
theory, de St. Aubin (1996) reported that individuals who scored high on the normative
subscale also scored higher on conservatism, whereas individuals who scored high on the
humanism subscale scored higher on liberalism. Other researchers have found that
individuals' score on the Polarity Scale correlates with their self-placement on an
ideological continuum (Loye, 1977); and individuals' placement of Republican and
Democratic political candidates was consistent with the normative-humanism distinction
(Carlson & Brincka, 1987).
Another example of a psychological theory explaining both liberalism and
conservatism is regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998), which asserts that
ideological preference is dependent upon care-taking style. This theory identifies two
psychological systems that are related to different kinds of goals. The promotion system
governs those goals concerned with a person's advancement, growth, and aspirations
(i.e., nurturance-related regulation). Promotion care-taking styles are characterized by
encouragement and include an emphasis on positive outcomes and withholding love as a
form of discipline. The prevention system governs those goals concerned with a person's
safety, security, and responsibilities (i.e., security-related regulation). A prevention care-
taking style is characterized by protection including an emphasis on avoiding negative
outcomes and the use of punishment as a form of discipline. Thus, depending on care-
taking style, prevention versus promotion, individuals will develop different ideological
orientati<?ns such that individuals exposed to a promotion care-taking style are predicted
to adopt more liberal ideologies, and individuals exposed to a prevention style of care-
taking are thought to develop more conservative ideologies. In support of this theory,
8research has shown that framing events as prevention versus promotion focussed leads
individuals to embrace a cognitively conservative orientation versus a more open
orientation (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999).
Some theories that account for the endorsement of all ideological orientations
have overwhelmingly been applied to conservatism: one example is Terror Management
Theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986). Terror management theory
proposes that cultures and worldviews serve to buffer anxiety stemming from a fear of
death. Specifically, Greenberg et al. (1986) claim that if mortality is salient, one's
particular worldview (e.g., liberalism or conservatism) will become more deeply
endorsed in order to buffer this anxiety. Although terror management theory hypothesizes
that mortality salience will foster stronger liberal or conservative ideological convictions
depending on an individuals' pre-existing tendency, this theory has primarily been
applied to conservative ideology. For example, in support of terror management theory,
research has shown that when mortality is salient, conservative individuals do behave
more conservatively (Greenberg et aI., 1990; but see Jost, Fitzsimons, & Kay, 2004).
A theory that is much more specific to political ideology is the ideologue
hypothesis (Rokeach, 1956, 1960). The ideologue hypothesis was proposed to counter the
rigidity of the right hypothesis. Essentially, the rigidity of the right hypothesis (Adorno,
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) is a theory of conservatism that suggests
that individuals adopt conservative ideologies in an effort to cope with psychodynamic
conflicts originating from childhood. According to this hypothesis, adopting a
conservative ideology involving rigid thinking, such as viewing issues as dichotomous,
meets ego-defensive needs. In contrast, the ideologue hypothesis suggests that the rigidity
9of the right hypothesis ignores the authoritarianism of those on the extreme left, and thus
maintains that individuals on the extreme left and right of the political spectrum are more
similar to each other than individuals in the centre (i.e., moderates) (Rokeach, 1956,
1960; see also Altemeyer, 1996 and Tetlock, 1984 for a discussion).
Both the ideologue and rigidity of the right hypotheses operate on the assumption
that it is possible to examine political beliefs with a single left-right continuum (Tetlock,
1989). However, Tetlock (1989) points out that it is relatively easy to find people who are
liberal on social policies and conservative on others. For instance, Johnson and Tamney
(2001) found two groups of conservatives: social conservatives and economic
conservatives. This observation suggests that a uni-dimensional continuum fails to assess
important differences among individuals' political ideologies. Tetlock (1989) proposed
that in order to adequately understand and research political ideology, a model must
account for multidimensional variations in political attitudes (i.e., assess political
ideology beyond a single continuum), focus on social-cognitive processes that foster
complex political thought, and yield specific hypotheses concerning political ideology
and various domains. The value pluralism model aims to fulfill these three objectives.
The value pluralism model assumes that the major ideological movements vary in
the importance they denote to values such as individual freedom and social equality
(Tetlock, 1983, 1984, 1989). Whereas conservatives attach most value to individual
freedom, liberals are thought to appreciate numerous values that are often in competition
with one another. In other words, liberals often have values such as individual freedom
competing with social'equality values. For example, a liberal might assign high value to
universal health care and lowering taxes. Therefore, liberals (i.e., those who subscribe to
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pluralistic ideologies) might be forced to use integratively complex thought in order to
satisfy their many competing values (Tetlock, 1983, 1984, 1989). This explanation would·
account for the reported higher use of cognitively complex statements by liberals
compared to conservatives (e.g., Tetlock, 1983).
Most of the theories of ideology described so far (lay epistemic theory, ideo-
affective polarity theory, regulatory focus theory, terror management theory, the
ideologue hypothesis, and the value pluralism model) account for the origins of both
liberalism and conservatism, yet research on these theories tends to focus on
understanding political conservatism to the exclusion of liberalism. Further, an even
greater number of psychological theories of ideology are more specific theories of
political conservatism. These theories are reviewed next.
Theories ofConservatism
Most theories investigating ideology focus entirely on conservatism. Many have
suggested that the two core aspects of political conservatism are resistance to change and
acceptance of inequality (e.g., Bobbio, 1996; Conover & Feldman, 1981; Jost, Glaser et
aI., 2003a; Kerlinger, 1984). This section will outline theories of conservatism including
personality theories, cognitive theories, and socio-political theories.
The general principle of personality theories is that a politically conservative
orientation is the result of basic personality traits. The rigidity of the right hypothesis was
one of the first theories of ideology derived mainly from studies on an authoritarian
personality (Adorno et aI., 1950). One of the most recognized theories associated with a
conservative orientation and the rigidity of the right hypothesis is right-wing
authoritarianism (RWA). This theory states that socialleaming (e.g., from interaction
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with parents, peers, etc.) emphasizing submission to authority, aggressiveness, and
conventionalism contributes to an authoritarian outlook (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996).
According to Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996), RWA is an ideology characterised by a high
degree of submission to legitimate authority, aggressiveness, and adherence to social
norms. Research supporting this theory has demonstrated that individuals high in RWA
are more likely to be conservative, hold prejudicial attitudes, blame victims, sanction
illegal actions by governments, have parents who frequently spanked them and had
higher levels of parental anger (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998), contest abortion
rights, diversity, and services for the homeless (Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993), and use
punitive parenting techniques (Peterson, Smirles, & Wentworth, 1997). Although this
ideology is characteristic of some conservatives, authoritarianism is not synonymous with
conservatism (Crowson, Thoma, & Hestevold, 2005). For example, Crowson et al. (2005)
argued that RWA is best conceptualized as a type of conservatism, but not necessarily
characteristic of all conservatives.
Similarly, the theory of intolerance of ambiguity (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949)
suggests that certain individuals tend to rely on things and ideas that are familiar to the~
and utilize stereotypes to eliminate perceptions of ambiguity. Frenkel-Brunswik (1949)
reported an association between intolerance of ambiguity and rigid social categorizing as
well as prejudice. Some research has supported Frenkel-Brunswik's (1949) theory. For
example, researchers have found a relationship between intolerance of ambiguity and
authoritarianism (Fibert & Ressler, 1998). Intolerance of ambiguity is thought to be
characteristic of individuals who hold conservative ideologies.
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.Finally, according to the dynamic theory of conservatism as uncertainty
avoidance (Wilson, 1973), conservatism can be viewed as the outcome of genetic and
environmental factors related to fear and anxiety. Wilson (1973) asserted that people who
are more susceptible to experiencing threat or anxiety brought about by uncertainty tend
to adopt a conservative attitude. Evidence for his theory has shown that individuals high
in conservatism prefer less complex and less ambiguous stimuli (e.g., Gillies &
Campbell, 1985; Glasgow & Cartier, 1985). In summary, several different theories
maintain that conservative ideologies are linked with specific personality traits or
individual differences such as RWA, intolerance of ambiguity, and uncertainty
avoidance.
In contrast to the personality theories, some theories of conservatism are socio-
political in nature and emphasize societal-level factors and the various ideological and/or
psychological functions political conservative ideologies perform. One of the most well
known of these theories is social dominance theory (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, &
Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Social dominance theory states that people seek to
minimize group conflict using ideological beliefs that rationalize the dominance of one
group over another (i.e., hierarchy-enhancing myths). According to social dominance
theory, the ideological belief in the supremacy of certain groups over others is determined
by both biology and socialization. Pratto et ale (1994) created a scale to measure
individual differences in social dominance beliefs. Individuals scoring high on the Social
Dominance Orientation (SDO) Scale exhibit a high desire to preserve the existing
dominance of high-status groups, or a preference for inequality in intergroup relations. In
support of social dominance theory, research has shown that high scores on SDO relate to
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high scores on variables such as prejudicial attitudes, conservatism, beliefs in sexism, and
opposition to women's rights, gay and lesbian rights, and support for military programs·
(Altemeyer, 1998; Pratto et aI., 1994).
Another socio-political approach to conservatism is system justification theory
(Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Jost, Pelham, &
Carvallo, 2002). System justification theory predicts that people should be motivated to
defend their social system even if they are victims of it (e.g., low income individ.uals in
need of publicly funded health care defending conservative policies promoting private
health care). System justification theory is based in part on cognitive dissonance theory
(Festinger, 1957) and just world theory (Lerner, 1980). For example, the theory states
that when individuals ?lYe confronted with a system that conflicts with their personal goals
they might minimize their dissonance by increasing their support of the same system that
oppresses them (e.g., a female accounting student endorsing stereotypes that women are
poor at math compared to men). This action in turn maintains the status quo and
inequality (Jost, 1995). In summary, system justification theory tries to explain why
people support a social system that sustains their disadvantaged group status or conflicts
with their personal or group's needs. One example of a system justifying ideology is
political conservatism (i.e., involving rationalization of the status quo and acceptance of
inequality). In recent years, a growing body of research has supported system justification
theory. Support includes research demonstrating that members of disadvantaged groups
tend to accept and legitimize their situation (Haines & Jost, 2000) and provide ideological
support for the social system (e.g., conservative ideologies) that maintains their
marginalized status (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003).
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According to Jost, Glaser et al. (2003a), current theories of political conservatism
are insufficient for investigating the psychological origins of political ideology. They
propose that a motivated social cognition approach would effectively unify diverse
theories and findings concerning political conservatism.
Motivated Social Cognition
According to a. motivated social cognition approach (Kruglanski, 1996),
motivational and cognitive systems are theoretically independent and address unique
areas; however, because elements of both systems are "inextricably intertwined" (p. 493)
it is impractical to separate them (Kruglanski, 1996). These systems are linked in that
motivation has cognitive elements and cognition has motivational elements. Specifically,
motivational variables such as arousal, rewards, and interests influence cognition
(Kruglanski, 1996). For example, high interest in a topic will determine how much a
person thinks about that topic (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Similarly, cognitive
variables such as encoding, memory retrieval, and judgment influence motivation
(Kruglanski, 1996). For example, cognitive activity such as goal setting can foster an
intrinsic motivation to' attain a particular goal (Kruglanski, 1996). In general, a motivated
social cognition approach states that individuals' motivations influence their thought
processes in a variety of ways, and in turn their thought processes influence their
motivations.
Motivated Social Cognition and Conservatism
Motivated social cognition has been applied to a variety of topics; however, Jost,
Glaser et al. (2003a) are the first to use it to examine political ideology. They argue that
certain epistemic, existential, and ideological needs are all related to the expression of
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political conservatism~ According to these authors, epistemic needs or motives such as
uncertainty avoidance, intolerance of ambiguity, and need for cognitive closure lead to
conservatism because they influence how individuals overcome feelings of uncertainty
and fear. Similarly, existential needs or motives such as fear of death and prevention of
loss lead to conservatism because these needs foster a resistance to change in order to
reduce a sense of uncertainty and insecurity (Jost, Glaser et aI., 2003a). Finally,
ideological needs or motives underlying conservatism such as system justification serve
to reduce feelings of uncertainty and relieve feelings of threat and worthlessness (e.g.,
Abelson, 1995; Altemeyer, 1998). Based on theoretical and empirical considerations,
Jost, Glaser et ai. (2003a) concluded that the three types of needs emerge because of
psychological efforts to cope with feelings of uncertainty and fear. The needs proposed in
this model are hypothesized to relate to two core aspects of conservatism, resistance to
change and sanction of inequality.
Jost, Glaser et al. (2003a) maintain that a motivated social cognition perspective
will overcome two primary limitations of traditional theories of political conservatism.
First, a motivated social cognition approach differentiates between psychological and
ideological variables. Second, it can account for the influence of situational factors on
ideology. The majority of theories to date examining political ideology ignore the
influences of situational factors (e.g., threat, fear, etc., induced by specific events). In
contrast, one of the main premises of the motivated social cognition approach to political
conservatism is that politically conservative orientations are mUltiply determined by both
situational and dispositional variables.
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Individual Differences and Conservatism
Jost, Glaser et al. (2003a) provide empirical support for the use of a motivated
social cognition approach for investigating political conservatism. Most of the support
provided by Jost, Glaser et ai. (2003a) comes from meta-analyses of the relations
between individual differences in needs and measures of political conservatism. These
meta-analyses show considerable evidence for the notion that individuals adopt
conservative ideologies in order to satisfy their feelings of uncertainty and fear. Overall,
the meta-analytic review by Jost, Glaser et ai. (2003a) found that conservatism was
associated with a number of individual difference variables related to epistemic needs
such as intolerance of ambiguity (e.g., Wilson, Ausman, & Mathews, 1973), openness to
experience (e.g., Jost & Thompson, 2000; Pratto et aI., 1994; Van Riel & Mervielde,
2004), need for cognitive closure (e.g., Jost et aI., 1999), and lower levels of integrative
complexity (e.g., Hinze, Doster, & Joe, 1997; Sidanius, 1984,1985,1988; Tetlock,
1984). For example, research has shown that conservatives prefer less complex paintings
(Wilson et aI., 1973), simple poems (Gillies & Campbell, 1985), and plausible versus
implausible literary texts (McAllister & Anderson, 1991). The meta-analyses also
supported the notion that conservatives have a personal need for order and structure (e.g.,
Altemeyer, 1998) and need for cognitive closure (e.g., Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). For
example, need for cognitive closure is associated with preservation of the status quo
(Golec, 2001, as cited in Jost, Glaser et aI., 2003a; see Golec de Zavala & Van Bergh,
2007) and authoritarianism (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
Additionally~ the meta-analytic review by Jost, Glaser et ai. (2003a) found
conservatism to be associated with several individual differences reminiscent of the
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hypothesized underlying existential needs such as fear, anger and aggression (e.g.,
Lavine, Polichak, & Lodge, 1999, as cited in Jost, Glaser et aI., 2003a), as well as
pessimism, disgust, and contempt (e.g., Carlson & Brincka, 1987; Williams, 1984). For
example, Altemeyer (1998) found a positive relation between individuals' recall of their
parents' anger and their reported level of authoritarianism.
In summary, there are a number of individual differences that relate to political
conservatism, and many of these individual differences can be interpreted as indicators of
the various social-cognitive needs that Jost, Glaser et ai. (2003a) propose influence
individuals' adoption of a politically conservative ideology. Recall that a motivated social
cognition approach also contends that situational variables that increase the salience of
certain needs contribute to political conservatism. Thus, the next section will focus on the
relationship between situational variables and a politically conservative ideology.
Situational Influences on Conservatism
There is evidence that situational variables can, in general, impact ideology. For
example, Kim and Fording (2001) analysed shifts in voter ideology in 13 western
democracies from 1952 to 1989. They found that inflation was an important predictor of
political ideology. Specifically, increases in inflation predicted increases in support of the
political ideology of the party not in power. Further, the political party ideology of
neighbouring countries also had an influence on voter ideology such that voters tended to
support ideologies characteristic of parties like those in power of neighbouring countries.
Also, international tensions influenced voter political ideology and varied across time.
For example, Kim and Fording found that whereas the Cold War shifted voter ideology to
18
the right, the 1970s saw a shift to the left. These results imply that situational variables do
impact people's political ideology.
Jost, Glaser et aI. (2003a) theorized that situations salient in needs related to
conservatism will increase individuals' endorsement of a conservative ideology. Their
meta-analysis showed .strong support for this hypothesis. Specifically, they found that
various situationally induced needs such as threat to self-esteem (e.g., Sales & Friend,
1973), fear, anger, and aggression (e.g., Lavine et aI., 1999, as cited in Jost, Glaser et aI.,
2003a), fear and prevention of loss (e.g., Crowe & Higgins, 1997), fear of death (e.g.,
Greenberg et aI., 1990), and threats to the stability of the social system (e.g., Doty,
Peterson, & Winter, 1991; Rickert, 1998; Sales, 1972; 1973) fostered endorsement of
conservatism or orientations associated with conservatism. For example, framing events
in terms of losses (e.g., Liberman et aI., 1999) and providing false negative feedback
(e.g., Sales & Friend, 1973) increase conservatism. Lavine et aI. (1999, as cited in Jost,
Glaser et aI., 2003a), for instance, gave participants messages that either emphasised the
rewards of voting or the costs of not voting five days prior to the 1996 U.S. presidential
election. They found that those high in authoritarianism were influenced more so by the
cost messages, whereas those low in authoritarianism responded to reward messages.
Further, Crowe and Higgins (1997) successfully fostered a prevention focus by stressing
losses rather than gains. This focus was associated with conservative and repetitive
responses, greater likelihood to give up on a task, and poorer performance on complex
tasks. Finally, research has shown that manipulating a high need for cognitive closure is
related to social stereotyping (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983) and rejecting individuals who
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express opinions that deviate from the group (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991), behaviours
which could be considered characteristic of conservatism.
In addition to research cited in lost, Glaser et al.'s (2003a) review, lost et al.
(2004) studied the impact of situational variables on ideology. Specifically, lost et ale
(2004) examined the effects of mortality salience on individuals' endorsement of
conservatism. Participants were exposed to either a mortality salience condition or a
control condition, and then their opinions concerning current political issues were
assessed. Terror management theory would predict that liberals would become more
liberal following mortality salience and conservatives would become more conservative.
In contrast, system justification theory and Jost, Glaser et al.'s (2003a) motivated social
cognition approach would predict that both liberal and conservative individuals would
become more conservative following a mortality salience prime. Results showed that
regardless of their political orientation, all participants tended to become more
conservative when mortality was salient, suggesting that situationally induced existential
factors can influence the expressions and endorsement of conservative political ideology.
Moreover, using time-series analyses Willer (2004) found that increased terror
warnings were related to higher (although short lived) approval ratings for George W.
Bush. Presumably, the terror warnings served as a mortality prime, fostering greater
endorsement of conservatism. Similarly, Landau et al. (2004) examined the influence of
reminders of 9/11 on support for government leaders. Their results (Study 3) showed that
participants who were asked to write about 9/11 reported greater support for President
Bush compared to those in a control condition (see also Cohen, Ogilvie, Solomon,
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2005).
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In summary, research supports Jost, Glaser et al.'s (2003a) motivated social
cognition approach by showing that conservative ideology is associated with both
individual differences and situational variables that presumably reflect the needs
hypothesized to underlie conservatism. However, their interpretation of the lite~ature is
not without criticism. Greenberg and Jonas (2003) for example, disagree with the notion
proposed by Jost, Glaser et al. (2003a) that individuals,manage uncertainty and fear by
adopting a conservative ideology. Instead, Greenberg and Jonas state that individuals
could adopt a rigid ideology, left-wing or right-wing, to manage uncertainty and fear. In
particular, they. propose that the differences in ideology represent alternate strategies of
coping with negative aspects of peoples' lives.
What is also clear from the Jost, Glaser et al. (2003a) review is that factors
indicative of social-cognitive needs or motives associated with political liberalism have
largely been unexplored. Although liberalism is often situated at the opposing end of
conservatism on a continuum, it "is not just the opposite of conservative" (Kerlinger,
1967, p. 112). In other words, even though liberals and conservatives may show some
opposing tendencies, they do not necessarily mirror one another on all inclinations.
Previous researchers (e.g., Conover & Feldman, 1981; Kerlinger, 1967, 1984) have
shown that antecedents of identifying oneself as politically liberal are often conceptually
distinct from those predicting self-identification as a political conservative. Conover and
Feldman (1981) concluded that liberals and conservatives have unique political
perspectives, and that, "liberals and conservatives view the political world not from
different sides of the same coin, but ... from the perspective of entirely different
currencies" (p. 204). Thus, some of the psychological needs or motivations that
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encourage individuals to adopt politically liberal ideologies might be different - not just
opposite - from those that foster politically conservative ideologies (this is examined in
more detail in Study 4 using separate measures of political liberalism and conservatism).
The present dissertation will address the current concentration on political conservatism
in the psychological literature by focussing on political liberalism, using a motivated
social cognition approach to political ideology.
Motivated Social Cognition. Perspective and Political Liberalism
A motivated social cognition approach predicts that various chronic needs or
motivations and situat~onal influences that heighten thes~ needs encourage individuals to
adopt a liberal ideology. However, unlike Jost, Glaser et al.'s (2003a) motivated social
cognition analysis of conservative ideology in which there are numerous theories and
empirical findings to guide hypotheses about the needs underlying conservatism, there
are relatively fewer theories and empirical studies from which to base similar hypotheses
concerning liberalism. Consequently, hypotheses in this dissertation concerning
liberalism are necessarily more exploratory. My hypotheses were constructed from three
primary sources. The first source is general psychological theories of political ideology.
Second, empirical research investigating political conservatism was also consulted (with
the idea that research utilized variables that may offer some insight on individuals
presumably low in liberalism). Finally, empirical research examining differences between
liberals and conservatives, most of which is experimental, were used to generate
hypotheses.
A review of the three literatures mentioned above led me to hypothesize that there
are four groups of related psychological needs that are associated with political
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liberalism. For the purpose of the present dissertation, I have labelled these categories:
Needfor Inclusiveness, Needfor Understanding, Needfor Change, and Avoidance of
Decisional Commitment. The following section will outline existing evidence for the
predicted relations.
Needfor Inclusiveness
The first social-cognitive need proposed to be associated with political liberalism
is a Need for Inclusiveness, or a desire to nurture and assist others, and be inclusive rather
than exclusive. This group includes related needs such as a need for nurturance, need for
inclusion, and need for affiliation. The prediction that liberals will be higher in these
related needs is based on theories of ideology (e.g., ideo-affective polarity theory,
Tomkins, 1963, 1965, 1987, 1995), empirical research examining political conservatism
(e.g., Peterson et aI., 1993), and research examining differences between liberals and
conservatives (e.g., Skitka, 1999).
Needfor Nurturance .
According to some theories of ideology, it is likely that liberals have a higher
need for nurturance compared to conservatives. For example, ideo-affective theory
(Tomkins, 1963, 1965, 1987, 1995) states that individuals who believe people are good
and that society should help people grow develop liberal ideologies, implying that
liberals have a greater need for nurturance. Also, regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997,
1998) claims that individuals exposed to a promotion care-taking style, which governs
goals concerned with advancement, growth, and aspirations, will develop a promotion
focus, or more liberal ideology. Exposure to this care-taking style would likely promote a
need for nurturance because of the emphasis on fostering growth and accomplishment.
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Empirical research focussing on conservatism provides additional evidence that
liberals have a higher need or motivation for nurturance. Research has shown that
individuals who score high on the normative subscale of Tomkins' (1964) Polarity Scale
express greater disgust and less sympathy towards welfare recipients compared to those
low on the normative scale (e.g., Williams, 1984). Furthermore, other research (e.g.,
Peterson et aI., 1993) has found that higher authoritarianism is associated with opposition
to services for groups such as AIDS patients and the homeless. Also, Pratto et aI. (1994)
found that individuals scoring low on SDO had greater concern for others. Given that
liberals can be expected to score lower on authoritarianism (as authoritarianism and
conservatism are positively related; Crowson et aI., 2005), SDO (as SDO and
conservatism are positively related; Pratto et aI., 1994), and on the normative scale
compared to conservatives (e.g., Peterson et aI., 1993; Williams, 1984), these results
suggest that liberals might have a greater need for nurturance.
Research on differences between liberals' and conservatives' responses to social
and political situations also provides substantial evidence that liberals have a greater need
for nurturance. One research area that provides a great deal of support is the literature
demonstrating that liberals are more likely to experience sympathy for and more likely to
be in support of, or provide assistance to, others in need of aid compared to conservatives
(e.g., Feather, 1985; Kluegel, 1990; Pellegrini, Queirolo, Monarrez, & Valenzuela, 1997;
Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2005; Skitka & Tetlock, 1992; 1993; Sniderman
& Tetlock, 1986). For example, a study conducted by Skitka, McMurray, and Burroughs
(1991) examined how conservatives' and liberals' attributions of responsibility for the
Persian Gulf War and affective reactions influenced their willingness to provide post-war
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assistance to Iraq and Kuwait. Liberalism was found to be related to providing aid to both
Iraq and Kuwait, a lower likelihood of attributing Iraqi responsibility for the war, and
more sympathy for the Iraqi people compared to conservatives. Furthermore, in a
multiple regression analysis, liberalism (and not RWA), predicted providing aid to Iraq,
over and above attributions of Iraqi responsibility for the war.
A follow up study by Skitka and Tetlock (1992) found that the relation between
political ideology and willingness to assist personally responsible claimants was
dependent upon the availability of necessary resources. Results indicated that under
scarcity, both liberals and conservatives denied aid to personally responsible claimants.
However, conservatives did so in a more punitive style. Under scarcity, conservatives
reported higher levels of negative affect for personally responsible claimants, whereas
liberals tended to report greater feelings of sympathy for all claimants. Therefore,
consistent with other research (e.g., Skitka et aI., 1991), liberals and conservatives seem
to diverge under conditions of no scarcity in their willingness to give aid and, overall, in
their emotional reactions to claimants such that liberals are more sympathetic in general
and more willing to give aid to everyone who needs help when they can (no scarcity).
One interpretation of results showing that liberals are more sympathetic toward and
provide more assistance to those in need, at least under scarcity, is that liberals do so
because they have a greater desire to nurture others.
Although a need for nurturance seems plausible for explaining the above findings
(Skitka et aI., 1991; Skitka & Tetlock, 1992), there could be alternative explanations. One
such explanation is that liberals "mindlessly" assist all claimants under no scarcity.
Research conducted by Skitka and Tetlock (1993) however, does not support this
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explanation. Specifically, their results showed that liberals continued to assist all
claimants under no scarcity even when prompted to think carefully about each claimant.
A second alternative explanation is that liberals and conservatives follow a
situational-script (i.e., practised ideological or attributional positions). To investigate this
possibility, Skitka (1999) examined differences in providing aid in the event of a natural
disaster, or an event that does not have predetermined scripts for liberals and
conservatives. Skitka (1999) manipulated the responsibility of communities and
individual claimants. Consistent with other research (e.g., Skitka & Tetlock, 1992, 1993),
results showed that liberals were more in favour of providing aid in all forms (e.g.,
assisting with basic and secondary needs) and less likely to believe that responsibility
rested on each community to cope with the disaster. Liberals were also more likely than
conservatives to support providing aid and more likely to provide humanitarian aid to
those (individuals and communities) who acted irresponsibly. Liberals viewed claimants
who were less responsible as more deserving of aid than did conservatives. Similar
patterns were found for communities. Generally, results suggested that liberals do not
follow a situational-script because liberals continue to allocate more aid than
conservatives even in the absence of predetermined scripts (see also Skitka, Mullen,
Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002).
Overall, theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that liberals have a greater
need for nurturance. In particular, psychological theories of ideology including polarity
theory (Tomkins, 1963, 1965, 1987, 1995) and regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997,
1998), empirical findings on conservatism, and findings from the differences between
liberals and conservatives in responses to giving aid (e.g., Skitka et aI., 1991; Skitka &
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Tetlock, 1992, 1993) ~upport the prediction that liberals have a greater need for
nurturance.
Needfor Inclusion
The second concept in the category ofNeed for Inclusiveness I have called need
for inclusion. Social dominance theory offers some theoretical support that those
individuals who value equality (i.e., low SDO) have a higher need for inclusion. Recall
that social dominance theory maintains that people attempt to minimize group conflict
using ideological beliefs that rationalize the dominance of one group over another (i.e.,
utilize hierarchy-enhancing myths; Pratto et aI., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
Individuals high in SDO attempt to preserve the existing dominance of high-status
groups. In other words, individuals who are high in SDO tend to be exclusive by denying
low status groups rights and power; whereas individuals low in SDO might tend to be
inclusive and attempt to secure equality for all individuals regardless of their in-group,
out-group status. That is, individuals low in SDO might prefer hierarchy-attenuating
myths, or beliefs that endorse intergroup equality (see Pratto et aI., 1994). Given that high
SDOs tend to be more conservative (Pratto et aI., 1994), low SDOs are presumably
higher in liberalism. Thus, individuals high in liberalism likely have a greater desire to be
inclusive and to treat others equally.
There is also evidence that liberals are more inclusive than conservatives in the
literature examining politically conservative ideologies. Crandall and colleagues (1994;
Crandall & Biernat, 1990), for instance, reported that political conservatives tend to hold
greater anti-fat attitudes compared to liberals. Further, research has found that individuals
high on authoritarianism are higher on prejudicial attitudes (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988,
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1996, 1998; Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; Esses & Hodson, 2006;
Hodson & Esses, 2005; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007), and are opposed to diversity on
university campuses (Peterson et aI., 1993). Similarly, individuals who score high on
SDO have been found to be high in prejudicial attitudes (Altemeyer, 1998; Esses &
Hodson, 2006; Hodson & Esses, 2005; Sibley, Robertson, & Wilson, 2006; Sibley et aI.,
2007), be unsupportive of women's rights, racial equality, affirmative action, and gay and
lesbian rights, and score lower on measures of tolerance (Pratto et aI., 1994).
Furthermore, a study by Esses, Hodson, and Dovidio (2003) showed that resistance to an
inclusive, one-group representation of immigrants and non-immigrants fully explained
the link between SDO and negative attitudes toward immigrants. Therefore, individuals
high in authoritarianism and SDO demonstrate behaviours and attitudes that could be
characterised as exclusive, whereas individuals low in authoritarianism and SDO tend to
demonstrate behaviours and attitudes that are inclusive in nature (see also Hodson, in
press; Hodson, Choma, & Costello, 2008). To the extent that liberals are lower on RWA
and SDO than are conservatives, liberals should have a higher need for inclusion.
Empirical research investigating differences between liberals and conservatives
offers additional support for the prediction that liberals have a greater need for inclusion.
Specifically, this body of research suggests that liberals tend to treat everyone equally, a
behaviour that is indicative of inclusiveness. For example, the literature on the
differences between liberals' and conservatives' aid allocation patterns discussed earlier
(e.g., Skitka, 1999; Skitka, et aI., 1991; Skitka & Tetlock, 1992) generally finds that
liberals tend to be more inclusive and egalitarian than conservatives with their helping
behaviour, often assisting as many claimants as possible when resources are not scarce
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(e.g., Skitka & Tetlock, 1992). Liberals are also more egalitarian concerning their
feelings towards others in that they experience sympathy for all claimants, regardless of
their attributions of responsibility (e.g., Skitka & Tetlock, 1992).
Research showing that liberals tend to emphasize situational explanations for
attributions of responsibility compared to dispositional ones also implies that liberals
have a greater need for inclusion. For example, studies investigating explanations for
poverty have consistently reported that conservatives attribute poverty, homelessness,
and obesity to personal causes, whereas liberals rely on situational explanations and hold
more positive feelings towards the poor and individuals who are overweight (e.g.,
Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001; Crandall, 1994; Furnham, 1982; Pandey, Sinha,
Prakash, & Tripathi, 1982; Pellegrini et aI., 1997; Wagstaff, 1983; Williams, 1984;
Zucker & Weiner, 1993). Additionally, there is evidence that liberals are simply less
interested with assigning personal blame at all. For instance, Tetlock (1984) found that
liberal politicians tended to be unconcerned with assigning blame for societal problems.
Findings demonstrating that liberals emphasize situational attributions rather than
dispositional ones implies that liberals have a greater need to be inclusive, given that
situational attributions tend to de-emphasize the differences among people (i.e., people
are similarly influenced by different situations) rather than highlighting enduring
individual differences.
Experimental research conducted by Skitka et al. (2002) suggests that the
egalitarian aid allocations, attributions, and sympathy exhibited by liberals might be the
result of a cognitively effortful process, implying a motivation for inclusiveness rather
than, for example, an unmotivated cognitive bias. More specifically, Skitka et al.
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proposed the motivated correction hypothesis, which states that liberals and conservatives
are equally likely to make personal attributions for social problems, but differ in their
motivation to correct for their initial attribution about the causes. Liberals presumably
correct for their initial attribution because it is inconsistent with their core values (e.g.,
equality) and motivations.
To provide evidence that liberals' correction was cognitively effortful, Skitka et
al. (2002, Study 5) explored differences in willingness to provide public assistance as a
function of a manipulation of the level of cognitive load. Results showed that liberals and
conservatives seem to make similar automatic attributions for others' situations. Yet,
liberals are motivated to change their initial attributions when they are in conflict with
their ideological values (e.g., inconsistent with equality). These findings indicate that
liberals' willingness to help might be the result of a cognitively effortful process,
implying a motivation (possibly need for inclusion) rather than, for example, an
unmotivated cognitive bias. This study provides evidence of liberals' strong adherence to
egalitarian values and therefore a link between liberalism and a greater need for inclusion
(see also Nail, Harton, & Decl(er, 2003).
A study by Mitchell, Tetlock, Newman, and Lerner (2003) examining the effects
of varying levels of meritocracy on participants' judgements ofjustice suggests that the
allegation that equality is one of the ideological values liberals hold is correct. Mitchell et
al. manipulated meritocracy using three hypothetical societies. Participants were asked to
judge the fairness of nine distributions of wealth for each type of society. Based on
previous research (e.g., Rohrbaugh, McClelland, & Quinn, 1980), they predicted that in
the society in which effort and ability represent half of a person's socioeconomic status,
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liberals would value equality more than would conservatives, report meritocracy as
lacking, and endorse greater equality. Results from Study 1 suggested that liberals, across
varied meritocracy conditions (income inequality was justified, ambiguous, or
unjustified), viewed more egalitarian distributio'ns as fairer than did conservatives. Study
2 examined more specific elements of redistribution policies that affect an individual's
perceptions of fairness. Results suggested that conservatives utilize an equity-based
evaluation process when making fairness judgements of redistributions of wealth (e.g.,
reported a greater emphasis on workfare), compared to liberals who relied on making the
classes more equal in terms of economic status, even if it meant using inefficient or
wasteful strategies. One explanation for liberals' insistence on treating everyone equally
could be a need for inclusion.
Evidence that liberals tend to be more tolerant of others is also consistent with the
notion that liberals have a greater need for inclusion. Tetlock (1984), for example,
reported that liberals tend to minimize differences among political parties and be tolerant
of others' views. Having greater tolerance of others and their opinions might be
characteristic of a greater need for inclusion.
In summary, research suggests that liberals tend to minimize differences among
people rather than focussing on chronic individual differences, as illustrated in their
tendency to treat people similarly in terms of aid and sympathy, utilize situational
attributions, and endorse egalitarian justice norms. Results also imply that liberals are
more tolerant of others and their opinions. These findings are consistent with liberals
possessing a greater need for inclusion.
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Needfor Affiliation
Another concept included in the overall Need for Inclusiveness category in
addition to a need for nurturance and a need for inclusion, I have called need for
affiliation. I propose that liberals have a higher motivation for affiliation compared to
conservatives. Social psychological research on attraction and relationships supports this
hypothesis. Research has shown that individuals like others who are similar (or perceived
to be similar) to them, who reward them, and who like them (Alcock, Carment, &
Sadava, 1998; see, e.g., Byrne, 1971). Research on the differences between liberals and
conservatives demonstrates that liberals display several behaviours and attitudes that can
be seen as examples of the factors that foster liking in others. For instance, providing aid
is an example of reward, and feeling sympathy (e.g., Skitka & Tetlock, 1992, 1993) could
be an example of liking others. Further, having inclusive or tolerant attitudes could also
be indicative of liking others (e.g., Bierbrauer & Klinger, 2002; Cozzarelli et al., 2001;
Nail et al., 2003; Pellegrini et aI., 1997). These attraction-related behaviours and attitudes
in liberals might be partly indicative of a need to affiliate with others.
Empirical research on political conservatism also implies that liberals demonstrate
behaviours that foster affiliation with others. For example, research by Altemeyer (1981,
1988, 1996, 1998) found that individuals high" in RWA tended to blame victims and
punish deviants more severely compared to individuals low in RWA. Individuals low in
RWA might not blame victims and punish deviants severely because they view victims
and deviants as more similar to themselves than individuals high in RWA. Further,
individuals low in RWA and SDO tend to hold more tolerant attitudes (e.g., Altemeyer,
1996; 1998; Pratto et aI., 1994). Thus, individuals high in liberalism (presumably those
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low in RWA) might view others as similar to themselves because they have a greater
need for affiliation.
Needfor Understanding
The second main group of social-cognitive needs proposed to be associated with
political liberalism is Need for Understanding, or a desire for cognitive complexity and
inquisitiveness, or a desire to understand one's social world. These needs might include a
need for cognitive complexity and a need for inquisitiveness.
Needfor Cognitive Complexity
The first concept in the category Need for Understanding I have called need for
cognitive complexity. Consistent with past research (e.g., Tetlock, 1983, 1984), I propose
that liberals have a higher need for cognitive complexity compared to conservatives.
Empirical research on conservatism is consistent with the notion that liberals are higher
in a need for cognitive complexity. For instance, research has shown that cognitive
flexibility is negatively related to political conservatism (Sidanius, 1985), and that
individuals high in SDO and RWA report lower levels of attributional complexity
(Altemeyer, 1998). Taken together, these results suggest that those low in conservatism,
SDO, and RWA - presumably individuals higher in liberalism - have a higher need for
cognitive complexity.
According to the rigidity of the right hypothesis (Adorno et aI., 1950), individuals
with a conservative ideology exhibit rigid thinking such as viewing issues as
dichotomous in order to meet ego-defensive needs (see Tetlock, 1984). This theory
suggests that liberals, in contrast, will have a greater need for cognitive complexity.
Similarly, the value pluralism model discussed earlier states that liberals and
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conservatives differ because they attach different levels of importance to values such as
individual freedom and social equality (Tetlock, 1983, 1984, 1989). Conservatives attach
most value to individual freedom whereas liberals are thought to attach equal importance
to many values that are often in competition with one another. In order to cope with this
competition, liberals might think in cognitively complex ways (Tetlock, 1984, 1989).
That is, liberals may have a greater motivation for cognitive complexity to reconcile their
competing values. In summary, both the rigidity of the right hypothesis and value
pluralism model imply that liberals have a higher need for cognitive complexity.
Research by Tetlock (1983, 1984) has focussed directly on cognitive complexity
in liberals and conservatives. For example, Tetlock (1983) analysed the integrative
complexity of speeches given by U. S. senators. Integrative complexity refers to (1)
cognitive differentiation, or the ability of a person to recognize many different parts of an
issue, and (2) the integration of information, or the ability of a person to create complex
connections arriong differentiated characteristics of an issue (Tetlock, 1983). Results
showed that liberals and moderates reported significantly more complex policy
statements than did conservatives. In addition, individuals' integrative complexity and
education independently predicted liberalism. In a follow up study, Tetlock (1984) found
that moderate liberal parliament members from Britain discussed issues with more
integrative complexity than did extreme liberals, extreme conservatives and moderate
conservatives. Overall, integratively complex politicians tended to be just politically left
of the centre.
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Needfor Inquisitiveness
The second concept in the category Need for Understanding I have called need for
inquisitiveness. I propose that liberals have a greater need for inquisitiveness compared to
conservatives. According to lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski, 1989), the process by
which beliefs become more permanent depends on four epistemic motivations. One of
th~semotivations is a need for non-specific closure. An example of a need for non-
specific closure is need for cognitive closure, a need associated with political
conservatism (e.g., Jost et al., 1999). Need for non-specific closure, such as cognitive
closure, as discussed earlier, represents a desire for a concrete and final belief regardless
of what that belief might be (Kruglanski, 1989). In support of lay epistemic theory, many
researchers examining conservatism have found that high conservatism is associated with
high scores on a measure of need for cognitive closure (e.g., Chirumbolo, 2002;
Chirumbolo, Areni, & Sensales, 2004; Golec de Zavala & Van Bergh, 2007; Jost et aI.,
1999; Kemmelmeir, 1997). The finding that liberals are lower on need for cognitive
closure suggests that liberals might be more likely to leave beliefs open while they seek
out and consider various alternative possibilities. That is, liberals may have a greater
motivation for inquisitiveness.
Finally, findings from the experimental literature on the differences between
liberals and conservatives demonstrate that liberals tend to be more concerned with the
reasons behind peoples' behaviour, another indicator of a need for inquisitiveness.
Wanke and Wyer (1996) for example, investigated the influence ofpolitical ideology on
reactions to others' behaviour and opinions. As predicted, liberals were more concerned
with the underlying intentions of others' actions rather than the outcomes, and about what
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peoples' behaviour implied about their opinions, compared to conservatives. Further,
when asked to recall· others' behaviour, liberals recalled better when instructed to
consider the opinions underlying the behaviour, compared to when they were instructed
to focus on the behaviour itself. Presumably, liberals performed better in the opinion-
focussed condition because this focus is consistent with their typical information
processing style (liberals tend to consider underlying causes of behaviour). These
findings suggest that liberals could be more motivated than conservatives to consider
antecedents of peoples' actions consistent with the notion that liberals have a greater need
for inquisitiveness.
In summary, theory and empirical results indicate that liberals tend to be more
integratively and cognitively complex (e.g., Tetlock, 1984), lower on need for cognitive
closure (e.g., Jost et aI., 1999) and more concerned with the underlying intention of
others' actions (Wank~ & Wyer, 1996). These ideas are consistent with the prediction
that one of the groups of needs satisfied by a liberal ideology is a Need for
Understanding, or a desire for cognitive complexity and inquisitiveness, and a need to
understand the social world.
Needfor Change
The third main group of neegs .hypothesized to influence a liberal ideology I have
called Need for Change. These needs might include a need for sensation-seeking or new
experiences, need for change, and a need to rebel. Evidence for this need category
originates from general psychological theories of ideology, empirical research on
conservatism, and research examining birth order.
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According to right-wing authoritarianism theory, high RWA is the result of social
learning and personal experiences (Altemeyer, 1988, 1996). RWA is characterized by a
high degree of submission to legitimate authority, aggression, and adherence to social
norms (Altemeyer, 1981, 1996). Therefore, individuals low in RWA might be more likely
to have a need to rebel against established social norms and authority. Moreover, recall
that according to regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998), ideology is dependent
upon care-taking style. Exposure to a promotion care-taking style is thought to foster a
liberal ideology by emphasizing advancement and growth, which should presumably
foster a preference for change. A prevention care-taking style should, in contrast,
promote a preference for stability (see also Jost, Glaser et aI., 2003a).
The theories of intolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty avoidance are also
consistent with the prediction that liberals have a higher Need for Change; in so far as
change involves an element of uncertainty and ambiguity. For instance, as discussed
earlier, individuals higher on intolerance of ambiguity - who tend to be more
conservative (lost, Glaser et aI., 2003a; Kohn, 1974) - rely on familiarity to reduce
perceptions of ambiguity (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949). Similarly, the theory ofuncertainty
avoidance (Wilson, 1973) claims that individuals susceptible to threat or anxiety brought
on by uncertainty develop conservative ideologies. To the extent that liberals might show
some opposing tendencies to conservatives, liberals are not intolerant of ambiguity or
uncertainty. In other words, individuals high on intolerance of ambiguity or uncertainty
might avoid change, whereas individuals low on intolerance of ambiguity or uncertainty,
presumably individuals high on liberalism, might tolerate or seek out change.
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There is empirical evidence that liberals have a Need for Change in studies on
conservative ideologies reporting that individuals who endorse more conservative
ideologies generally fear change (Jost, Glaser et aI., 2003a). Research has shown that
conservatives are less open to experience (e.g., Carney, Jost, Gosling, Niederhoffer, &
Potter, 2006, as cited in Jost, 2006; Hodson & Sorrentino, 1999; Joe, Jones, & Ryder,
1977; Jost & Thompson, 2000; Pratto et aI., 1994), lower on sensation seeking (Kish,
1973), higher on measures of uncertainty avoidance (e.g., Fay & Frese, 2000; Gillies &
Campbell, 1985; Glasgow & Cartier, 1985; McAllister & Anderson, 1991; Wilson et aI.,
1973), higher on intolerance of ambiguity (Kohn, 1974), and higher on needs for order
and structure (Altemeyer, 1998). Generally then, if conservatives fear change, it is
possible that liberals, in contrast, are more motivated to change the status quo and seek
out new experiences.
Research on birth order also suggests that liberals might have a greater need for
change and rebellion. Sulloway (1996) noted that scientists who held liberal ideologies
were more open to new scientific innovations compared to conservatives. He also noted
that liberal theories ten<;l to attract the support of younger individuals and later borns, a
group known to be more rebellious and supportive of change.
Anecdotal evidence further implies that liberals have a greater Need for Change.
For example, U. S. Senator and candidate for the Democratic nomination in the 2008
U.S. presidential election Barack Obama's entire campaign is based on change. Indeed,
his website is called "Barack Obama: Change We Can Believe In.'' In summary, ideology
theories stating that liqerals are more tolerant of change, empirical research
demonstrating that conservatives are lower on sensation-seeking and openness (e.g., see
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Jost, 2006; Kish, 1973), birth order research (Sulloway, 1996), and anecdotal evidence
indicating that liberals have a greater need to rebel support the prediction that liberals
have a greater Need for Change.
Avoidance ofDecisional Commitment
The final group ofneeds hypothesized to be associated with a liberal ideology I
have called Avoidance of Decisional Commitment. This group of needs might include a
fear of commitment and a fear of being wrong or a need for accuracy in one's decisions.
There is anecdotal evidence that liberals are high in needs that fall under the
category of Avoidance of Decisional Commitment. Jost, Glaser et al. (2003a) used a
quote by George Bush to illustrate the relationship among dogmatism, intolerance of
ambiguity, and conservatism, "1 know what I believe and I believe what I believe is
right" (quote originally published in Sanger, 2001, p. AI). However, this quote also
illustrates conservatives' ease of commitment to an idea and strong sense of conviction.
In contrast, liberals have often been criticized for their inability to take a stand on an
issue. For example, John Kerry, the Democratic leader in the 2003 U.S. presidential
election was attacked for his lack of conviction. The Republican Party accused Kerry of
"flip-flopping" (Schneider, 2004). George Bush was quoted as saying, "Senator Kerry
has been in Washington long enough to take both sides on just about every issue."
According to Schneider (2004), Kerry validated Bush's attacks by stating at a West
Virginia town hall, "I actually did vote for the $87 billion before I voted against it."
Similarly, former Canadian Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin was attacked for
"waffling" on numerous issues from gay.marriage to missile defence. Wilson-Smith
(2004) described Prime Minister Paul Martin, as "the waffling figure we've seen as Prime
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Minister-the one who's needlessly created new enemies, listened too much to thuggish
advisers, and talked more than acted on big issues" (p. 6).
Fear afCommitment
The first need in the category of Avoidance of Decisional Commitment I have
labelled fear of commitment. There are several ideological theories that suggest that
liberals have a fear of committing. These theories were discussed in previous sections.
Briefly, right-wing authoritarianism theory (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998), the theory of
intolerance of ambiguity (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949), and the theory of uncertainty
avoidance (Wilson, 1973) imply that conservatives have conviction and make
commitments in an effort to reduce feelings of ambiguity and uncertainty. To the extent
that liberals might tolerate feelings of ambiguity and uncertainty, they might do so
because they fear committing to one decision or course of action. Lay epistemic theory
(Kru:glanski, 1989) is also consistent with this predication. Recall that lay epistemic
theory states that the process by which beliefs become more permanent depends on four
epistemic motivations. Two of these motivations, avoidance of specific closure and
avoidance of non-specific closure could be particularly relevant for individuals high in
liberalism and, if so, would be consistent with the prediction that liberals have a greater
fear of commitment.
Empirical research from the political conservatism literature allows for the same
proposal. For instance, in support of the theories mentioned above, research discussed
earlier has shown that conservatives are higher on cognitive closure (e.g., Jost et aI.,
1999), uncertainty avoidance (e.g., Fay & Frese, 2000), and intolerance of ambiguity
(e.g., Kohn, 1974). Research also shows that conservatives commit to decisions such as
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prejudicial attitudes or stereotypes (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, ~996, 1998; Pratto et aI.,
1994). Again, because conservatives appear to have a need to commit, it is possible that
liberals, who might show some opposing tendencies, fear committing to a decision or
course of action.
Fear ofBeing Wrong
The second need in the category of Avoidance of Decisional Commitment I have
called fear of being wrong. Both the ideology theories and the research on conservatism
noted above, as well as implying that liberals have a fear of commitment, might also
mean liberals have a greater fear of being wrong.
Findings from the literature on differences between liberals and conservatives in
providing aid and endorsement ofjustice norms are also consistent with the prediction
that liberals have a greater fear of being wrong than do conservatives. For example, recall
that liberals provide aid to more claimants compared to conservatives (Skitka, 1999;
Skitka & Tetlock, 1992, 1993), that this effect is mediated by feelings of sympathy
(Skitka et aI., 2002), and that liberals can be wasteful in order to redistribute wealth
(Mitchell et aI., 2003). In the section on Need for Inclusiveness, I proposed that these
findings were indicative of a need for nurturance. Yet, they could also reflect that liberals
fear being wrong about who is deserving or undeserving of wealth. Skitka and Tetlock
(1993), for example, argued that liberals avoid deciding who should be helped. Perhaps,
in order to avoid being wrong, liberals do not commit to aiding one group and instead
help everyone equally.
Additionally, research on the motivated correction hypothesis indicates that
liberals could have a greater fear of being wrong. According to Skitka et aI. (2002),
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Summary ofProposed Needs Associated with Liberalism
In summary, the main purpose of the present dissertation is to look for evidence
of a relation between liberalism and the four proposed groups of needs outlined above:
Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, and Avoidance of
Decisional Commitment. Studies 1 and 2 of the present dissertation will focus on the
relation between political liberalism and individual differences that are indicative of the
various needs discussed in this Introduction. In addition to an examination of chronic
needs, the present dissertation will explore the effects of situation~llyinduced needs on
individuals' endorsement of political liberalism. The influence of situationally induced
needs on liberal ideology is discussed next.
Situational Influences on Liberal Ideology
Although dispositional differences among people explain some of the variation in
political ideology, they do not exhaustively account for why individuals adopt different
political ideological orientations. According to a motivated social cognition perspective,
situational variables also influence why individuals adopt liberalism versus conservatism.
As mentioned earlier, research from the conservatism literature has shown that
high levels of certain situationally induced social-cognitive needs can increase peoples'
endorsement of conservatism (e.g., Bonanno & Jost, 2006). Though not tested directly,
some of these results might mean that low levels of these variables push people toward
liberalism (not simply just away from conservatism). For example, McCann (1997)
examined the victory margins for popular vote winners in U. S. Presidential elections. He
found that winners rated high on his strength-conservatism measure tended to win by
larger margins during years characterised by high social/economic/political threat;
43
whereas winners low on strength-conservatism tended to win by larger margins during
years characterised by low threat. Therefore, insofar as liberals are low on strength-
conservatism, McCann's findings imply that situations of low threat lead people to
choose leaders who are higher in liberalism.
Although no studies directly test the effects of situational variables on liberalism,
a study by Crowe and Higgins (1997) exploring regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997,
1998) offers some indirect evidence that situational variables do affect liberal ideologies.
They investigated the effects of promotion focus versus prevention focus on participants'
performance on various tasks. Their results showed that whereas a prevention focus led
participants to adopt a cognitively conservative orientation, a promotion focus resulted in
participants taking more chances to get correct answers, something that may underlie a
more open or liberal orientation.
In summary, I predicted for this dissertation that situationally induced Need for
Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, and Avoidance of Decisional
Commitment, similar to the chronic needs discussed in the previous sections, will
increase individuals' levels of political liberalism. This prediction will be tested in
Studies 3 and 4.
The Moderating Role of Political Sophistication
According to a motivated social cognition perspective, both cognitive and
motivational factors contribute to an individual's political ideology, as outlined above.
Political expertise or sophistication represents one particular cognitive variable that has
been consistently linked with ideology (e.g., Converse, 1964; Judd & Krosnick, 1989;
Zaller, 1992). Converse (1964) argued that ideological thinking was reserved for the
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politically sophisticated or elite, which he operationalized as ideological consistency and
stability. More specifically, Converse proposed that individuals could vary in their degree
of horizontal constraint (i.e., "ideological consistency among attitudes toward different
political issues"; Federico & Schneider, 2007, p. 232), as well as hierarchical constraint
(i.e., consistency in the relations between individual issue positions with general
ideology), with political elites demonstrating a greater degree of constraint.
Consistent with Converse's (1964) original conclusions, several researchers have
subsequently demonstrated that variables conceptually similar to political expertise
including education level, political sophistication, and political awareness are associated
with constraint and attitude consistency (e.g., Federico & Schneider, 2007; Jacoby, 1991;
Judd & Krosnick, 1989; Lavine, Thomsen, & Gonzales, 1997; Luskin, 1987; Millar &
Tesser, 1986; Zaller, 1992). For the most part, individuals higher in political expertise
organize their political attitudes using abstract categories (e.g., liberalism or
conservatism). In contrast, individuals who are lower in political expertise tend to be less
inclined or able to organize their attitudes toward political issues utilizing""abstract
ideological constructs. Thus, the usefulness of the concepts liberal and conservative
might be dependent upon one's level of political sophistication (e.g., Bynner, Romney, &
Emler, 2003; Converse, 1964; Jacoby, 1988).
With regards to the present dissertation, the evidence reviewed above suggests
that the hypothesized relations between political liberalism and the four proposed needs
might be moderated by political sophistication (e.g., Converse, 1964; Jacoby, 1991).
Individuals higher in political sophistication can be expected to more accurately (by
accurately I mean consistent with socially-shared definitions of liberalism and
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conservatism) indicate their ideology on a single liberal-conservative continuum, whereas
those lower in political sophistication might be less accurate or show a greater degree of
error. As a consequence, the purer or error-free association between liberalism and the
proposed.needs might be observed among those who are more accurate in their political
ideology self-identification. More specifically, the relation between liberalism and the
needs should approach its "true" nature among political elites.
Importantly, the above assertion does not imply that individuals who are less
politically sophisticated are non-ideological (see Jost, 2006). That is, the inability of an
individual to rely on abstract concepts of liberalism and conservatism does not
automatically render him or her non-ideological. As Jost (2006) points out, even though
Converse (1964) might be correct in his assertion that individuals demonstrate some
inconsistency in their reported ideology, individuals' self-identified ideology is still
meaningful (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Feldman, 2003; Kerlinger, 1984; Knight, 1999).
Thus, by operationalizing ideology as internal consistency and coherence, Converse
(1964) might have overemphasized the role of political sophistication in the
meaningfulness of ideology in peoples' lives (Jost, 2006). Nevertheless, this body of
research suggests that the relation between political ideology and relevant underlying
needs or motivations might be stronger among individuals higher in political
sophistication. Thus, the present dissertation will also examine whether the above
hypothesized relations. between the four needs and political liberalism are moderated by
political sophistication.
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General Hypotheses
Psychological theories of ideology (e.g., ideo-affective polarity theory and social
dominance theory) and empirical research show that liberals tend to be giving and
sympathetic to others (e.g., Skitka et aI., 1991; Skitka & Tetlock, 1992, 1993), have
inclusive attitudes (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996,1998; Bierbrauer & Klinger, 2002; Cozzarelli
et aI, 2001; Hodson et aI., 2008) and demonstrate behaviours and attitudes that foster
liking in others (see Alcock et aI., 1998). Based on these findings, I hypothesize that
needs related to inclusiveness (e.g., need for nurturance, need for inclusion, and need for
affiliation) will be associated with liberalism.
According to ideology theories such as the rigidity of the right hypothesis, the
value pluralism model (Tetlock, 1983) and empirical research (e.g., Tetlock, 1983,1984),
liberals should have greater cognitive complexity. Research has also found that liberals
are lower on cognitive closure (e.g., Jost et aI., 1999) and demonstrate greater interest in
understanding reasons behind peoples' actions (Wanke & Wyer, 1996). Therefore, my
second prediction is that needs related to a Need for Understanding (e.g., need for
cognitive complexity and need for inquisitiveness) will be associated with greater
endorsement of a liberal ideology.
Some psychological theories of ideology (e.g., right wing authoritarianism theory,
theory of intolerance of ambiguity, and theory of uncertainty avoidance) and empirical
research indicate that liberals are higher on openness to experience (e.g., Jost &
Thompson, 2000), sensation-seeking (Kish, 1973), and rebelliousness (e.g., Sulloway,
1996). Considering these findings, I reason that needs related to a Need for Change (e.g.,
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need for sensation-seeking, need for change, and need to rebel) will be associated with
higher levels of political liberalism.
Anecdotal evidence implies that liberals have less conviction than conservatives
(e.g., Schneider, 2004). Further, psychological theories of ideology (e.g., right-wing
authoritarianism and uncertainty avoidance) and empirical research show that liberals
tend to tolerate feelings of uncertainty (e.g., Fay & Frese, 2000), be wasteful when
distributing wealth (e.g., Mitchell et aI., 2003), and may have more reason to be fearful of
commitment (e.g., Brickman et aI., 1989). Therefore, I predict that needs related to
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment (e.g., fear of commitment and fear of being
wrong) will be associated with political liberalism.
Studies 1 and 2 will test the associations between liberalism and chronic
individual differences reflective of the four proposed social-cognitive needs. Studies 3
and 4 will investigate the effects of the four proposed social-cognitive needs when
situationally induced. The present dissertation will also examine whether these proposed
relations and effects are moderated by political sophistication.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
Participants were 201 upper year undergraduate students from Brock University
located in St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada (Mage == 23.28; SD == 6.11; 62.7% female,
35.3% male, 2.0% unspecified), who participated for course participation or $10. Of the
200 participants who reported their ethnicity, 84.5% identified themselves as White, 6%
Asian, 5% multi-ethnic, 2% Black, 1.5% other, and 1% Middle Eastern. Of the 185
participants who indicated their religion, 29.7% identified themselves as Catholic, 19.5%
Atheist, 17.3% other, 10.3% Protestant, 9.7% United, 6.5% Anglican, 3.2% Hindu, 2.7%
Baptist, and 1.1% Muslim.
Procedure
In groups of approximately 5 to 15, participants individually read and signed
consent forms (see Appendix A and Appendix B for REB clearance) and completed
questionnaire packages containing measures of political liberalism, political
sophistication, Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change,
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment, and demographic variables (age, sex, ethnicity,
religion).l Unless otherwise specified, participants responded on a scale with response
options ranging from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5). Once finished,
participants were given written debriefing information (see Appendix C).
Measures
Political liberalism. Participants responded to three items indicating how liberal
or conservative they were on a scale from "very liberal" (1) to "very conservative" (7) in
1 There were five randomly assigned orders of the questionnaire package.
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terms of their general outlook, social policy, and economic policy (see Skitka et aI., 2002;
see Appendix D). A composite score was computed by reverse-scoring the items and
calculating the mean (a == .82). Higher scores indicated greater political liberalism.
Political sophistication/knowledge. To assess political sophistication, participants
responded to a l2-item political knowledge test consisting of questions about current
Canadian and international politics and government structure (e.g., "Who is the Prime
Minister of Canada?";· "Who is the secretary general of the United Nations?"; see
Appendix E; for similar measures. see Delli Caprini & Keeter, 1996; Zaller, 1992). Scores
were computed by summing the number of correct responses with higher scores
indicating greater political sophistication.
Needfor Inclusiveness. To measure individual differences indicative of a Need for
Inclusiveness, or a desire to nurture or assist others and be inclusive rather than exclusive,
participants completed four scales: a l3-item Nurturance scale (Hofstee, de Raad, &
Goldberg, 1992; see Appendix F; a == .83); an 8-item Altruism (versus Antagonism) scale
(from the HEXACO-PI; Lee & Ashton, 2004; see Appendix G; a == .85); a 20-item
Universal Orientation scale (Phillips & Ziller, 1997; see Appendix H; a == .72), which
assesses an orientation to view similarities between self and others rather than
differences; and Goldberg's (1999) 10-item Gregariousness scale from the IPIP-6FPQ (a
counterpart to Jackson, Paunonen, & Tremblay's, 2000, 6FPQ Affiliation scale; see
Appendix I; a == .91). Scores for each subscale were computed by averaging the items.
Higher scores reflected greater Need for Inclusiveness.
Needfor Understanding. Four scales measured individual differences reflective of
a Need for Understanding, or a desire for cognitive complexity and inquisitiveness, or
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desire to understand one's social world: a la-item Intellect scale (from the IPIP-NEO,
Goldberg, 1999; see Appendix J; a == •.84); a IO-item Culture scale (which is a counterpart
to the 6FPQ Breadth of Interest scale from the IPIP-6FPQ; see Appendix K; a == .76); and
two 8-item scales assessing Inquisitiveness (a == .81) and Creativity (a == .76; from the
HEXACO-PI; see Appendix G). Scores were computed by averaging the items for each
subscale. Higher scores reflected greater Need for Understanding.
Needfor Change. Four separate scales were used as indicators ofNeed for
Change, or a desire for sensation-seeking, new experiences, and rebelliousness: a la-item
Adventurousness scale (which is a counterpart to the 6FPQ Change scale from the IPIP-
6FPQ; see Appendix L; a == .81); an 8-item Unconventionality scale (from the HEXACO-
PI; see Appendix G; a == .73); a IO-item Rebelliousness scale (from the IPIP-TCI;
Goldberg, 1999; see Appendix M; a == .86); and the Thrill and Adventure Seeking (TAS,
a == .48) and Excitement Seeking (ES, a == .63) subscales of the Sensation Seeking Scale
V (Zuckerman, 1979; see Appendix N). For the sensation seeking subscales, participants
answered 20 items by indicating their choice between two options. A value of one was
allotted for high sensation seeking items and zero for low. Scores were calculated for
each scale by averaging the items, excluding the sensation-seeking scales for which the
items were summed. Higher scores reflected greater Need for Change.
Avoidance ofDecisional Commitment. Two scales were used as indicators of an
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment, or a fear of commitment or fear of being wrong,
or need for accuracy in one's decisions. Participants completed the 40-item Fear of
Commitment Scale (Serling & Betz, 1990; see Appendix 0; a == .94) and indicated their
agreement from "strongly agree" (1) to "strongly disagree" (6). Participants also
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completed the 19-item Judgmental Self-Doubt Scale (Mirels, Greblo, & Dean, 2002; see
Appendix P; a == .95), which measures generalized mistrust of one's judgment.
Participants indicated their agreement using a response scale with options ranging from
"strongly disagree" (-3) to "strongly agree" (+3). Scores were calculated for each
subscale by averaging the items. Higher scores reflected greater Avoidance of Decisional
Commitment.
Results
An a level of .05 was used for significance tests. All tests for a priori predictions
were one-tailed unless otherwise stated. A small number of missing values were replaced
with the sample means. The data were screened to ensure that statistical assumptions
were met.
Descriptive Statistics
Means and standard deviations of political liberalism, political knowledge and the
individual difference variables indicative of the four needs, as well as the zero-order
correlations among these variables are shown in Table 1. The relations between age and
sex with politicalliber,alism were examined since previous research has shown that both
are associated with political ideology (Knight, 1999). Political liberalism was unrelated to
sex (p == .314), but significantly associated with age (r == -.24,p < .001); therefore age was
controlled for in subsequent correlation and regression analyses.
Factor Structure ofthe Four Proposed Needs
A principal components analysis of the 15 variables used as indicators of the
needs was conducted to verify the proposed four-factor need structure. The eigenvalues
of the first eight factors were 4.1,2.9,2.0,1.2, .79, .68, .58, and .52. Examination of the
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Table 1
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations among variables in Study 1
M(SD) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 .15 16
.05
4.62 (1.20)
4.05 (2.61)
1. LIB
2. PK
tl INC:
3. AFF 3.65 (0.77) .01 -.19**--
4. ALT 4.05 (0.70) .12* -.16* .17*
5. NUR 3.60 (0.60) .08 -.18* .17* .74**
6. VO 3.56 (0.41) .19** -.07 .23** .43** .46**
NUND:
7. BOI 4.06 (0.53) .21** -.06 .19** .18** .12t .36**
8. eRE 3.34 (0.71) .16** .08 .07 .03 -.04 .06 .36**
9.INQ 3.34 (0.80) .12* .33** -.02 -.14* -.20** .131 .40** .38**
10. INT 3.68 (0.66) .11 t .30** -.02 -.05 -.14t .24** .32** .27** .45**
~CHA:
11. CHA 3.85 (0.62) .33** .01 .30** -.09 -.17* .21 ** .40** .40** .42** .25**
12. TAS 0.53 (0.19) .22** .02 .24** -.19** -.24** .07 .23** .39** .33** .17* .59**
13. ES 0.57 (0.22) .13* .16* .09 -.26** -.36** -.01 .15* .23** .33** .23** .63** .52**
14. REB 2.62 (0.73) .06 .01 -.07 -.55** -.63** -.40** -.08 .22** .19** .09 .32** .36** .46**
15. UNC 3.50 (0.58) .30** .12 t -.03 -.14* -.21 ** .20** .33** .43** .39** .49** .47** .38** .39** .38** --
ADC:
16. FCM 3.15 (0.76) -.01 .11 -.42** .00 -.07 -.13 t -.05 .17* .10 -.04 -.13 t -.04 .02 .13 t .10--
17. JSD -.33 (1.24) -.03 -.02 -.38** .08 .02 -.12 t -.09 .05 -.09 -.24** -.19** -.16* -.07 .08 .00 .79**
Note. N== 201. ** p < .01; *P <.05; 1"p <.10, two-tailed. Tests with political liberalism are one-tailed. LIB == political liberalism, a
composite of three items; PK == political knowledge; N INC == Need for Inclusiveness; AFF == affiliation; ALT == altruism; NUR ==
nurturance; UO == universal orientation; N UND == Need for Understanding; BOI == breadth of interest; CRE == creativity; INQ ==
inquisitiveness; INT == intellect; N CRA == Need for Change; CRA == change; TAS == thrill and adventure seeking;. ES == excitement
seeking; REB == rebelliousness; ADC == Avoidance of Decisional Commitment; FCM == fear of commitment; JSD == judgmental self-
doubt.
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scree plot suggested that the four factors with eigenvalues greater than one be extracted
as there was a sharp break between the fourth and fifth factors (see Cattrell, 1966;
Gorsuch, 1983; Kaiser, 1958; Reis & Judd, 2000). The first four factors were rotated to a
varimax solution, and the first and second factors were subsequently re-rotated 30
degrees to align more closely with the suggested alignment of the need variables. (Note
that variables in the domains of attitudes and of personality tend not to be simple-
structured, and that factor axis locations tend to fluctuate across variable sets and
samples; see e.g., Hofstee et aI., 1992.) As shown in Table 2, the loadings of the variables
in the final four-factor solution correspond closely to the expected pattern; however, the
Affiliation and Unconventionality scales both showed slightly higher loadings on a factor
other than their respective intended factors. 2
Composite scores were computed for each of the four proposed needs by
calculating the mean across the variables that were assessed as indicators of the
respective needs, because results of the principal components analysis generally
supported the proposed four factor need structure. The Affiliation and Unconventionality
scales were excluded from these composites because of their discrepant loadings.
Correlations among the composite scores are shown in Table 3. Composite scores of
standardized variables were used instead of factor scores for remaining analyses, because
the scoring weights used in computing factor scores tend to be sample-dependent,
whereas composite scores might be more readily compared across samples (see Goldberg
& Digman, 1994). The four need composite scores were consistent with the factor scores
2 Given that a perfect simple structure was not expected, PCA rather than confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) was conducted (see McCrae, Zonderman, Costa, Bond, & Paunonen, 1996). That is, it was expected
that lnany of the individual difference measures would demonstrate secondary loadings as well as
numerous small correlated error terms, and as a consequence, PCA was a more appropriate statistical
analysis. However, for results of the CFA see Appendix Q.
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calculated from the factor analysis, as shown by the zero-order correlations (two-tailed)
of the factor scores with the corresponding composite scores: Need for Inclusiveness (r ==
.8l;p < .001); Need for Understanding (r == .86;p < .001); Need for Change (r == .94;p <
.001); and Avoidance of Decisional Commitment (r == .97;p < .001).
Table 2
Factor loadings o/individual variables o.n the/our rotated need/actors in Study 1
Need Need Need Avoidance of
for for for Decisional
Inclusiveness Understanding Change Commitment
Altruism .71 -.08 -.48 .09
Nurturance .68 -.15 -.56 .00
Universal .65 .33 -.25 -.16
Orientation
Affiliation .50 -.21 .24 -.54
Excitement .08 .19 .75 -.02
Seeking
Adventure .28 .14 .75 -.08
Seeking
Rebelliousness -.41 .07 .74 .13
Change .39 .29 .71 -.15
Unconventionality .10 .64 .41 .12
Intellect -.03 .85 .01 -.15
Inquisitiveness .05 .70 .28 .04
Breadth of Interest .49 .53 .09 -.04
Creativity .33 .41 .39 .24
Fear of -.04 .05 .03 .91
Commitment
Judgmental Self- .02 -.16 -.04 .92
Doubt
Note. N== 201. Factor loadings were obtained by examining the zero-order correlations
among the Need factor scores and individual variables. Need for Inclusiveness and Need
for Change factors represent those factors that were re-rotated 30 degrees.
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Table 3
Correlations among composite need scores in Studies 1 and 2
1 2 3
Study 1:
1. Need for Inclusiveness
2. Need for Understanding .08
3. Need for Change -.34** .43**
4. Avoidance of Decisional Commitment -.05 -.03 -.06
Study 2:
1. Need for Inclusiveness
2. Need for Understanding .34**
3. Need for Change .12 .33**
4. Avoidance of Decisional Commitment -.15* -.23** -.05
Note. N== 201 (Study 1), N== 197 (Study 2). ** p < .01; * p <.05 (two-tailed).
Predicting Political Liberalism
Partial correlations were run between each of the four composite need scores and
political liberalism controlling for age. Consistent with predictions, Need for
Inclusiveness,pr (198) == .17,p == .008, Need for Understanding,pr (198) == .23;p < .001,
and Need for Change,pr (198) == .21,p == .002, were positively related to political
liberalism. Contrary to predictions, Avoidance of Decisional Commitment was unrelated
to politicalliberalism,pr (198) == -.04;p == .281.
To evaluate whether the four needs uniquely predict political liberalism and to
examine whether political knowledge moderates these relations, a hierarchical regression
analysis was conducted. Age was entered in the first step. In the second step, political
knowledge, Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, and
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment were entered. In the third step, the four interaction
terms (between each of the four needs and political knowledge) were entered. One
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univariate and five multivariate outliers were detected and removed from the analysis
(see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Results showed that the model accounted for 20.8 % of
the variance in political liberalism. In the first step, age was a significant predictor, b == -
.05, sr2 == .06, t(193) == -3.43,p < .001, such that greater age was associated with lower
liberalism. In the second step, the four needs and political knowledge significantly added
to the model, !1R2 == .11, P < .001: Need for Inclusiveness, b == .34, sr2 == .04, t(188) ==
2.93,p == .002, and Need for Change, b == .36, sr2 == .04, t(188) == 2.81,p == .003, uniquely
predicted greater endorsement of political liberalism. Political knowledge was also a
significant predictor, b == .14, sr2 == .01, t(I88) == I.72,p == .043, indicating that those
higher in political knowledge were higher on political liberalism. Finally, Need for
Understanding (p == .204) and Avoidance of Decisional Commitment (p == .431) were
non-significant predictors. In the third step, the two-way interactions significantly added
to the model, I1R2 == .04,p == .050. Two of the two-way interactions were significant:
political knowledge by Need for Inclusiveness, b == .27, sr2 == .02, t(184) == 2.04,p == .021,
and political knowledge by Avoidan'ce of Decisional Commitment, b == .23, sr2 == .02,
t(184) == 2.24,p == .013. The interactions of political knowledge by Need for
Understanding and by Need for Change were non-significant (p == .484 and p == .229,
respectively).
Simple slope analyses were conducted to explore the significant interactions (see
Aiken & West, 1991). Simple slopes were probed at 1 SD above, 1 SD below, and at the
mean on political knowledge and at three values of each ofNeed for Inclusiveness and
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment (i.e., 1 SD above, 1 SD below, and at the mean).
For the simple regression with political liberalism regressed onto Need for Inclusiveness,
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the slope was significantly different from zero for high, sr2 == .05, t(184) == 3.37,p < .001,
and mean sr2 == .03, t(184) == 2.81, P == .002 levels of political knowledge (see Figure 1).
The relation was non-significant at low levels (p == .363).
For the simple regression with political liberalism regressed onto Avoidance of
Decisional Commitment, the slope was significantly different from zero at a low level of
political knowledge, sr2 == .01, t(184) == -1.77,p == .039, such that greater Avoidance of
Decisional Commitment predicted lower political liberalism. Results showed a
marginally significant relation at a high level of political knowledge, such that higher
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment predicted higher political liberalism, sr2 == .01,
t(184) == I.63,p == .052 (see Figure 2). The relation was non-significant at a mean level (p
== .457).3
Discussion
The primary objective of Study 1 was to test whether the four proposed needs -
Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, and Avoidance of
Decisional Commitment - would be positively associated with political liberalism.
Generally, the results of Study 1 supported the hypotheses: Three of the proposed needs
were positively related to political liberalism, and political sophistication moderated
some of the proposed relations. These findings are discussed in turn below.
3 The relations between the four needs with political liberalism, and the hypothesized interactions between
political knowledge and the needs were also examined using AMOS 16.0 software. The SEM findings were
consistent with those obtained using hierarchical regression (see Appendices Rand S). Single indicators
were used in the SEM model for the latent variable needs as well as political liberalism so that the needs
and liberalislTI were equally reflected by each indicator (Le., the measures used to create the composite
scores). Kline (2005) recommends using a corrected error variance for the observed variables (see pages
229-231). Thus, the explained variances of the observed variables are equal to their reliabilities.
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Figure 1. Interaction between Need for Inclusiveness and political knowledge (pk) on
political liberalism (Study 1).
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Consistent with hypotheses, Need for Inclusiveness, or a desire to be inclusive
and nurturing was positively associated with, and a unique predictor of greater liberalism.
Need for Understanding, or a desire for cognitive complexity and inquisitiveness was
also significantly related to greater liberalism. However, it did not uniquely predict
political liberalism. Further, Need for Change, or a desire for new and novel experiences,
sensation-seeking, and change was related to and uniquely predicted greater endorsement
ofpolitical liberalism. Finally, and contrary to predictions, Avoidance of Decisional
Commitment was umelated to political liberalism (although Avoidance of Decisional
Commitment did demonstrate an association via an interaction with political
sophistication, discussed below).
Additionally, two interactions between a specific need and political sophistication
were found. In general, results of the simple slopes analyses suggested that the predicted
relations between certain needs and greater political liberalism was stronger and more
positive, as expected, for those individuals who scored high on the political knowledge
test. Both higher Need for Inclusiveness and Avoidance of Decisional Commitment
interacted with political sophistication to predict greater endorsement of political
liberalism (primarily among those higher in political knowledge).
Interestingly, higher Avoidance of Decisional Commitment appeared to predict
lower political liberalism among those with lower political sophistication. In other words,
greater Avoidance of Decisional Commitment predicted opposite patterns depending on
an individual's level of political sophistication. The pattern of results for individuals low
in political sophistication is consistent with research showing that fear (e.g., fear of
general threat) is related to more conservative ideologies (e.g., Jost, Glaser et aI., 2003a).
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Nevertheless, my results for individuals low in political sophistication - that is a negative
relation between Avoidance of Decisional Commitment with political liberalism - are
somewhat surprising given the recent work by Amodio, Jost, Master, and Yee (2007)
suggesting that liberals, compared to conservatives, might be more sensitive to being
accurate or careful in their decisions. Perhaps, a measure tapping a need for accuracy
might be more appropriate for assessing the Avoidance of Decisional Commitment need.
Partial redundancy (i.e., overlapping variance) among some of the needs might
explain why Need for Understanding did not emerge as a unique predictor of political
liberalism, even though it demonstrated a significant correlation. The moderate
association between Need for Understanding and Need for Change (see Table 3) suggests
that partial redundancy might explain why Need for Understanding was not a unique
predictor. In particular, Need for Understanding may have been dropped as a unique
predictor as Need for Change accounted for a shared portion of variance in political
liberalism (see Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
Although some researchers have proposed that shared variance among predictor
variables might also account for difficulty in detecting interactions (e.g., Morris,
Sherman, & Mansfield, 1986), others argue that shared variance cannot explain
undetected interactions (e.g., Cronbach, 1987; Jaccard, Turrisi, & Wan, 1990). Poor
reliability, measurement error, and low statistical power inherent in correlational data are
more likely to blame (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen et aI., 2003; Jaccard et al., 1990).
McClelland and Judd (1993) concluded that lower variability in correlational relative to
experimental designs makes it difficult to detect interactions in non-experimental
analyses; as a result, even interactions that account for a very small proportion of
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variance should be considered. Consequently, it is possible that significant interactions
between Need for Understanding and Need for Change with political knowledge did not
emerge because such interactive effects in correlational designs are difficult to detect.
Furthermore, McClelland and Judd's conclusions highlight the significance of the
interactions uncovered between Need for Inclusiveness and Avoidance of Decisional
Commitment with political knowledge.
Finally, given that the overall level and the variability in scores of political
knowledge was relatively low, and the research was conducted with university students, it
is important that the proposed relations among the four needs, political sophistication,
and political liberalism be examined further among a sample of participants who are
more representative of the general population, and presumably more variable in political
sophistication. Therefore, the main purpose of Study 2 is to examine the hypotheses
among a diverse sample of community adults.
STUDY 2
Method
Participants
Participants were 197 community members from the Niagara Region in southern
Ontario, ranging in age from 19 to 78 years (Mage == 39.51; SD == 12.86). The sample
consisted of 54.5% females, 36.5% male and 9.1 % did not specify their sex. Of the 195
participants who reported their ethnicity, 84.1 % identified themselves as White, 5.1%
South Asian, 3% other, 2.6% Black, 1.5% each Southeast Asian and Arab/West Asian,
1% Chin~se, and 0.5% each Korean and Filipino. Of the 177 participants who i~dicated
their religious affiliation, 33.9% were Catholic, 15.8% other, 15.3% Protestant, 11.3%.
Anglican, 10.7% Muslim, 5.6% Atheist, 4.5% Baptist, 2.3% Uniteq, and 0.6% Jewish.
Procedure
Two experimenters canvassed neighbourhoods in a city in Southern On~ario,
Canada. In order to gather a diverse sample containing a wide range ofpolitical
orientations, religious affiliations, and socio-economic statuses, a variety of households
and businesses were targeted. p'articipants were given a consent form to read and sign
(see Appendix T and Appendix B for REB clearance), along with.a shortened version of
the questionnaire used' in Study 1 to be completed privately. As in Study 1, there were
five different random orders of the questionnaire package. Once participants completed
the study materials, they were given a $5 gift certificate to a popular coffee shop and a
debriefing form explaining the purpose of the study (see Appendix C).
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Measures
Political liberalism was measured with the three items outlined in Study 1 (a ==
.87). Political sophistication was assessed with a 9-item version of the political
knowledge test administered in Study I; questions asked about current Canadian and
international politics and government structure (see Appendix E). A score was calculated
by summing the correct responses. To assess the proposed needs, measures were chosen
that best captured the conceptualization of each need as defined in the Introduction. To
assess Need for Inclusiveness, an 18-item version of the Universal Orientation scale used
in Study I was administered (n == .70; see Appendix H). Need for Understanding was
measured with the IO-item Intellect scale (a == .87) and the IO-item Culture scale (n == .87)
also administered in Study I (see Appendices J and K). To measure Need for Change, an
8-item version of the Adventurousness scale (n == .77) and a 9-item version of the
Rebelliousness scale (a == .86) that were used in Study I were administered (see
Appendices Land M). Finally, to assess Avoidance of Decisional Commitment, an 8-
item version of the Fear of Commitment Scale that was administered in Study I was used
(a == .89; see Appendix 0). Scores were calculated for each of the scales by averaging the
items. Composite scor~s of standardized scale scores were computed by calculating a
mean across the variables indicative of each need. Higher scores indicated greater
endorsement of each need.
Results and Discussion
An a level of .05 was used for significance tests. All tests for a priori predictions
were one-tailed unless otherwise stated. A small number of missing values were replaced
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with sample means. The data were screened to ensure that statistical assumptions were
met.
Descriptive Statistics
Means and standard deviations of political liberalism, political knowledge and the
individual difference variables reflective of the four needs, and the zero-order
correlations among the variables are presented in Table 4. The relations between age and
sex with political liberalism were examined, as in Study 1. Both variables were unrelated
to political liberalism and therefore not controlled for in subsequent analyses.
Correlations among the composite needs scores are shown in Table 3.
Table 4
Means, standard deviqtions, and zero-order correlations among variables in Study 2
M(SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. LIB
2.PK
NINC:
3.00
4.54 (1.16)
4.56 (2.75) -.01
3.44 (0.43) .11 t .09
NCHA:
4.CHA
5. REB
NUND:
6. BOI
7. INT
3.54 (0.67)
2.37 (0.74)
3.83 (0.72)
3.54 (0.73)
.23**
.06
.24**
.20**
.06
-.11
.09
.19**
.26**
-.09
.37**
.22**
.10
.57**
.53**
-.20**
-.03 .57**
ADC:
8. FCM 2.94 (1.09) .11 t -.19** -.15* -.11 .04 -.18* -.22**
Note. N = 197. ** p < .01; * p <.05; t p <.10. Tests with political liberalism are one-tailed.
LIB = political liberalism, a composite of three items; PK = political knowledge; N INC
= Need for Inclusiveness; VO = universal orientation; N UND = Need for Understanding;
BOI = breadth of interest; INT = intellect; N CRA = Need for Change; CRA = change;
REB = rebelliousness; ADC = Avoidance of Decisional Commitment; FCM = fear of
commitment.
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Predicting Political Liberalism
The primary goal of Study 2 was to provide a further test of the hypotheses
examined in Study 1 in a sample of community adults. Consistent with the findings of
Study 1, Need for Inclusiveness, r (195) == .11,p == .058, Need for Understanding, r (195)
== .25,p < .001, and Need for Change, r (195) == .19,p == .003, were positively related to
political liberalism, though the correlation with Need for Inclusiveness was marginal.
Consistent with predictions, however contrary to Study 1, Avoidance of Decisional
Commitment was also marginally related to political liberalism, r (195) == .11, p == ~064.
To evaluate whether the four needs uniquely predict political liberalism and to
examine whether political knowledge moderates these relations, a hierarchical regression
analysis was performed. Political knowledge, Need for Inclusiveness, Need for
Understanding, Need for Change, and Avoidance of Decisional Commitment were
entered in the first step. The four interaction terms (between each of the four needs and
political knowledge) were entered in the second step. Three multivariate outliers were
detected and removed from the analysis (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
Results showed that the model accounted for 17.5 % of the variance in political
liberalism. In the first step, Need for Understanding, b == .31, sr2 == .04, t(18?) == 3.03, p ==
.001, Need for Change, b == .21, sr2 == .02, t(187) == 1.81 ,p == .036, and Avoidance of
Decisional Commitment, b == .16, sr2 == .02, t(187) == 1.89 ,p == .030, were significant
predictors, indicating that greater need for understanding, change, and avoidance of
decisional commitment predicted greater endorsement of political liberalism. Need for
Inclusiveness (p == .206) and political knowledge (p == .444) were non-significant
predictors. Thus, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, and Avoidance of
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Decisional Commitment uniquely predicted greater political liberalism. In the second
step, the two-way interactions significantly added to the model, !J.R2 == .06,p == .014:
Political knowledge by Need for Inclusiveness, b == .17, sr2 == .015, l(183) == 1.84, p ==
.033, and political knowledge by Need for Change, b == .26, sr2 == .03, 1(183) == 2.44,p ==
.008, were significant predictors. The interactions ofpolitical knowledge by Need for
Understanding and by Avoidance of Decisional Commitment were non-significant (p ==
.450 and p == .187 respectively).
Simple slope analyses were used to explore the significant interactions (see Aiken
& West, 1991). Simple slopes were probed at 1 SD above, 1 SD below, and at the mean
on political knowledge and at three values of each ofNeed for Inclusiveness and Need
for Change (i.e., 1 SD above, 1 SD below, and at the mean). As shown in Figure 3, for
the simple regression with political liberalism regressed onto Need for Inclusiveness, the
slope was significantly different from zero for high levels of political knowledge, sr2 ==
.02, l(183) == 2.00,p == .023. The relation was non-significant at mean and low levels (p ==
.189 and p == .222 respectively). For the simple regression with political liberalism.
regressed onto Need for Change the slope was significantly different from zero at a high
level of political knowledge, sr2 == .04, l(183) == 2.93,p == .002, and at a mean level, sr2 ==
.013,1(183) == 1.75,p == .041 (see Figure 4). The relation was non-significant at a low
level (p == .354).4
Therefore, the results of Study 2 involving community adults, replicated the
findings of Study 1 wi~h respect to the correlations between Need for Inclusiveness, Need
for Understanding, and Need for Change with political liberalism, although the relation
4 As in Study 1, AMOS software was used to test the relations between the four needs with political
liberalism, and the potential interactions between political knowledge and the needs. Results from the SEM
analyses showed similar findings to those obtained using hierarchical regression (see Appendices U and V).
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with Need for Inclusiveness was only marginally significant. In particular, a greater
desire to be inclusive, a desire for cognitive complexity and inquisitiveness, and a desire
for change were associated with greater endorsement of political liberalism.
Also, Need for Change uniquely predicted political liberalism, similar to Study 1.
Contrary to Study 1, Need for Understanding (rather than Need for Inclusiveness in Study
I) uniquely predicted greater endorsement of political liberalism. However, given the
moderate intercorrelations among these needs (i.e., partial redundancy, discussed earlier),
it is not surprising that only one of these two needs emerged as a unique predictor (see
Cohen et aI., 2003; Jaccard et aI., 1990; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Moreover,
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment uniquely predicted greater liberalism, consistent
with predictions.
Furthermore, the general finding that political sophistication can moderate the
relations between certain needs and political liberalism was also replicated. As found in
Study I, the relation between political liberalism and Need for Inclusiveness was
moderated by political sophistication. The relation between Need for Change and
political liberalism was also shown to be moderated by political sophistication in Study 2.
Consistent with the general pattern of interactions in Study 1 (with Need for
Inclusiveness and Avoidance of Decisional Commitment), the relation between Need for
Inclusiveness and Need for Change (Study 2) with political liberalism was stronger and
positive among individuals high in political sophistication. Given the difficulty in
detecting interactions in correlational research (see Cohen et aI., 2003; McClelland &
Judd, 1993), it is noteworthy that an interaction between Need for Inclusiveness with
political knowledge emerged in both the student as well as community sample.
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Figure 3. Interaction between Need for Inclusiveness and political knowledge (pk) on
political liberalism (Study 2).
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In summary, the findings from Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that greater political
liberalism is positively linked with a Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding,
Need for Change, and Avoidance of Decisional Commitment (although the latter relation
only emerged in Study 2, and was marginal). Moreover, some of these relations,
including the relation between liberalism and Avoidance of Decisional Commitment in
Study 1, can be moderated by political sophistication.
Although dispositional differences among people can explain some of the
variation in political ideology - as shown in Studies 1 and 2 - individual differences do
not exhaustively account for why individuals might adopt different political ideological
orientations. As outlined in the Introduction, according to a motivated social cognition
perspective, political ideology is multiply determined by both dispositional as well as
situational factors (lost, Glaser et aI., 2003a; Kruglanski, 1996). Thus, in addition to
exploring the role of chronic needs or motivations, it is imperative that the role of
situationally induced needs on political liberalism be explored. Therefore, the primary
goal of Study 3 was to determine whether situationally induced Need for Inclusiveness,
Need for Understanding, Need for Change and Avoidance ofDecisional Commitment
foster greater endorsement of political liberalism, as predicted.
An additional goal of Study 3 was to test the effect of the four proposed social-
cognitive needs on implicitly measured political liberalism. Recently, political
psychologists and political scientists have argued that in order to fully understand
people's responses, including their identification as a political liberal or political
conservative, researchers should explore individual's automatic or spontaneous responses
using implicit or non-reactive tools (e.g., Burdein, Lodge, & Taber, 2006). For instance, a
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recent study by Friese, Bluemke, and Wanke (2007) in Germany found that implicitly
measured political party preference predicted voting behaviour. Implicit or non-reactive
measures allow researchers to examine evaluations or attitudes relatively independent of
social desirability effects, and address aspects of evaluations and/or attitudes that might
be outside ofaperson's awareness (see Banaji, 2001; Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji,
2001).
In the present study, I used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), a well known indirect
measure of attitudes, although only recently used to assess attitudes in the political
domain (e.g., Friese et aI., 2007; Karpinski, Steinman, & Hilton, 2005; 'Knutson, Wood,
Spampinto, & Grafman, 2006; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). The IAT is a reaction
time (RT) task that indirectly assesses relations between concepts (e.g., liberalism and
conservatism with positive and negative valence). More specifically, the IAT measures
the association between a target category (e.g., political orientation: Liberal,
Conservative) and an attribute (e.g., valence: Positive, Negative). If an individual is
quicker to categorize political words when liberal is paired with positive than when
conservative is paired with positive, it can be inferred that this individual has an implicit
preference for liberalism. Therefore, Study 3 also tested the influence of situationally
induced needs on individuals' implicitly measured political liberalism.
STUDY 3
Method
Participants
Participants were 120 undergraduate students from Brock University, located in
St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada, who ranged in age from 18 to 46 years (Mage = 21.57;
SD = 4.62; 79.2% female, 19.2% male, 1.7% unspecified), and participated for course
participation or $10. One participant was excluded from analyses because he/she circled
the same value throughout his/her survey. Of those who indicated their ethnicity, 87.4%
identified themselves as White, 2.5% each identified themselves as Arab/West Asian,
South Asian, and other, 1.7% each Chinese and Latin American, and 0.8% each Black
and Southeast Asian. Of the 109 participants who reported their religious affiliation,
39.4% identified them,selves as Catholic, 27.5% as other, 8.3% each as Protestant and
Atheist, 4.6% each Anglican and United, 2.8% each Baptist and Muslim, and 1.8% as
Hindu.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in 1.5 hour sessions. Upon arrival,
participants read and signed a consent form (see Appendix Wand Appendix X for REB
clearance) detailing a study examining "cognitive performance and general attitudes" in
which they would be asked to complete a "language abilities task" (i.e., Scrambled-
Sentence Manipulation), a computer task assessing their "word categorization
performance'~ (i ..e., a Political Orientation IAT), and a survey concerning their general
attitudes. The first 100 participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions:
Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, Avoidance of
73
74
Decisional Commitment, or a control condition. To evaluate whether the conditions were
reasonably equivalent in terms of participants' political orientations before the
manipulation, the proportion ofparty supporters across oonditions was examined.
Previous party support was analysed because, presumably, it should be unrelated to
responses to the manipulation. In other words, reported past party support was used to
determine whether individuals endorsing different political ideologies were randomly
distributed across the five conditions. Analyses showed that the control group comprised
a disproportionate number of left-of-centre party supporters (31.6% of participants in the
control condition were New Democratic Party supporters, and 42.9% of all NDP
supporters were control condition participants), as well as participants with no party
affiliation (42.1 % of participants in the control condition did not have an affiliation, and
26.7% of all individuals who did not have an affiliation were in the control condition).
Therefore, an additional 20 participants were sampled and assigned to the control
condition.
The Scrambled-Sentence Manipulation (Skrull & Wyer, 1979) was used to prime
participants with one of the four needs. This task consists of a list of 30 lines of text with
five words presented in each line in a random order. The experimenter told participants
"I'm first going to give you a task that measures your language ability. Please construct
grammatically correct four-word sentences as quickly as possible." She then gave
participants one of five versions of the scrambled-sentence manipulation (see Appendix
Y). For participants in the four need conditions, 15 of the 30 sentences were intended to
prime the relevant need: Need for Inclusiveness (e.g., "we are all equal"); Need for
Understanding (e.g., "I need to comprehend"); Need for Change (e.g., "I did something
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different"); and Avoidance of Decisional Commitment (e.g., "we are really unsure"). And
the remaining 15 sentences were neutral (e.g., "the wind was chilly"). Those in the
control condition received 30 neutral sentences.
Next, participants were asked to complete a computer task assessing their "word
categorization performance." They were told to follow the instructions on the screen and
notify the experimenter when they were finished. In reality, participants completed a
Political Orientation IAT to assess their implicit political orientation.
Participants then completed a questionnaire package containing manipulation
checks to determine whether the scrambled-sentences primed participants with the
relevant needs, as well as measures of political liberalism, political sophistication, Need
for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, Avoidance of Decisional
Commitment, and demographic variables. Unless otherwise specified, participants
responded on a scale with response options ranging from "strongly disagree" (1) t6
"strongly agree" (5). Once finished, participants were provided with verbal and written
debriefing (see Appendix Z).
Measures
Previous party support. Participants responded to a single item, "Please indicate by
checking the political party you typically support (e.g., vote for, donate to, etc.)" to
measure party support~ Twelve of Canada's registered federal parties were listed, as well
as the options "other" and "I do not have an affiliation".
Implicit political liberalism. To assess automatic (or implicit) political orientation, a
Political Orientation version of the IAT was administered using the software E-Prime.
The IAT is a popular indirect measure for assessing the relation between a target category
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(e.g., political orientation: Liberal, Conservative) and an attribute (e.g., valence: Positive,
Negative). To select political stimulus words, a list of 37 political words including
political figures and issues (e.g., gay marriage, Stephen Harper) was rated by 15
undergraduate students in a pilot study (see Appendix AA for consent form). For each
word, participants in the pilot study indicated whether the political word was "politically
liberal", "politically conservative", or whether they were "unsure", as well as their degree
of confidence in their categorizing choice on a scale from "not at all" to "extremely
confident" (see Appendix BB for categorizing words questionnaire). Twenty words (10
conservative, 10 liberal) were selected based on whether students correctly categorized
the words as either liberal or conservative, and were confident of their decision (see
Appendices CC for Study 3 Pilot Study Debriefing Form and DD for political stimuli
words used in the Political Orientation IAT). Neutral stimuli were selected from a list of
words from Lodge (personal communication, September 12,2006; see Appendix DD).
The Political Orientation IAT consisted of five blocks with 20 or 40 trials per
block. Words were presented in a random order with a given word appearing only once in
each block. In the first block, which consisted of 20 trials, participants were instructed to
categorize 20 political stimulus words (10 conservative, 10 liberal) into conservative and
liberal groups by pressing one of two keys. In the second block, which also consisted of
20 trials, participants were asked to categorize 20 non-political words (10 positive, 10
negative) into positive and negative groups. For the third, fourth and fifth blocks, words
were presented that belonged to categories of political words or neutral words. For
example, participants were asked to press one key if the target word was "positive or
conservative" and another key if the word was "negative or liberal". The third block
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consisted of 40 trials, the fourth block had 20 trials (practise block) and the fifth block
had 40 trials.
To account for order effects, the last three blocks were counter-balanced. For half
of the participants, "liberal or positive" and "conservative or negative" were grouped
together for the third block, and "conservative or positive" and "liberal or negative" were
grouped together for the fourth and fifth blocks. For the other half of participants,
"conservative or positive" and "liberal or negative" were grouped together for the third
block, and "liberal or positive" and "conservative or negative" were grouped together for
the fourth and fifth blocks.
Scores were created from this task using the formula described by Greenwald et
ai. (1998; see also Greenwald et aI., 2003). Specifically, any trials with reaction time
(RT) latencies greater than 10 000 ms and below 400 IDS were first removed. A mean'was
computed for correct RT latencies for blocks 3 and 5, and error latencies were replaced
with the respective RT block means. To calculate a Political Orientation IAT score, a
difference score (RT from block 3 minus RT from block 5, or vice versa) was computed
and divided by the standard deviation for all of the trials in blocks 3 and 5. Higher scores
indicated a greater preference for liberalism.
Manipulation checks. To assess whether the primes for the four needs were
successful, participants responded to eight items using a scale from "not at all" (1). to
"extremely" (9) in terms of how they felt at that moment (see Appendix EE). Two items
each assessed whether a desire for inclusiveness was salient (e.g., "Please indicate the
extent to which you believe everyone should be accepted/included"; r = .25,p = .014), a
desire for understanding was salient (e.g., "Please indicate the extent to which you want
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to understand or know"; r == .54,p < .001), a desire for change was salient (e.g., "Please
indicate the extent to which you desire change"; r == .62,p < .001), and whether an
avoidance of committing to a decision or course of action was salient (e.g., "Please
indicate the extent to which you feel you would have difficulty making a decision or
choosing a course of action right now"; r == .61,p < .001). Scores were computed by
averaging the two items for each of the four needs with higher scores reflecting greater
salience of that particular need.5
Political liberalism. Political liberalism was measured with the same three items
outlined in Studies 1 and 2 with a small modification. Participants were asked to indicate
their political orientation by placing a vertical dash on a horizontal line running from
"extremely liberal" to "extremely conservative." A score was derived by measuring in
centimetres where participants placed their dash on each of the three lines. A composite
score was computed by calculating the mean of the three items (a == .82). Higher scores
reflected greater endorsement of political liberalism. Scores could range between zero
and nine.
Political sophistication/knowledge. Political sophistication was measured using the
same nine questions from Study 2 about current Canadian and international politics and
government structure. A score was computed by summing the number of correct
responses.
? Selected items from the individual difference measures used in Studies 1 and 2 to assess the fOUf needs
were used as manipulation checks for the first 20 participants (see the Needs section of Study 3 Method
section). Analyses of means on these measures showed no differences between conditions. In retrospect, a
more appropriate measure would have been a state rather than trait measure. Therefore, a revised
manipulation check intended to assess state, rather than trait, differences between conditions was created.
Because the manipulation check measure was changed, values for the new manipulation check were
lnissing for the first 20 participants.
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Needs. To assess Need for Inclusiveness, five items from the Universal Orientation
scale used in Studies I and 2 were administered (u == .55). Need for Understanding was
measured with a composite of the 10-item Intellect scale and the 10-item Culture scale (n
== .81), also administered in Study 1. To measure Need for Change, participants
completed 9 items from the Adventurousness scale (a == .69) used in Studies 1 and 2.
Finally, to assess Avoidance of Decisional Commitment, a 5-item version of the Fear of
Commitment Scale that was administered in Studies 1 and 2 was used (a == .89; possible
responses for this scale ranged from [1] "strongly disagree" to [6] "strongly agree").
Shorter versions of the individual difference measures were used in Study 3 because of
time constraints.
Results
Means and standard deviations of Study 3 variables, and zero-order correlations
among Study 3 variables are shown in Table 5. An a level of .05 was used for
significance tests. All tests for a priori predictions were one-tailed unless otherwise
stated. A small number of missing values were replaced with sample means. Three cases
were deleted from the data set: One case was removed because the participant selected
the same number repeatedly and two because they were univariate outliers (see
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Age was unrelated to political liberalism (p == .871). Sex was
significantly correlated with greater explicit political liberalism (r == .26,p == .005), such
that women were more liberal than men, and therefore was controlled for in subsequent
analyses. The data were screened to ensure that statistical assumptions were met.
Table 5
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations among variables in Study 3
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M(SD) I 2 3 4 5 6 7: 8 9 10 1I 12
1. Liberalism 6.00 (1.74) --
2. Social 6.57 (2.13) .89** --
3. Economic 5.24 (1.88) .76** .45** --
4. IAT 0.29 (0.32) .48** .41 ** .40** --
5. Know 2.56 (2.05) -.17* -.06 -.25** -.05
6. Inclus MC 6.60 (1.43) .12 .11 .11 -.05
-.17t --
7. UnderMC 7.45 (1.01) -.07 .04 -.151" .08 -.01 .20*
8. Chan MC 6.64 (1.26) .15 t .17t .161' . I 71" -.13 .08 .33** --
9. Avoid MC 4.72 (1.97) .04 .01 .20* .03 -.17 .10 -.15 .171' --
10. N Inclus 3.58 (0.56) .27** .35** .09 .13 t -.04 .33** .25* .05 -.08
11. N Under 3.80 (0.43) .11 .22** -.07 .11 .13 .13 .39** .19t -.31 ** .32** --
12. N Chan 3.90 (0.50) .10 .16* -.02 .11 -.08 -.03 .171' .19t -.20* .07 .27** --
12. N Avoid 3.43 (1.30) .01 -.04 .09 .08 -.08 .08 -.201" .01 .48** -.08 -.33** -.27**
Note. N=:: 116, except N=:: 95 for correlations with manipulation checks. ** p < .01; *p <.05; ,. p <.10 (two-tailed). Tests with political
liberalism variables are one-tailed. Liberalism =:: Political Liberalism, a composite of three items; Social == Social Liberalism;
Economic =:: Economic Liberalism; Know =:: Political Knowledge; Inclus =:: Inclusiveness; MC =:: manipulation check; Under =::
Understanding; Chan == Change; Avoid =:: Avoidance of Decisional Commitment; N =:: Need for.
81
Manipulation Checks
To examine whether the scrambled-sentence tasks successfully primed
participants with the four needs, a series of ANOVAs were conducted with condition as
the independent variable and the manipulation checks for each need as the dependent
variables. There were no significant differences between the conditions on any of the
manipulation checks (see Appendix FF for detailed results). Therefore, the scrambled-
sentence priming manipulation was unsuccessful.
Explicit and Implicit Liberalism
To test whether individuals' explicitly and implicitly measured political liberalism
differed between conditions, an ANOVA was run with condition as the independent
variable and explicit ,political liberalism and implicit liberalism as the dependent
variables. Contrary to predictions, there were no significant differences between
conditions on the dependent variables (see Appendix FF).
Internal Analyses
Internal analyses controlling for condition and sex were conducted with the
manipulation check measures for each need and measures of political liberalism.
Specifically, a series of hierarchical regression analyses were run to examine whether the
manipulation check measures predicted explicit and implicit (IAT) political liberalism, as
well as whether these relations were moderated by political knowledge. Four variables
(effects codes; see Aiken & West, 1991) were created to compare each of the need
conditions with the control condition.6 Sex and the four effects codes were entered in the
6 For all four variables (effects codes), the control condition was assigned a value of -1 and the relevant
comparison group (Le., Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, or Avoidance
of Decisional Commitment condition) was assigned a value of+1. Conditions not involved in the contrast
for a particular effects code were assigned a value of zero (see Aiken & West, 1991).
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first step. In the second step, political knowledge, and the manipulation checks for each
of the four needs were entered. In the third step, the four interaction terms (between each
of the four need manipulation checks and political knowledge) were entered.
Results of the two hierarchical regression analyses, one for explicit political
liberalism and one for implicit political liberalism showed (see Appendix GG for a table
of the regression results) that in the first step, sex was a significant predictor of explicit
political liberalism, but not implicit political liberalism. None of the effects codes were
significant predictors. None of the manipulation checks in Step 2 were significant
predictors. In the third. step, three of the interactions (all but the political knowledge by
the avoidance of decisional commitment manipulation check interaction) w~re unique
predictors of explicit liberalism; the political knowledge by the need for change
manipulation check interaction was a unique predictor of implicit political liberalism.
Generally, the pattern of interactions found was consistent with those observed in Studies
1 and 2.
Only the interactions between the need manipulation checks and political
knowledge uniquely predicted implicit and explicit liberalism. As such, the predictive
ability of the needs manipulation checks on political liberalism was explored further. The
liberal-conservative continuum has been described as "the single most useful and
parsimonious way to classify political attitudes for more than 200 years" (Jost, 2006, p.
654). However, previous research suggests that ideology can also be summarized by two
dimensions, one more social in nature and one more economic in nature (e.g., Ashton,
Danso, Maio, Esses, Bond, & Keung, 2005; Choma, Ashton, & Hafer, 2007; Eysenck,
83
1954; Ferguson, 1939; Jost, Glaser eta!., 2003a, 2003b). Therefore, in addition to .
examining political liberalism as a composite score of three items (general, social, and
economic), the social item and economic item for political liberalism were analysed
separately using hierarchical regression (outlined in the previous paragraph) to explore
the findings in greater detail.7
Results of the two hierarchical regression analyses (see Appendix GG) showed
that sex was a unique predictor of both the social dimension and economic dimension in
the first step, such that women were higher on political liberalism than men; effects codes
for condition were non-significant in both regression analyses. In the second step, none of
the need manipulation checks or political knowledge uniquely predicted the social
dimension. However, the need for understanding manipulation check and political
knowledge uniquely predicted the economic dimension, such that lower need for
understanding and lower political knowledge predicted greater economic liberalism. In
the third step, the manipulation check for need for inclusiveness interacted with political
sophistication to predict the social dimension of political liberalism. Also, the need for
change manipulation check by political knowledge interaction, and need for
understanding manipulation check by political knowledge interaction uniquely predicted
the economic dimension. Generally, the pattern of interactions found was consistent with
those observed in Studies 1 and 2.
7 See Appendices HH and II for the regression results of the four needs predicting the social and economic
diJnensions of liberalism for Studies 1 and 2, respectively.
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The Role ofDispositional Needs in Predicting Political Liberalism: A Replication of
Studies 1 and 2
A replication of the analyses from Studies 1 and 2 using the dispositional needs
was also conducted (because the manipulations failed) to determine whether a similar
pattern of results would emerge for explicitly and implicitly measured political
liberalism. Note that the following analyses were based on composite scores using
standardized itenls from the individual difference measures outlined in the Needs section
earlier.
Partial correlations were run between each of the four need scores with explicit
political liberalism, the social dimension of liberalism, the economic dimension of
liberalism, and implicit liberalism (IAT), controlling for sex (see Table 6)8. Consistent
with predictions and the findings from Studies 1 and 2, Need for Inclusiveness, Need for
Understanding, and Need for Change were positively related to explicit political
liberalism, the social dimension of liberalism, and implicitly measured political liberalism
(IAT), although the relations with implicit liberalism were only marginal. Also, the
associations between political liberalism with Need for Understanding were only
marginally significant. Contrary to predictions and the results from Study 2, yet
consistent with Study 1, Avoidance of Decisional Commitment was unrelated to the
measures ofpolitical liberalism. Finally, the economic dimension of liberalism was
unrelated to the four needs.
To evaluate w1?-ether the four needs uniquely predicted the four political liberalism
variables, and to examine whether political knowledge moderated these relations, a series
8 Partial correlations between the four individual difference needs and political liberalism, the social
dimension of liberalism, and the economic dimension of liberalism are shown in Appendix JJ.
85
of hierarchical regression analyses were conducted. All variables were first standardized
(see Aiken & West, 1991). Sex was entered in the first Step. In the second Step, political
knowledge, Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, and
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment were entered. In the third Step, the four interaction
terms (between each·ofthe four needs and political knowledge) were entered. The
findings for each political liberalism variable are discussed next ~nd shown in Table 7.
Table 6
Partial correlations between the four needs with explicit and implicit political liberalism
for Study 3 controllingfor sex
Political Social Economic
Liberalism Liberalism Liberalism IAT
Need for Inclusiveness .22** .32** .02 .12t
Need for Understanding .14t .24** -.03 .12t
Need for Change .17* .22** .06 .13 t
Avoidance of Decisional -.04 -.08 .04 .07
Commitment
Note. N == 116. One-tailed significance tests are reported. ** p < .01; * p <.05; t P < .10.
Political liberalism is a composite of three items (general, social, and economic).
Concerning explicit political liberalism, in the first Step sex was a significant
predictor, such that women reported greater liberalism than men. In the second Step,
Need for Inclusiveness uniquely predicted greater political liberalism. In the third Step,
the interaction between Need for Inclusiveness by political knowledge was significant
(see Table 7). Simple slope analyses were conducted to explore the significant interaction
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(see Aiken &.West, 1991). Simple slopes were probed at 1 SD above, 1 SD below, and at
the mean on political knowledge and at three values ofNeed for Inclusiveness (i.e., 1 SD
above, 1 SD below, and at the mean). As shown in Figure 5, for the simple regression
with political liberalism regressed onto Need for Inclusiveness, the slope was
significantly different from zero for high, sr2 == .06, t(105) == 2.74,p == .003, and m~an sr2
== .03, t(105) == 2.06,p == .020, levels of political knowledge. The relation was non-
significant at low levels (p == .395).
For the social dimension of liberalism, in the first Step, sex was a unique
predictor. In the second Step, Need for Inclusiveness and Need for Change uniquely
predicted greater social liberalism. In the third Step, the interaction between Need for
Inclusiveness by political sophistication was marginally significant (see Table 7).
With respect to the results for the economic dimension of political liberalism, in
the first Step sex was a significant predictor. However, there were no significant effects
in Step 2. In Step 3, the interactions between Need for Inclusiveness, Need for
Understanding, and Need for Change by political sophistication were marginally
significant (see Table 7).
Finally, for implicit political liberalism, in the first Step, sex was a non-significant
predictor. Only Avoidance of Decisional Commitment uniquely predicted implicitly
measured liberalism at Step 2, and this relation was only marginally significant and very
small. Contrary to predictions, in the third step, none of the interactions predicted implicit
political liberalism (see Table 7).
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Table 7
Regression results for dispositional needs predictingpolitical liberalism in Study 3
Political Social Economic
Liberalism Liberalism Liberalism IAT
Steps: 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 ,.,J
Sex 1.11 ** .93* .78* .99* 1.00* .83t 1.47** 1.17** 1.06** .06 .06 .05
Need for Inclusiveness .33* .36* .55** .55** .07 .09 .03 .03
Need for Understanding .10 .17 .26 .31 t -.06 .05 .03 .04
Need for Change .21 .241' .36* .37* .09 .11 .04 .04
Avoidance of Commitment .06 .09 .06 .09 .08 .13 .051' .04i-
Political Knowledge -.12 -.05 .06 .09 -.261' -.18 -.00 .00
PK by Need for Inclusiveness .30* .261' .23t .02
PK by Need for Understanding -.14 -.07 -.25t -.02
PK by Need for Change .13 -.10 .29t .00
PK by Avoidance of Commitment .08 .14 .07 -.01
R2 .07 .14 .18 .04 .18 .20 .10 .12 .17 .01 .06 .06
R2 Change .07 .04 .14** .02 .02 .05 .05 .01
Note. N= 116. ** p < .01; *p <.05, t p < .10. Unstandardized coefficients are reported. Avoidance of Commitment = Avoidance of
Decisional Commitment; PK = political knowledge. Political Liberalism is a composite of three items (general, social, and economic).
Sex was coded with women = 1, men == O.
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Discussion
The goal of Study 3 was to determine whether situationally induced Need for
Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, and Avoidance of Decisional
Commitment could foster greater endorsement of political liberalism. To prime
participants with the four proposed needs, the scrambled-sentence manipulation (Slaull &
Wyer, 1979) was used. Contrary to previous research successfully utilizing the scrambled
sentence manipulation (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996), the prime did not successfully induce a
state of any of the four proposed needs. As a result, the role of situationally induced
needs on political liberalism could not be assessed.
The relations between political liberalism and individual difference measures of
the four needs were examined across conditions in an attempt to replicate the findings
from Studies 1 and 2 on both explicitly and implicitly measured political liberalism.
Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, greater political liberalism was positively associated
with greater Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding (although this association
was only marginal), and Need for Change. Also, consistent with Study 1, Avoidance of
Decisional Commitment was unrelated to political liberalism. Further, to explore the
relations more fully, the social and economic dimensions of political liberalism were
examined separately. Results demonstrated that whereas Need for Inclusiveness, Need for
Understanding, and Need for Change were positively related with the social dimension of
political liberalism, they were all unrelated to the economic dimension of political
liberalism. Also, regression analyses showed that Need for Inclusiveness uniquely
predicted political liberalism, as well as social liberalism; and, Need for Change was a
unique predictor of greater social liberalism.
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These findings' suggest that Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, and
Need for Change might be especially relevant for the social dimension ofpolitical
liberalism. However, another (and I propose more likely) explanation is that 'participants
in the present study defined their ideology more in terms of the social rather than
economic dimension. Conover and Feldman (1981; see also Johnson & Tamney, 2001;
Tetlock, 1989) argue that individuals' structure and/or meaning of ideology can vary,
with some individuals placing more emphasis on social issues and others on economic
issues. Thus, the lack of findings for the economic dimension in the dispositional need
analyses might be a result of participants defining their ideology more in terms of social
issues than economic ones. Younger adults especially might be more aware of social
issues than economic issues. For instance, first year university students are probably more
likely to know how they feel about (and understand) social issues such as abortion
compared to economic issues such as tax reform.
Contrary to the majority of research on political ideology, with the exception of a
handful of recent studies (e.g., Friese et aI., 2007; Knuston et aI., 2007), Study 3 also
examined implicitly measured political liberalism using an lAT. Although the relations
were only marginally significant, implicitly measured political liberalism was positively
linked with Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, and Need for Change,
consistent with the findings for explicitly measured political liberalism is Studies 1, 2 and
3.
Recently, the nature of the association between implicit and explicit measures of
attitudes has been a topic of considerable discussion in psychology. Whereas some
researchers report strong relations between explicit and implicit measures, others find no
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association (see Hofm~n, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Hofmann,
Gschwendner, Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005). According to a meta-analysis by Hofmann,
Gawronski et aI., the average correlation between implicit and explicit measures is .24. In
the present study, the association between explicitly measured and implicitly measured
liberalism was moderate (r == .48). This finding is consistent with previous works in the
political domain. For instance, Knutson et ai. (2007) found a positive relation (r == .50)
between party affiliation IAT scores and explicit political affiliation scores. Similarly,
Karpinski et al. (2005) reported that participants' Bush-Gore IAT scores strongly
correlated with their explicit assessments of Bush and Gore (r == .61).
In addition to examining the relations between political liberalism and the four
needs, the potential moderating role ofpolitical sophistication between the needs and
political liberalism was also tested. Similar to the results of Studies 1 and 2, the relation
between Need for Inclusiveness and political liberalism was moderated by political
knowledge such that among those with a high or moderate level of political knowledge"
the relation between Need for Inclusiveness and political liberalism was positive.
Considering this finding in combination with the results from Studies 1 and 2, the
interaction between a desire to be inclusive rather than exclusive and political knowledge
appears to be fairly consistent.
The main limitation of Study 3 was the unsuccessful manipulation of the four
proposed needs. Thus, the primary purpose of Study 4 was to determine whether a more
meaningful and less subtle manipulation of a need associated with political liberalism
could foster greater endorsement ofpolitical liberalism. Studies 1, 2 and 3 suggested that
a chronic desire for inclusiveness is associated with greater end~rsementof political
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liberalism (although the zero-order association was only marginal in Study 2). Therefore,
Study 4 focussed on Need for Inclusiveness. According to a motivated social cognition
perspective (Jost, Glaser et aI., 2003a; Kruglanski, 1996), situationally induced Need for
Inclusiveness, similar to a chronic Need for Inclusiveness, should foster greater political
liberalism.
STUDY 4
Method
Participants
Participants were 43 undergraduate students from Brock University (Mage ==
19.81; SD == 2.25; 74.4% female, 25.60/0 male), who participated for course participation
or $2. With respect to ethnicity, 67.4% of participants identified themselves as White,
16.3% Asian, 7% Black, 4.7% other, and 2.3% each Aboriginal and
Hispanic/Latino/South American. Of the 36 participants who reported their religio,us
affiliation, 36.1% identified themselves as Catholic, 19.4% as other, 13.9% as atheist,
11.1% as Protestant, 5.6% each Anglican and Baptist, and 2.8% each Jewish, Hindu, and
Multiple.
Procedure
In groups of approximately 5 to 10, participants individually read and signed
consent forms (see Appendix KK). Need for Inclusiveness was then manipulated using a
perceived similarity task (see Ames, 2004). In particular, participants who were randomly
assigned to the Need for Inclusiveness condition read the following instructions:
Even though you may have a few differences, you likely have a lot in
common with most people in the world. We'd like you to focus on
the important ways in which most people in the world are similar to
you. In the space below, write about some truly important ways in
which most people are similar to you. Discuss whatever you think is
important-beliefs, interests, anxieties, dreams, values, and so on.
In contrast, those randomly assigned to the control condition read the following
instructions:
A recent survey comparing web-based and television-based news
media found that although they have a few differences, web-based
and television-based news media also have some things in common.
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We'd like you to focus on some ways in which web-based and
television-based news are (a) similar and (b) different from one
another. Discuss whatever you think is relevant.
Participants in both conditions were provided with one piece of paper to write their
responses. Next, participants completed a questionnaire package consisting of measures
of the similarity manipulation check, political liberalism, political sophistication, and
demographic variables. Finally, participants were provided with written debriefing (see
Appendix LL).
Measures
Similarity manipulation check. To assess whether the similarity manipulation was
successful, participants responded to three items used by Ames (2004) on a scale from
"strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (7): "In general, I am similar to most people in
the world", "I think I am very similar to other people in the world", and "I'm motivated
by very different things than most people in the world". A composite score was computed
by averaging the fIrst two ite~s (r = .66,p < .oOll Results for the composite as well as
the third item are displayed. Higher scores indicated greater perceived similarity.
Political liberalism. Political liberalism was again measured using a composite of
the three items outlined in the previous studies (i.e., general, social, economic; a == .83).
In addition, participants completed six items specific to either a left-wing (liberal) or
right-wing (conservative) ideology concerning general outlook, social policy, and
economic policy on a scale from "not at ailliberal"/ "not at all conservative" (1) to
"extremely liberal"! "extremely conservative" (9) (see Appendix MM). A composite
score using the average of the three items specific to liberalism was calculated (Left-
9 The reliability for the composite using all three items, with the third item reverse-keyed, was extremely
low (n = .47).
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Wing Ideology; a == .91). Higher scores reflected greater endorsement of liberalism or a
left-wing ideology. A composite score using the average of the three items specific to
conservatism was also calculated (Right-Wing Ideology; a == .89). Higher scores reflected
greater endorsement of conservatism or a right-wing ideology. To assess liberal political
attitudes, participants responded to seven items concerning health-care, divorce law,
abortion, reducing income differences, same-sex marriage, lowering taxes, and money for
the military (see Appendix NN). A score was computed by reverse-scoring politically
conservative items and then averaging the items (a == .64).10 Higher scores indicated
greater liberal political attitudes.
Political sophistication. The same nine-item political knowledge test used in
Studies 2 and 3 was administered (see Appendix E). Scores were computed by summing
the number of correct responses. Higher scores reflected greater political knowledge.
Results
Means and standard deviations of Study 4 variables, and zero-order correlations
among Study 4 variables are displayed in Table 8. An a level of .05 was used for
significance tests. The data were screened to ensure that statistical assumptions were met.
In addition to examining political liberalism, left-wing ideology, and right-wing i~eology
as composite scores, the social and economic dimensions of each variable were analysed
separately to further explore the nature of the effects.
10 Liberal political attitudes were also assessed in Studies 1, 2 and 3; however, all showed low reliabilities.
To measure liberal poIitical attitudes in Study 1, seven items measured participants' attitudes toward
political issues (based on items used by Johnson & Tamney, 2001; see Appendix LL; a =.51); in Study 2,
participants responded to five items (see Appendix LL; a = .31); in Study 3, participants responded to the
same five items used in Study 2 (see Appendix LL; a = .42). Across all three studies, scores were computed
by reverse-scoring politically conservative items and then averaging the items. Higher scores indicated
greater political liberalism. See Appendix JJ for the relations between the four needs and liberal political
attitudes in Studies 1, 2 and 3. See appendices HH, II, and 00 for regression results of needs predicting
liberal political attitudes for Studies 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
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Table 8
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations for Study 4 variables
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
.90**
.77** .48**
.53** .53** .28*
.55** .61 ** .21 t .95** --
.36** .30* .36** .86** .71 ** --
-.84** -.71 ** -.65** -.44** -.45** -.33* --
-.82** -.81 ** -.48** -.48** -.54** -.29* .93** --
-.62** -.36** -.73** -.25 t -.18 -.34* .84** .61 ** --
.70** .77** .38** .47** .53** .24t -.48** -.57** -.20t --
M(SD)
1. Political Liberalism 5.78 (1.44)
2. Social Liberalism 6.07.(1.83)
3. Economic Liberalism 5.33 (1.52)
4. Left-Wing Ideology 5.14 (1.72)
5. Social Left-Wing 5.35 (2.18)
6. Economic Left-Wing 4.88 (1.61)
7. Right-Wing Ideology 4.17 (1.64)
8. Social Right-Wing 3.93 (1.97)
9. Economic Right-Wing 4.42 (1.66)
10. Liberal Political Attitudes 3.40 (0.69)
11. Political Knowledge 2.07(1.62) -.01 -.00 -.06 -.10 -.07 -.12 .01 .02 .08 .04--
12. Perceived Similarity 4.38 (1.21) -.14 -.22 .14 -.14 -.19 .10 .17 .26t -.05 -.05 -.13
13. Perceived Similarity 3 3.98 (1.44) -.03 .10 -.13 .19 .26t .19 .04 -.12 .20 .18 .26t .03
Note. N= 43. ** p < .01; *p <.05; t P < .10. Political liberalism is a composite of three items concerning general outlook, social
policy, and economic policy on a scale from conservative to liberal. Left-Wing Ideology is a composite of three items concerning
general outlook, social policy, and economic policy on a scale from not at all liberal to extremely liberal. Right-Wing Ideology is a
composite of three items concerning general outlook, social policy, and economic policy on a scale from not at .all conservative to
extremely conservative. Perceived Similarity = composite of the first two items. Perceived Similarity 3 = third item. Significance tests
for relations with political knowledge, perceived similarity, and perceived similarity 3 are two-tailed. .
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Manipulation Checks
An independent samples t-test was conducted to assess whether the similarity
manipulation'was successful. Results showed that there were no significant differences
between the control group (M== 4.36; SD == 0.91) and the Need for Inclusiveness
condition (M == 4.41; SD == 1.46) on perceived similarity, t (41) == -0.14;p == .890 (or on
the third perceived similarity item,p == .915).
Between Group Differences
Two multivariate analyses of covariance (MANCQVA) were conducted to test
whether participants in the Need for Inclusiveness condition reported greater political
liberalism compared to those in the control condition. The first MANCOVA examined
the three liberal composite variables (political liberalism, left-wing ideology, and liberal
political attitudes). Sex was entered as a covariate because it was significantly correlated
with liberal political attitudes (r == -.44,p == .003), indicating that women were higher on
liberal political attitudes compared to men. The second MANCOVA examined the four
individual social and economic dimension items used to create the political liberalism and
left-wing ideology variables. Age was entered as a covariate because it was significantly
correlated with the economic dimension of liberalism (r == -.31,p == .044).
Results showed that for the first MANCOVA conducted on the composite
variables, the multivariate effect for condition was significant, F (3, 38) == 5.36,p == .002.
Univariate tests showed that participants in the Need for Inclusiveness condition reported
significantly greater liberal political attitudes (see Table 9). Although participants in the
Need for Incl:usiveness condition reported greater political liberalism and left-wing
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Table 9
Means and standard deviations by condition, and results ofunivariate and tests for
dependent measures in Study 4
Need for
Inclusiveness Control
M(SD) M(SD) F p d
Political Liberalism 6.05 (1.39) 5.49 (1.48) 1.40 .121 .38
Left-Wing Ideology 5.45 (1.84) 4.81 (1.57) 1.33 .127 .39
Liberal Political Attitudes 3.71 (0.60) 3.10 (0.62) 13.28 .0005 1.00
Social Liberalism 6.64 (1.84) 5.48 (1.66) 4.53 .020 .66
Economic Liberalism 5.36 (1.53) 5.29 (1.55) .01 .464 .05
Social Left-Wing 5.82 (2.44) 4.86 (1.80) 2.12 .076 .45
Economic Left-Wing 5.05 (1.65) 4.71 (1.59) .43 .259 .21
Right-Wing Ideology 4.02 (1.62) 4.33 (1.69) .39 .268 -.19
Social Right-Wing 3.64 (2.10) 4.25 (1.81) 1.00 .161 -.31
Economic Right-Wing 4.45 (1.74) 4.40 (1.67) .02 .443 .03
Note. N == 22 for Need for Inclusiveness condition; N == 21 for control condition.
Significance ~ests are one-tailed. Cohen's dwas calculated using means and standard
deviations.
ideology, as expected, these effects did not reach statistical significance (see Table 9).
Results showed that for the second MANCOVA conducted on the four social and
economic dimension items, the multivariate effect for condition was not significant, F (4,
37) == 1.39,p == .128. Univariate tests showed that participants in the Need for
Inclusiveness condition reported significantly greater social political liberalism and
marginally greater social left-wing ideology (see Table 9). Although participants in the
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Need for Inclusiveness condition reported greater economic political liberalism and
economic left-wing ideology, these effects did not reach statistical significance (see Table
9).
To examine whether Need for Inclusiveness affected participants reported right-
wing ideology, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. Although
participants in the Need for Inclusiveness condition reported lower right-wing ideology,
the effect was not significant, F (1,40) == .39,p == .268 (see Table 9). To determine
whether Need for Inclusiveness affected participants reported social right-wing ideology
and economic right-wing ideology, a MANOVA was conducted. The multivariate effect
for condition was non-significant, F (2, 40) == 0.96, p == .196. Univariate tests also
revealed that participants in the Need for Inclusiveness condition did not report
significantly different levels of economic or social right-wing ideology than those in the
control condition (see Table 9).
A series of hierarchical regressions were run to examine whether political
knowledge moderated the effects of condition on each of the dependent measures. Sex
was controlled for in the regression predicting liberal political attitudes, and age was
controlled for in the regression predicting economic political liberalism (Step 1). For the
remaining ideology variables, in Step 1,·condition and (standardized) political knowledge
were entered. In the second step, the interaction between condition and political
knowledge was entered. Results showed that political knowledge did not significantly
moderate the effects for any of the dependent variables (allps > .188, one-tailed).
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Discussion
The purpose of Study 4 was to test whether situationally induced Need for
Inclusiveness' could foster greater political liberalism. Consistent with hypotheses and a
motivated social cognition perspective, participants in the Need for Inclusiveness
condition reported significantly greater social liberalism and liberal political attitudes, as
well as marginally greater social left-wing ideology, compared to those in a control
condition (even though the manipulation check was unsuccessful). Contrary to
expectations, there were no significant differences between conditions on political
liberalism, economic liberalism, left-wing ideology, and economic left-wing ideology,
although the pattern of means was in the expected direction. It is possible that Need for
Inclusiveness is more specific to the social dimensions. Nevertheless, I propose that a
more likely explanation (discussed earlier) is that participants in the present study defined
their ideology more in· terms of social issues than economic issues. As a result, effects of
situationally induced Need for Inclusiveness were shown on the social dimensions but not
the economic dimensions. Also ofnote, there were no significant differences between the
two conditions on the right-wing ideology variables suggesting that Need for
Inclusiveness might be more specific to greater liberalism rather than low conservatism
(see also Conover & Feldman, 1981).
Contrary to Studies 1, 2 and 3, political sophistication did not moderate these
effects. However, the level and range of political knowledge scores among Study 4
participants was particularly low and unvaried (lower than Studies 1, 2 and 3).
Consequently, the restricted range might have hampered the likelihood of detecting a
moderating role of political knowledge (Cohen et aI., 2003; McClelland & Judd, 1993).
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Alternatively, the lack of moderation could be specific to situationally induced needs.
Perhaps, political sophistication plays a moderating role among the relations between
chronic needs with political liberalism, but not with situationally induced needs and
political liberalism. Future research is needed to explore this possibility.
Although the results of Study 4 suggest that the Need for Inclusiveness condition
fostered greater political liberalism compared to a control condition, it is important to
note that the manipulation check for perceived similarity was non-significant. Using a
comparable manipulation, Ames (2004, Studies 2 and 3) successfully fostered greater
perceived similarity among participants in a perceived similarity condition compared to
those in a dissimilarity condition. Unlike Ames' design, however, the control condition
used in the present study was not a dissimilarity manipulation (i.e., write about how
dissimilar you are to most people in the world). Rather, participants in the control
condition were asked to write about similarities and differences of two types of media.
Therefore, participants in the control condition might also have been influenced by a
similarity prime. Thus, it is somewhat unclear whether the similarity manipulation did
indeed foster greater Need for Inclusiveness. Future research relying on a more direct
measure ofN'eed for Inclusiveness (vs. perceived similarity) as well as a dissimilarity
control condition is necessary.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This dissertation was intended to extend previous research examining the
psychological variables that underlie political ideology (e.g., Block & Block, 2006; Jost,
Glaser et aI., 2003a; Thorisdottir et aI., 2007). Given that most research on political
ideology focuses almost entirely on political conservatism, the present dissertation aimed
to fill a gap in the literature by exploring the social-cognitive needs or motives underlying
political liberalism. On the basis of general psychological theoretical perspectives on
political ideology, empirical work examining political conservatism, and empirical
research studying differences between liberals and conservatives, I hypothesized that four
psychological needs would predict the endorsement of political liberalism, namely: Need
for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, and Avoidance of
Decisional Commitment.
In Studies 1, 2 and 3 - two student samples and a diverse sample of community
adults - I examined whether a Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for
Change, and a Avoidance of Decisional Commitment predicted greater endorsement of
political liberalism (note that the relations with the four proposed needs and political
liberalism were tested in Study 3 given the failed manipulation). In Study 4, I tested
whether situationally induced Need for Inclusiveness fostered greater political liberalism.
As outlined in the Introduction, some research suggests that political sophistication might
moderate the relation of needs and motives with political ideology (e.g., Converse, 1964;
Federico & Schneider, 2007; Jacoby, 1991). Thus, I expected that the proposed links
between (or effects of) the four needs and political liberalism would be stronger among
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individuals higher in political sophistication. This prediction was tested in all four
studies.
Across Studies 1, 2 and 3, a fairly consistent pattern of correlations between the
needs and political liberalism emerged: Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding,
and Need for Change all related to greater endorsement of political liberalism (although
the relations between political liberalism and Need for Inclusiveness in Study 2, and
between liberalism and Need for Understanding in Study 3 were marginally significant).
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment was also related to political liberalism; however,
this association only emerged marginally in Study 2. In Study 3, liberalism was also
assessed using an implicit tool, the Implicit Association Test or IAT (Greenwald et aI.,
1998). As mentioned earlier, researchers such as Burdein et al. (2006) have emphasized
the importance of incorporating measures tapping participants' automatic responses in
addition to consciously controlled responses in research in the political domain. Friese et
al. (2007), for example, found that implicitly assessed political party preferences, in
addition to explicitly measured party preference and voting intention, predicted
participants' voting behaviour. Consistent with the pattern of results found for explicitly
measured liberalism in the present dissertation, the results from Study 3 demonstrated
that Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, as well as Need for Change all
related to greater implicitly measured political liberalism, although these relations were
only marginally significant.
To more fully explore the nature of the relations between the four proposed needs
with political liberalism in Study 3, the measure of explicit liberalism was split into social
and economic dimensions. Several previous researchers have shown that political
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ideology can be summarized by two dimensions, one typically concerning social issues
and one concerning economic issues (e.g., Ashton et al., 2005; Choma et aI., 2007). In
Study 3, analyses showed that Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, and Need
for Change significantly related to the social dimension of liberalism, but not the
economic dimension (see Table 6). The needs proposed to be underlying liberalism in the
present dissertation might be more relevant for the social dimension than the economic
dimension. Yet, as I proposed earlier, it is possible that this pattern of findings might be
better explained by the notion that participants in the present studies defined their
ideology more in terms of the social dimension than the economic dimension (see
Conover & Feldman, 1981).
To summarize, Need for Inclusiveness, or a desire to be inclusive and nurturing
was positively associated with greater liberalism, as predicted. Need for Understanding,
or a desire for cognitive complexity and inquisitiveness was also significantly related to
greater endorsement of political liberalism. In addition, Need for Change, or a desire for
new and novel experiences, sensation-seeking, and change was related to greater political
liberalism. Contrary to predictions, Avoidance of Decisional Commitment was unrelated
to political liberalism in Studies 1 and 3, and only weakly linked with liberalism in Study
2. In fact, the correlation between Avoidance of Decisional Commitment with political
liberalism was close to zero in Studies 1 and 3. However, Avoidance of Decisional
Commitment demonstrated an association with political liberalism through an interaction
with political. sophistication in Study 1. This result was explored earlier (see Study 1
Discussion), and will be explained further in this General Discussion.
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Although Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, and Need for Change
all correlated with greater political liberalism, only certain needs uniquely predicted
political liberalism when entered simultaneously into a regression. In particular, Need for
Inclusiveness was a unique predictor of greater political liberalism in Studies 1 and 3.
Need for Change uniquely predicted greater political liberalism in Studies 1 and 2, but
did not in Study 3. Need for Understanding and Avoidance of Decisional Commitment
were unique predictors in Study 2 only. As mentioned throughout this dissertation, one
potential explanation for this inconsistency is overlapping variance among the needs (see
Cohen et aI., 2003; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). In circumstances where two predictor
variables (e.g., Need for Change and Need for Understanding) account for a portion of
shared variance in a criterion variable (e.g., political liberalism), one is typically dropped
as a unique predictor when tested simultaneously (Cohen et aI., 2003; Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2001; Tzelgov & Henik, 1991). Therefore, given the overlapping variance among
certain needs, it is not surprising that all three needs did not emerge as unique predictors
in each study.
The role of political sophistication or expertise in political ideology has been
debated for decades (see Jost, 2006). Previous researchers have shown that certain factors
such as education level and political sophistication can increase ideological consistency
(e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Judd & Krosnick, 1989; Lavine et aI., 1997; Luskin, 1987; Millar &
Tesser, 1986; Zaller, 1992), suggesting that the relation between the four proposed needs
with political liberalism might be moderated by political sophistication. As discussed in
the Introduction, findings demonstrating that individuals low in political expertise are less
likely to use abstract ideological constructs to organize their political attitudes (e.g.,
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Converse, 1964) do not necessarily imply that individuals who are less politically
sophisticated are non-ideological (see Jost, 2006). Instead, this body of research suggests
that the relations between political ideology and the relevant underlying needs or
motivations might be stronger among individuals higher in political sophistication. Thus,
political sophistication was examined as a potential moderator in the present dissertation.
Several of the proposed needs interacted with political knowledge to predict
political liberalism in Studies 1, 2 and 3, the most consistent being a Need for
Inclusiveness. In Studies 1, 2 and 3, Need for Inclusiveness predicted greater political
liberalism among those with a higher or moderate knowledge of politics, but not among
those with a low level of political knowledge. Similarly, this pattern emerged for Need
for Change among the community participants of Study 2. Finally, Avoidance of
Decisional Commitment also interacted with political sophistication such that among
those with a high knowledge of politics, the relation with political liberalism was
positive. In contrast, the relation between Avoidance of Decisional Commitment and
political liberalism was negative among those with a low knowledge of politics. Thus, a
comparable pattern of interaction was replicated across Studies 1, 2 and 3: Among those
with a greater knowledge of politics, the association between a certain need and political
liberalism tended to be stronger and positive. This pattern is consistent with a recent
study conducted by Kemmelmeier (2007) who found that political interest moderated the
relation between cognitive orientation (rigidity) and conservatism, such that the relation
was stronger and posi~ive among those with a greater interest in politics.
What remains unclear however, is why the relation between the proposed needs
and political liberalism is stronger among those higher in political sophistication? There
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are several potential explanations, all of which beg future investigation. First, it is
possible that these findings are simply an artifact of measurement. As I proposed in the
Introduction, individuals higher in politic~l sophistication are likely better able to
accurately indicate their political ideology, compared to those lower in political
sophistication, who might do so with a greater degree of error. If this is the case, then a
significant relation between liberalism and the proposed needs (e.g., Need for
Inclusiveness) might emerge among those higher in political sophistication simply
because there is less error in their self-reported ideology. However, inherent in this
explanation is the assumption that individuals with a greater knowledge ofpolitics utilize
their knowledge, and this might not always be the case, as discussed next.
The majority of research examining political sophistication has assumed that its
effects are a result of informational processes, such that individuals with ideological-
specific knowledge rely on this base to interpret and make sense of political
attitudes/stimuli (e.g., Converse, 1964). Recent work by Federico and Schneider (2007),
however, has demonstrated that while a greater knowledge of politics is related to
ideological consistency or constraint, the relation is moderated by a motivation to utilize
this knowledge base. In particular, they found that the relation between expertise and
constraint was stronger among individuals with a greater motivation to evaluate. Thus,
perhaps it is not solely the possession of political expertise that moderates the relation
between needs and liberalism, but a motivation to apply that expertise. These findings
imply that the moderating effects of political sophistication found in the present
dissertation between needs and political liberalism might be further moderated by a
motivation to use one's political knowledge.
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One way to further investigate the role of political sophistication and motivation
to evaluate could be with experimental research. In the future, researchers should
manipulate political consistency or constraint (e.g., a seminar on the meaning of liberal
and conservative, and the typical issues-stances that accompany these orientations) and
motivation to use this knowledge base (e.g., encourage participants to think about their
attitudes and self-placement in light of this knowledge).
As discussed earlier, the detection of interactions in correlational designs are
difficult because of issues related to the nature of distributions of predictor variables (e.g.,
restricted range, fewer cases at extreme values, etc.) and lower statistical power (Aiken &
West, 1991; Cohen et aI., 2003; Jaccard et aI., 1990; McClelland & Judd, 1993). As such,
the chall~nges in detecting interactions in non-experimental designs might explain why
consistent interactions between political sophistication and certain needs were not found.
For example, the interactions of Avoidance of Decisional Commitment and Need for
Change with political sophistication were only found in one study each.
To account for the difficulties of testing moderation with correlational data, future
research should manipulate participants' level of political knowledge. In contrast to
correlational or observational designs in which the range and variability of scores is
dependent upon the population sampled, experimental manipulation of a moderator
variable permits a test of moderation using extreme ranges, making it easier to detect
moderation (McClelland & Judd, 1993). Such experimental research would help to
clarify whether political sophistication similarly moderates the relations of all chronic
needs associated with political liberalism, or whether the moderating influence of
political sophistication is reserved for certain needs.
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The results from Studies 1, 2 and 3 provide some evidence for the role of chronic
social-cognitive needs or motives in peoples' endorsement of political liberalism. Such
findings can account for some of the variation in individuals' political ideology; however,
results specific to individual differences cannot explain variations in political ideology
entirely. As discussed in the Introduction, according to a motivated social cognition
perspective, both dispositional and situational variables multiply determine peoples'
political ideology (Jost, Glaser et aI., 2003a; Kruglanski, 1996). Previous research has
illustrated the effects situational variables can have on individuals' political leanings
(e.g., Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Doty et aI., 1991; Jost et aI., 2003a; Kruglanski & Webster,
1991; McCann, 1997; Sales, 1973). Therefore, to fully understand why individuals adopt
certain political ideologies, the role of situationally induced needs must be examined. As
such, in Studies 3 and 4a Need for Inclusiveness, a Need for Understanding, a Need for
Change, and an Avoidance of Decisional Commitment were individually manipulated
and their impact on the endorsement of political liberalism was assessed.
Unfortunately, the scrambled-sentence prime (Bargh et al., 1996; Slaull & Wyer,
1979) used in Study 3 did not successfully raise the salience of the four proposed needs
(see Study 3, Discussion). Therefore, as an additional test of the role of situationally
induced social-cognitive needs on expressions of political liberalism, in Study 4, Need for
Inclusiveness was manipulated using a perceived similarity exercise (see Ames, 2004).
Study 4 also examined the influence ofNeed for Inclusiveness on political liberalism,
independent of political conservatism. In Studies 1, 2 and 3, political liberalism was
assessed using a uni-dimensional scale, and thus, could not inform whether the proposed
needs were uniquely linked with political liberalism. To address this, separate measures
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of political liberalism and political conservatism were employed in Study 4. Contrary to
expectations, the difference between conditions on a composite measure of political
liberalism was not significant. Further, the effect for social left-wing ideology was only
marginally significant. However, participants in the Need for Inclusiveness condition
reported significantly greater social political liberalism and liberal political attitudes
compared to those in a control group. Presumably, reflecting on how similar one is to
most people in the world fostered greater liberalism (however, this is uncertain given that
the manipulation check failed). Therefore, Study 4 provided some empirical support for
the notion that situationally induced social-cognitive needs - at least Need for
Inclusiveness- - might foster greater endorsement of political liberalism.
Contrary to predictions, political knowledge did not moderate the effects of
manipulated Need for Inclusiveness on political liberalism. Low variability in political
knowledge scores may account for the lack of moderation (Cohen et aI., 2003;
McClelland & Judd, 1993; see Study 4 Discussion). As suggested above, future research
should examine the moderating role of political sophistication by directly manipulating
participants' level of political knowledge to increase the likelihood of detecting an
interaction (see McClelland & Judd, 1993). This would inform whether the effects of
situationally induced needs (in comparison to individual difference needs) are similarly
subject to moderation, or whetherpolitical knowledge only moderates the relations with
individual difference needs.
In summary, the present dissertation examined the role of four dispositional, as
well as situationally-induced needs, on the endorsement of political ideology, especially
liberalism. By examining the motivational underpinnings ofpolitical ideology with a
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focus on political liberalism, the findings of the present dissertation indicate that there
might be other needs underlying political ideology that have been overlooked. Across
.four studies involving samples of first year university students, fourth year university
students, and a diverse sample of community adults, the present dissertation provided
some empiri~al support for the prediction that the endorsement of political liberalism is
multiply determined by both chronic and situationally induced social-cognitive needs or
motives, primarily: Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, and Need for
Change. Also, Study 4 provided some evidence that there might be certain needs (perhaps
Need for Inclusiveness) that are linked with political liberalism in particular. Further, the
present research identified one moderating variable of the association between needs with
political ideology - political sophistication.
Several qualifications of the present findings and suggestions for future research
should be noted. First, future research on political liberalism should look beyond the
specific needs proposed in the current dissertation. For example, the needs and motives
explored in the present studies are not exhaustive. There might be other needs or
motivations that promote greater political liberalism through dispositional and/or
situational avenues. Future research is needed to identify any such variables. Moreover,
there are other influences, outside of needs or motivations that likely affect people's
endorsement of certain political ideologies. For instance, variables such as demographic
characteristics (see Knight, 1999), developmental factors (see Sears & Levy, 2003), and
socialization influences (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981, 1998), also playa role in predicting an
individual's political orientation.
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Second, because I propose that some of the needs associated with political
liberalism are different, not just opposite, from those that foster political conservatism
(see also Conover & Feldman 1981), future research should test whether needs are
differentially related to separate measures of liberalism versus conservatism. In .
particular, future research should employ a measure similar to the bi-dimensional scale of
political ideology used in Study 4. Such research would provide empirical evidence for
the notion that some needs are related to greater liberalism and not necessarily low
conservatism. For instance, the effects in Study 4 ofNeed for Inclusiveness fostering
greater liberalism and left-wing ideology, but not lower right-wing ideology, suggest that
Need for Inclusiveness might be more relevant to liberalism than conservatism.
Third, and related to the above two points, an analysis of the relations between
separate measures of liberalism and conservatism with the four proposed needs of
liberalism, as well as the needs reviewed by Jost, Glaser et al. (2003a) associated with
conservatism, would greatly extend current knowledge concerning the social-cognitive
needs fostering liberalism and conservatism. In the present dissertation, I proposed that
some of the needs or motives underlying liberalism are different than those that underlie
political conservatism. A simultaneous examination of several needs proposed to underlie
liberalism and conservatism using separate measures of these constructs would allow
researchers to directly test which needs are distinctly related to liberalism versus
conservatism (see Conover & Feldman 1981), and which needs are similarly (although
oppositely) related to liberalism and conservatism. This line' of inquiry would allow
researchers to further explore what kinds of needs are associated with liberalism versus
conservatism, or even the number of needs that underlie these political ideologies.
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Fourth, although the present dissertation examined the role of situationally
induced Need for Inclusiveness, additional experimental research is needed to examine
whether situationally induced Need for Understanding, Need for Change, Avoidance of
Decisional Commitment or related variables, similarly foster greater endorsement of
political liberalism. Importantly, a greater understanding of how real-life events (e.g.,
9/11, Bonanno & Jost, 2007) heighten the salience of certain needs or motives associated
with liberalism and/or conservatism and the impact this might have on individuals'
political ideology, political attitudes, political involvement and voting preferences is
needed. For example, a study by Willer (2004) showed that approval ratings for U~S.
President George W. Bush were associated with increased terror warnings.
Further, an examination of the interaction of dispositional with situationally
induced needs or motives on political ideology would also extend current knowledge. For
example, perhaps individuals chronically high in Need for Inclusiveness who are exposed
to a situation characterized by a high Need for Inclusiveness might be especially high on
political liberalism.
Finally, and as recommended by others (e.g., Federico & Schneider, 2007),
researchers should sample from diverse populations, especially beyond university
samples. To adequately understand the role of social-cognitive needs or motivations, as
well as other variables, in expressions of political ideology, it is imperative that proposed
associations are examined among diverse populations with varying levels of potential
moderating variables (e.g., political expertise). Indeed, limiting the possible range of
scores ofpotential moderators drastically reduces the chances of detecting an interaction,
even if one does exist (Cohen et aI., 2003; McClelland & Judd, 1993; Pitt & West, 2001).
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Failing to test the generalizability of our findings limits our understanding of political
ideology and the many variables that contribute to it, relate to it, and are influenced by it.
In conclusion, although liberals and conservatives differ on certain needs, as
Klein's quote at the beginning of this dissertation suggests, liberals and conservatives
probably have one major thing in common: their ideologies are probably both influenced
by underlying needs and motivations. Future researchers exploring chronic and
situational sources of social-cognitive needs, and their interaction, would greatly expand
current knowledge about political orientation (both political conservatism and liberalism),
especially our understanding of the reasons - motivated and otherwise - for why
individuals adopt certain political ideologies.
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Brock University: Participants Informed Consent Statement
Project Title: General Attitudes and Personality
Principle Investigator: Becky Choma
PhD Student, Psychology Department
rc98ac@brocku.ca ; 905-688-5550 ext. 4680
Supervisor: Dr. Carolyn Hafer
Brock University Professor
chafer(2Ubrocku.ca ; 905-688-5550 ext. 4297
PURPOSE/INFORMATION: You are being invited to participate in a study investigating how people's
personality is related to their general attitudes, values, and beliefs. You will be given 2 copies of this
consent form that you will read and may ask any questions. Then, you will be asked to sign both copies,
one will be handed to the researcher and one you will keep for your own records. After you have signed the
consent form you will be asked to complete a questionnaire taking approximately 30 (or 60-90) minutes.
After you have handed in your questionnaire the researcher will provide you with a debriefing form
explaining the specific purpose of the study.
RISKS/BENEFITS: There are no known risks for participating in this study. If you have any questions,
you may contact the researcher or her supervisor. The information from this study will help with the
completion of a PhD dissertation and contribute to research on personality and attitudes. This study counts
as a 1.5 hour study for PSYC course research apprenticeships.
CONFIDENTIALITY: Your name will only be associated with this consent form. There will be no way
ofknowing what you wrote. All consent forms and data will be kept in a locked room at all times and
destroyed 5 years after publication. Only Becky Choma and Dr. Carolyn Hafer will have access to this data.
Any information gathered from this research will be anonymous.
CONTACT: If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures you may contact the
researcher, Becky Choma, at Brock University in the Psychology Department, and through email:
rc98acrmbrocku.ca, her Supervisor, Dr. Carolyn Hafer, Brock University, 688-5550, extension 4297 or
chafer@brocku.ca. This project has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of
Research Ethics Board (File # 05-010). If you have any pertinent questions regarding your rights as a
participant, please contact the Research Ethics Officer at reb@brocku.ca, 905-688-5550 ext 3035.
PARTICIPATION: Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate at any
time without consequences to yourself by informing the researcher of this decision. If you withdraw from
the study before you are done the questionnaire your questionnaire will be omitted from analysis upon your
request. Due to the anonymous nature of this study, data cannot be withdrawn once submitted. You have
the right to omit any question(s) you choose.
FEEDBACK AND PUBLICATION: The results from this study will be incorporated into a PhD
dissertation and may be used in any journal articles, presentations, or books published. The results of this
research study may be available approximately one year from now. Would you like to receive a copy of the
results (circle)? Please provide an email address where the results can be sent: _
CONSENT: You must be at least 20 years of age to participate in this study.
I have read and understand the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I understand that I
may ask questions in the future. I agree to participate in this study.
Participant's signature Date _
Investigator's signature Date _
**PLEASE KEEP A COpy OF THIS CONSENT FORM FOR YOUR RECORDS***
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DATE: August 24,2005
FROM: Linda Rose-Krasnor, Chair
Research Ethics Board (REB)
TO: Carolyn Hafer, Psychology
Becky CHOMA
FILE: 05-010 CHOMA
TITLE: General Attitudes and Personality
The Brock University Research Ethics Board has reviewed the above research proposal.
DECISION: Accepted as clarified, however, please add the Research Ethics Officer contact
information to the letter for Manager/Owners.
This project has received ethics clearance for the period ofAugust 24, 2005 to May 30, 2006 subject to full
REB ratification at the Research Ethics Board's next scheduled meeting. The clearance period may be
extended upon request. The study may now proceed.
Please note that the Research Ethics Board (REB) requires that you adhere to the protocol as last reviewed
and cleared by the REB. During the course of research no deviations from, or changes to, the protocol,
recruitment, or consent form may be initiated without prior written clearance from the REB. The Board
must provide clearance for. any modifications before they can be implemented. If you wish to modify your
research project, please refer to http://w\vw.brocku.ca/researchservices/fornls to complete the appropriate
form Revision or Modification to an Ongoing Application.
Adverse or unexpected events must be reported to the REB as soon as possible with an indication ofhow
these events affect, in the view of the Principal Investigator, the safety of the participants and the
continuation of the protocol.
If research participants are in the care of a health facility, at a school, or other institution or community
organization, it is the responsibility of the Principal Investigator to ensure that the ethical guidelines and
clearance of those facilities or institutions are obtained and filed with the REB prior to the initiation of any
research protocoIs.
The Tri-Council. Policy Statement requires that ongoing research be monitored. A Final Report is
required for all projects upon completion of the project. Researchers with projects lasting more than one
year are required to submit a Continuing Review Report annually. The Office of Research Services will
contact you when this form Continuing Review/Final Report is required.
Please quote your REB file nUlnber on all future correspondence.
LRKlbb
Office of Research Ethics
Brock University
Office of Research Services
500 Glenridge Avenue
St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada L2S 3A1
phone: (905)688-5550, ext. 3035 fax: (905)688-0748
email: reb@brocku.ca
http://www.brocku.ca/researchservices/ethics/humanethicsl
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Brock University Written Debriefing Form
Project Title: General Attitude and Personality
Principle Investigator: Becky Choma
PhD Student, Psychology Department
rc98ac@.brocku.ca ; 905-688-5550 ext. 4680
Supervisor: Dr. Carolyn Hafer
Brock University Professor
chafer@brocku.ca ; 905-688-5550 ext. 4297
The purpose of this research is to understand why people adopt certain political
ideologies. For example, either liberal or conservative-not the political parties-instead general
ways of thinking or viewing the world. Other research examining political ideologies has found
that political conservatism is related to many personality traits.
One group of researchers, specifically, Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway predicted
that some people hold conservative ideologies to fulfill some of their psychological needs.
Although there is a large body of research showing that conservatism is related to many
personality traits, there is minimal research examining the relationship between liberalism and
personality.
Because there is minimal research on liberalism, the present study aims to fill this gap by
examining what personality traits are related to liberalism. Theory and research on political
ideology--both on conservatism and liberalism, and research on the differences between
conservatives and liberals suggests that there are four main groups of psychological
needs/motives related to political1iberalism: (1) Need for Inclusiveness, (2) Need for
Understanding, (3) Need for Change/Need to Rebel, and (4) Fear of Commitment to a
Decision/Need to be Accurate. Findings from this study will help to understand what personality
traits may be related to political liberalism.
It is important to remember that there is a range in beliefs and a variety of ways of viewing the
world. For example, people have different political ideologies, or different religious beliefs. And
all viewpoints 'deserve consideration and respect.
Please do not show this form to other potential participants, this is for your viewing. This
is so that other potential participants do not find out about the study beforehand; this could
prevent them from responding naturally to the questions. Thank you for your cooperation.
If you feel you have not been treated according to the descriptions in this form, or your
rights as a participant in research have been violated during the course of this project, you may
contact the Research Ethics Officer at 905-688-5550, extension 3035. This project has been
reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of Research Ethics Board (File.# 05-
010).
Thank you for your time and support in participating in this study!!
Becky
If you have any questions or concerns please feel free to contact any of the following:
Becky Choma (Principle investigator) Dr. Carolyn Hafer (Supervisor)
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Please indicate on the scale below how liberal or conservative (in terms of your general
outlook) you are in general:
1
Very Liberal
2 3 4 5 6 7
Very
Conservative
How liberal or conservative do you tend to be when it comes to social p.olicy?
1
Very Liberal .
2 3 4 5 6 7
Very
Conservative
How liberal o~ conservative do you tend to be when it comes to economic policy?'
1
Very Liberal
2 3 4 5 6 7
Very
Conservative
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Please answer each of the following questions to the best of your ability.
1. Who is the Governor General of Canada?
-------------------
2. Who is the Prime Minister of Canada?
--------------------
3. What is the name of the Prime Minister's political party? _
4. What job or. political offices do the following hold?
i.JacquesChka9~ _
ii. Tony Blair _
ili.~illes~uceppe~ ~
5. Who is the head of the UN?
------------------------
6. What party has the most seats in the House of Commons? _
7. How many readings does a bill go through in the House of Commons? _
8. Where does a bill go after it passes the House of Commons? _
9. Who is the former Conservative Party MP who crossed the floor and joined the Liberal Party in
May of2005? _
Wh~posliionwasthispersonappoin~d? ~
10. Name the four political parties with the most seats in the House of Commons. _
Note. Questions 1, 2,3, 4i, 4iii, 5, 7, 8, and 9 were used in Studies 2, 3, and 4.
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1. I have a soft heart. 1 2 3 4 5
2. I go out of my way for others. 2 3 4 5
3. I think of others first. 2 3 4 5
4. I will do anything for others. 1 2 3 4 5
5. I like to please others. 2 3 4 5
6. I wouldn't harm a fly. 2 3 4 5
7. I make enemies. 2 3 4 5
8. I oppose authority. 2 3 4 5
9. I believe that I am better than others. 2 3 4 5
1o. I seek danger. 1 2 3 4 5
11. I put people under pressure. 2 3 4 5
12. I try to outdo others. 2 3 4 5
13. I believe only in myself. 2 3 4 5
Appendix G
Inquisitiveness:
1. I'm interested in learning about the history and politics of other countries.
2. I find TV nature programs to be very boring.
3. I enjoy looking at maps of different places.
4. I know the capital cities of many countries.
5. I would like to visit the ruins of ancient civilizations.
6. I would be very bored by a book about the history of science and technology.
7. .I like'to keep up with news about scientific discoveries.
8. I've never really enjoyed looking through an encyclopaedia.
Creativity:
1. I prefer doing things the way I've always done them, rather than waste time
looking for a new way.
2. I would like ajob that requires following a routine rather than being creative.
3. I think I could develop some good ideas for television commercials.
4. I would like the job of drawing a comic strip or an editorial cartoon.
5. I have often solved problems by using new ideas that other people had not
imagined.
6. I would enjoy creating a work of art, such as a novel, a song, or a painting.
7. People have often told me that I have a good imagination.
8. I don't think of myself as the artistic or creative type.
Unconventionality:
1. I like hearing about opinions that are very different from those of most people.
2. I think that paying attention to radical ideas is a waste of time.
3. People sometimes describe me as unconventional.
4. I would avoid hanging around with people who have unusual opinions.
5. I like. people who have unconventional views.
6. I think of myself as a somewhat eccentric person.
7. Most people would consider some of my beliefs to be quite strange.
8. I find it boring to discuss philosophy.
Altruism-Antagonism:
1. I am a soft-hearted person.
2. I would feel very badly if I were to hurt someone.
3. I have sympathy for people who are less fortunate than I am.
4. I try to give generously to those in need.
5. I try to respect other people's feelings.
6. I like the idea that only the strong should survive.
7. It wouldn't bother me to harm someone I didn't like.
8. People see me as a hard-hearted person.
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1. The similarities between genders/races/people of different religions/etc are
greater than the differences.
2. I tend to value similarities over differences when I meet someone.
3. At one level of thinking we are all of a kind.
4. I can understand almost anyone because I'm a little like everyone.
5. Little differences among people mean a lot.
6. I can see myself fitting into many groups.
7. There is a potential for good and evil in all of us.
8. When I look into the eyes of others I see myself.
9. I could never get accustomed to living in another country.
10. When I first meet someone I tend to notice differences between myself and the
other person.
11. "Between" describes my position with regards to groups better than "in" and
"out."
12. The same spirit dwells in everyone.
13. Older persons are very different than I am.
14. I can tell a grea~ deal ,about a person by knowing their ethnicity.
15. There is a certain beauty in everyone.
16. I can tell a great deal about a person by knowing his/her age.
17. Men and women will never totally understand each other because of their inborn
differences.
18. Everyone in the world is very much alike because in the end we all die.
19. I have difficulty relating to persons who are much younger than I.
20. When I meet someone I tend to notice similarities between myself and the. other
person.
Note. Items 7 and 11 were excluded in Study 2. Items 1, 2, 4, 10 and 20 were used in
Study 3.
Appendix I
1. I talk a lot of different people at parties
2. I feel comfortable around people.
3. I make friends easily.
4. I warm up quickly to others.
5. I start conversation.
6. I often feel uncomfortable around others.
7. I avoid contacts with others.
8. I keep others at a distance.
9. I am hard to get to know.
10. I avoid company.
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1. I like to solve complex problems 1 2 3 4 5
2. I love to read challenging material. 1 2 3 4 5
3. I have a rich vocabulary 1 2 3 4 5
4. I can handle a lot of information. 1 2 3 4 5
5. I enjoy thinking about things. 2 3 4 5
6. I am not interested in abstract ideas. 2 3 4 5
7. I avoid philosophical discussions. 2 3 4 5
8. I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. 1 2 3 4 5
9. I am not interested in theoretical discussions. 1 2 3 4 5
10. I avoid difficult reading material. 2 3 4 5
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Appendix K
1. I believe in the importance of art.
2. I enjoy hearing new ideas.
3. I love to learn new things.
4. I get excited by new ideas.
5. I like music.
6. I do not enjoy going to art museums.
7. I believe that too much tax money goes to support artists.
8. I do not like concerts.
9. I do not like poetry.
10. I do not enjoy watching dance performances.
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Appendix L
1. I would like to live for while in a different country.
2. I like to visit new places.
3. I seek adventure.
4. I try to do too difficult things.
5. I dislike changes.
6. I am attached to conventional ways.
7. I dislike the unknown.
8. I don't like to travel.
9. I would never go hang-gliding or bungee-jumping.
10. I am a creature of habit.
Note. Items 9 and 10 were excluded from Study 2. Item 10 was excluded from Study 3.
Appendix M
1. I break rules. 1 2 3 4 5
2. I know how to get around the rules. 1 2 3 4 5
3. I enjoy crude jokes. 1 2 3 4 5
4. I use swear words. 1 2 3 4 5
5. I cheat to get ahead. 1 2 3 4 5
6. I resist authority. 1 2 3 4 ·5
7. I would never cheat on my taxes. 1 2 3 4 5
8. I try to follow the rules. 1 2 3 4 5
9. I stick to the rules. 1 2 3 4 5
10. I respect authority. 1 2 3 4 5
Note. Item 7 was excluded from Study 2.
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Each of the items below contains two choices, A and B. Please indicate by circling the either A or
B which of the choices most describes your likes or the way you feel. Please choose the one
which better describes your likes or feelings. In some cases you may find items in which you do
not like either choice. In these cases mark the choice you dislike least.
It is important you respond to all items with only one choice, A or B. We are interested only in
your likes or feelings, not in how others feel about these things or how one is supposed to feel.
There are no right or wrong answers as in other kinds of tests. Be frank and give your honest
appraisal of yourself.
1. A. I dislike the sensations one gets when flying.
B. I enjoy many of the rides in amusement parks.
2. A. I would like ajob which would require a lot of traveling.
B. I would prefer ajob in one location.
3. A. I am invigorated by a brisk, cold day.
B. I can't wait to get into the indoors on a cold day.
4. A. I often wish I could be a mountain climber.
B. I can't understand people who risk their necks climbing mountains.
5. A. I dislike all body odours.
B. I like ~ome of the earthy body smells.
6. A. I get bored seeing the same old faces.
B. I like the comfortable familiarity of everyday friends.
7. A. I like to explore a strange city or section of town by myself, even if it means getting lost.
B. I prefer a guide when I am in a place I don't know well.
8. A. I find the quickest and easiest route to a place and stick to it.
B. I sometimes take different routes to a place I often go, just for variety's sake.
9. A. I would not like to try any drug which might produce strange and dangerous effects on me.
B. I would like to try some of the new drugs that produce hallucinations.
10. A. I would prefer living in an ideal society where everyone is safe, secure and happy.
B. I would have preferred living in the unsettled. days of our history.
11. A. I sometimes like to do things that are a little frightening.
B. A sensible person avoids activities that are dangerous.
12. A. A person should change jobs from time to time simply to avoid getting into a rut.
B. A person should find ajob which is fairly satisfying to him and stick with it.
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13. A. larder the dishes with which I am familiar, so as to avoid disappointment and
unpleasantness.
B. I like to try new foods that I have never tasted before.
14. A. I can't stand riding with a person who likes to speed.
B. I sometimes like to drive very fast because I find it exciting.
15. A. If I were a salesman I would prefer working on a commission if I had a chance to make
more money than I could on salary.
B. If I were a salesman I would prefer a straight salary rather than the risk of making little or
nothing on a commission basis.
16. A. Rules and regulations have their proper and valid functions, and therefore should be
observed without exception.
B. I often feel tempted to break minor rules just for the hell of it.
17. A. I would like to take off on a trip with no pre-planned or definite routes, or timetables.
B. When I go on a trip I like to plan my route and timetable fairly carefully.
18. A. I would like to try parachute jumping.
B. I would never want to try jumping out of a plane, with or without a parachute.
19. A. I would prefer to specialize in studying one particular subject.
B. I would like to study many different kinds of subjects.
20. A. I do not like the irregularity and discord of most modern music.
B. I like to listen to new and unusual kinds of music.
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Appendix a
1. I feel as if most people would be surprised to know the "rear' me.
2. I often (more than 50% of the time) feel overwhelmed when I picture myself in a
specific job.
3. When faced with several options in an important area in my life, I have a difficult
time deciding which option would be the best one.
4. If I wore the type of clothes I really want to wear, I'm afraid my friends wouldn't
want to spend time with me.
5. Once I make a major decision, I feel as if I cannot change my mind.
6. Sometimes I'm afraid that being successful will lead to personal loneliness.
7. Being labelled a successful person means I always have to be a "super" person - and
that gets very tiring.
8. I feel badly about myself for quite a while (more than two weeks) when I have made a
mistake about an important decision.
9. My friends tell me'I have trouble making decisions.
10. Being successful (e.g., in school, work, sports, etc) has caused a lot of problems in my
life.
11. Sometimes I will ignore a decision I should make because I don't want to make a
mistake.
12. People have higher expectations for those who succeed - and the pressure can be too
intense.
13. I often keep my thoughts to myselfbecause I'm afraid my friends would disapprove.
14. There are times when I do not make an important decision because I am afraid of
failing.
15. When I feel I have made a mistake about an important decision, I don't worry or
dwell upon it.
16. I often (more than 50%) of the time "shrug off' compliments from others because the
comments do not truly reflect who I am.
17. I worry that I won't find the best major/job/career for me.
18. If I become successful in my job, I'm afraid I will lose close ties to important people
in my life.
19. It upsets me when important people in my life are disappointed in my decisions.
20. I feel as if I have always had trouble making decisions.
21. It rarely bothers me when my friends do not agree with the choices I make about
important events in my life.
22. I often (more than 50% of the time) feel confident that I will succeed at what I choose
to do.
23. I often (more than 50% of the time) worry that I will be disappointed in my
performance, no matter what major or career I choose.
24. If I dated someone for more than 6 months it would be hard to spend as much time on
myself (my friends, my work, etc) as I would like.
25. If I am a leader in my career, I'm afraid a lot of people won't like me.
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26. I feel a great deal of pressure from significant people in my life whenever I am facing
a major decision.
27. I know that I make mistakes and I am comfortable when I do so.
28. When I'm faced with an important decision, I change my mind a lot.
29. After I have made a decision about an important issue, I continue to think about the
alternatives I did not choose.
30. When I make a major decision, I feel as if I'm losing out on many other opportunities.
31. I can never do well enough.
32. I consider myself to be a person who has difficult making decisions.
33. I wouldn't date a person my friends disliked; then they would dislike me, too.
34. I am rarely satisfied with decisions I make.
35. Choosing a major/career has been very difficult for me.
36. Picking a major/career has been difficult for me because I'm not sure that I will get
mostly A's.
37. When I choose my career, it is important to me that my parents/friends/spouse/family
are pleased.
38. Sometimes I feel trapped when it is time to make an important choice.
39. I worry about what my friends think regarding important decisions that I make.
40. Whenever I am faced with an important decision, I worry about whether or not I will
make the wrong choice.
Note. Items 1.1, 14, 20, 30, 32, 33, 37, and 40 were used in Study 2. Items 11, 14, 20, 32,
and 40 were used in S~udy 3.
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Appendix P
1. I have difficult making decisions.
2. I have a tendency to change my mind according to the last opinion I hear.
3. After deciding something, I tend to worry about whether my decision was wrong.
4. I frequently find myself afraid of not doing the right thing.
5. I often have the sense that others know better than I do.
6. Often I put off making difficult decisions.
7. I often don't trust myself to make the right decision.
8. I often trus~ the judgement of others more than my own.
9. My judgements abo·ut situations often tum out to be mistaken.
10. I often worry about whether a decision I made will have bad consequences.
11. In making a decision, I often tire myself out by switching back and forth from one
conclusion to another.
12. I am included to have trouble knowing where to stand on an issue.
13. When making a decision, I often feel confused because I have trouble keeping'all
relevant factors in mind.
14. In almost all situations I am confident of my ability to make the right choices.
15. I often don't know what to feel or believe.
16. I wish I were more confident in my opinions.
17. Many times I don't know what to do next.
18. I have a great deal of confidence in my opinions.
19. Frequently, I doubt my ability to make sound judgements.
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Appendix Q
Confirmatory factor analysis results for Study 1: Standardized estimates
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Note. N== 201. Model fit was poor, X2 (60) == 302.33, CFI == .777, RMSEA == .142. The
residual variance for fear of commitment was negative in an initial analysis of the model.
Therefore, in order to test the model, the paths for fear of commitment and judgemental
self-doubt were constrained. Not surprisingly, all of the indicators for Need for Change
showed moderate correlations with Need for Understanding and Need for Inclusiveness,
and the indicators for Need for Understanding showed moderate correlations with Need
for Change.
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Appendix R
SEM results for Study 1: Four needs predicting political liberalism by political
knowledge group
Political
Liberalism
-.03/-.03/-.02
-.27*/.04/.58**
.45**/.34**/.27**
Need for
Change
Avoidance of
Decisional
Commitment
Need for
Inclusiveness
Need for
Understanding
Note. The Ull<?onstrained model was fully saturated and thus had perfect fit, CFI == 1.00.
The constrained structural pathways model had poor fit, X2 (8) == 20.68, P == .008, CFI ==
.888, RMSEA == .091. 'The residual covariances by group were consulted. There was a
large significant covariance between political liberalism and Avoidance of Decisional
Commitment, z == 2.21,p < .05; therefore, the constraint on Avoidance of Decisional
Commitment was freed. Model fit improved, X2 (6) == 11.24,p == .081, CFI == .954,
RMSEA == .067. The residual covariances between political liberalism and Need for
Inclusiveness were much larger than the other covariances for the low and high political
knowledge groups, z == -1.63, z == 1.43, respectively. The constraint for Need for
Inclusiveness was freed and model fit was perfect, X2 (4) == 3.86,p == .426, CFI == 1~00,
RMSEA == .00. Standardized regression weights are reported for low/mean/high political
group respectively. Participants in the low group scored 0 to 2, the mid group scored 3 to
6, and the high group scored 7 to 11. ** p < .01; * p <.05; t p <.10 (one-tailed).
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Appendix S
Correlations among the latent need variables in Study 1
Need for Need for
Inclusiveness Understanding
Low Political Knowledge:
Need for
Change
Need for Inclusiveness
Need for Understanding -.13
Need for Change -.51 **
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment -.05
Mean Political Knowledge:
Need for Inclusiveness
Need for Understanding .13
Need for Change -.33**
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment -.01
High Political Knowledge:
.61 **
.01
.49**
-.11
-.04
Need for Inclusiveness
Need for Understanding .50*
Need for Change -.40t .40t
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment -.24 .06 .53*
Note. Ns: Low Group == 56, Mean Group == 113, High Group == 26. ** p < .01; * p <.05; tp
<.1 0 (two-tailed).
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Appendix T
Brock University: Participants Informed Consent Stat~ment
Project Title: General Attitudes and Personality
Principle Investigator: Becky Choma, M.A.
PhD Student, Psychology Department
rc98ac@J.brocku.ca ; 905-688-5550 ext. 4680
Supervisor: Dr. Carolyn Hafer
Brock University Professor
chafer@brocku.ca ; 905-688-5550 ext. 4297
PURPOSE/INFORMATION: You are being invited to participate in a study investigating how. people's
personality is related to their general attitudes, values, and beliefs. You will be given 2 copies of this
consent form that you will read. You can ask any questions you may have about the information in this
form. Then, you will be asked to sign both copies; one will be handed to the researcher and one you will
keep for your own records. After you have signed the consent form you will be asked. to complete a
questionnaire taking approximately 20 minutes. After you have handed in your questionnaire the researcher
will provide you with a debriefing form explaining the specific purpose of the study and a $5 gift certificate
for a coffee shop as a small token of our appreciation.
RISKS/BENEFITS: There are no known risks for participating in this study. If you have any questions,
you may contact the researcher or her supervisor. The information from this study will help with the
completion of a PhD dissertation and contribute to research on personality and attitudes.
CONFIDENTIALITY: Your name will only be associated with this consent form. There will be no way
of connecting your name to anything you wrote. All consent forms and data will be kept locked at all times
and destroyed 5 years after publication. Consent forms will be kept in a separate from the questionnaires to
preserve anonymity. Only Becky Choma and Dr. Carolyn Hafer will have access to these data. "Again, any
information gathered from this research will be anonymous.
CONTACT: If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures you may contact the
researcher, Becky Choma, at Brock University in the Psychology Department, rc98ac@brocku.ca. You
lnay also contact Ms. Choma's Supervisor, Dr. Carolyn Hafer, Brock University, 688-5550, extension 4297'
or chafer@brocku.ca. This project has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of
Research Ethics Board (File # 05-010). If you have any questions regarding your rights as a participant,
please contact the Research Ethics Officer at reb@brocku.ca, 905-688-5550 ext 3035.
PARTICIPATION: Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate at any
time without consequences to yourself by informing the researcher of this decision. If you withdraw from
the study before you are done the questionnaire your questionnaire will be omitted from analysis upon your
request. Due to the anonymous nature of this study, data cannot be withdrawn once submitted. You have
the right to omit any question(s) you choose.
FEEDBACK AND PUBLICATION: The results from this study will be incorporated into a PhD
dissertation and may be used in any journal articles, presentations, or books published. The results of this
research study may be available approximately one year from now. If you are interested in the results, .
please contact either of the researchers at that time.
CONSENT: You must be at least 20 years of age to participate in this study.
I have read and understand the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I understand that I
may ask questions in the future. I agree to participate in this study.
Participant's signature Date _
Investigator's signature Date _
PLEASE KEEP A COpy OF THIS CONSENT FORM FOR YOUR RECORDS
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Appendix U
SEM results for Study 2: Four needs predicting political liberalism by political
knowledge group
Avoidance of
Decisional
Commitment
Political
Liberalism
-.31 */.26*/.43**
Need for
Change
Need for
Inclusiveness
Need for
Understanding
Note. The unconstrained model was fully saturated and thus had perfect fit, CFI == 1.00.
The constrained structu;ral pathways model had poor fit, X2 (8) == 17.22,p == .028 CfI ==
.896, RMSEA == .078. The residual covariances by group were consulted. There was a
large significant covariance between political liberalism and Need for Change, z == -2.45,
p < .05; therefore, the constraint on Need for Change was freed. Model fit improved
substantially, X2 (6) == 4.82,p == .567, CFI == 1.00, RMSEA == .00. Standardized regression
weights are reported for low/mean/high political group respectively. Participants in the
low group scored 0 to 2, the mid group scored 3 to 6, and the high group scored 7 to 9. **
p < .01; *p <.05; tp <.10 (one-tailed).
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Appendix V
Correlations among the latent need variables in Study 2
Need for Need for
Inclusiveness Understanding
Low Political Knowledge:
Need for
Ch~nge
Need for Inclusiveness
Need for Understanding .31 t
Need for Change .30
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment -.06
Mean Political Knowledge:
Need for Inclusiveness
Need for Understanding .42**
Need for Change .14
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment -.19
High Political Knowledge:
.62**
-.26t
.37**
-.22t .11
Need for Inclusiveness
Need for Understanding .62**
Need for Change .30 .28t
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment -.45* -.25 .15
Note. Ns: Low = 53, Mean = 81, High = 59. ** p < .01; *p <.05; Tp <.10 (two-tailed).
155
Appendix W
Project Title: What's the Story? Cognitive Performance and General Attitudes Jan 07- Sept 08
Principal Investigator: Becky Choma
,PhD Student, Psychology Department
beckv.choma(@.brocku.ca; 905-688-5550 ext. 4680
Supervisor: Dr. Carolyn Hafer
Brock University Professor, Psych Dept
chafer0),brocku.ca; ext. 4297
PURPOSE/INFORMATION: You are being invited to participate in a study investigating how people's cognitive
performance is related to their general attitudes, values, and beliefs. You will be given 2 copies of this consent form to
read and sign. One copy will be handed to the researcher and one you will keep for your own records. Next, you will be
asked to complete a Language Abilities Task, a Categorizing Words Task on the computer, and a paper and pencil
questionnaire measuring your' general attitudes, values and beliefs. The entire session should take approximately 1 to
1.5 hours. After you have finished your questionnaire the researcher will provide you with a debriefing form explaining
the specific purpose of the study. You may ask questions about the research at any time.
RISKS/BENEFITS: There are no known risks for participating in this study. If you have any questions, you may
contact the researcher or her supervisor. The information from this study will help with the completion of a PhD
dissertation and contribute to research on cognitive performance and general attitudes.
CONFIDENTIALITY: Your name will only be associated with this consent form. All consent forms and data will be
kept in a locked room at all times. Only Becky Choma, Dr. Carolyn Hafer, and their Research Assistants will have
access to this data. Any information gathered from this research will be anonymous. All consent fonns will be shredded
after a period of 5 years. Survey and computer data will be de-identified and therefore not include any identifying
information. These data will be kept indefinitely for the purpose of future analyses on related research questions about
general attitudes, values, and beliefs. When these data are destroyed, the survey data will be shredded, and the data file
containing computer scores will be deleted.
CONTACT: If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures you may contact the researcher,
Becky Choma, or her Supervisor, Dr. Carolyn Hafer (see above contact information). This project has been reviewed
and received ethics clearance through the Office of Research Ethics Board (File # 06-108). If you have any pertinent
questions regarding your rights as a participant, please contact the Research Ethics Officer at reb(m,brocku.ca, 905~688­
5550 ext 3035.
PARTICIPATION: Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate at any time without
consequences to yourself by informing the researcher of this decision. If you withdraw from the study before you are
done the questionnaire or computer tasks, your questionnaire and computer scores will be omitted from analysis upon
your request. Due to the anonymous nature of this study, data cannot be withdrawn once submitted. You have the right
to omit any question(s) you choose.
FEEDBACK AND PUBLICATION: The results from this study will be incorporated into a PhD dissertation and may
be used in any journal articles, presentations, or books published. The results of this research study will be available
approximately one year from now. If you would like a copy of the results, please contact the researcher at that time.
CONSENT: I have read and understand the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I understand that I
may ask questions in the future. I agree to participate in this study.
Please check appropriate box:
o I am participating in this research project for 1 hour of research participation in a psychology course and will
not receive monetary payment for my participation.
o I am participating in this experiment for $10. This experiment will not count toward research participation
hours in a psychology course
Signature of participant Course for participation Signature of researcher
**PLEASE KEEP A COpy OF THIS CONSENT FORM FOR YOUR RECORDS***
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Appendix X
DATE: December 1,2006
FROM: Julie Stevens, Vice-Chair
Research Ethics Board (REB)
TO: Carolyn Hafer, Psychology
Becky CHOMA
FILE: 06-108 CHOMA
TITLE: What's The Story? Cognitive Performance and General Attitudes
The Brock University Research Ethics Board has reviewed the above research proposal.
DECISION: Accepted as clarified.
This project has received ethics clearance for the period of December 1, 2006 to December 31, 2007
subject to full REB ratification at the Research Ethics Board's next scheduled meeting. The clearance
period may be e:xtended upon request. Tile study may now proceed.
Please note that the Research Ethics Board (REB) requires that you adhere to the protocol as last reviewed
and cleared by the REB. During the course of research no deviations from, or changes to, the protocol,
recruitment, or consent form may be initiated without prior written clearance from the REB. The Board
must provide clearance for any modifications before they can be implemented. If you wish to modify your
research project, please refer to http://www.brocku.ca/researchservices/forms to complete the appropriate
form Revision or Modification to an Ongoing Application.
Adverse or unexpected events must be reported to the REB as soon as possible with an indication of how
these events affect, in the view of the Principal Investigator, the safety of the participants and the
continuation of the protocol.
Ifresearch participants are in the care of a health facility, at a school, or other institution or community
organization, it is the responsibility of the Principal Investigator to ensure that the ethical guidelines and
clearance of those facilities or institutions are obtained and filed with the REB prior to the initiation of any
research protocols.
The Tri-Council Policy Statement requires that ongoing research be monitored. A Final Report is required
for all projects upon completion of the project. Researchers with projects lasting more than one year are
required to submit a Continuing Review Report annually. The Office of Research Services will contact you
when this form Continuing Review/Final Report is required.
Please quote your REB file number on all future correspondence.
JS/law .
Brenda Brewster, Research Ethics Assistant
Office of Research Ethics, MC D250A
Brock University
Office of Research Services
500 Glenridge Avenue
St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada L2S 3A1
phone: (905)688-5550, ext. 3035 fax: (905)688-0748
email: reb@brocku.ca
http://w\vw.brocku.calresearchservices/ethics/hulnanethics/
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Appendix Y
Need for Inclusiveness:
Please construct grammatically correct 4-word sentences from the string of 5 words included in each
line as quickly as possible.
1. are human we all falling
2. pointed differ really people don't
3. those lights bright moment are
4. vacation alike are extraordinarily people
5. orientation Monday on falling starts
6. chilly was pointed the wind
7. telephoned turn off the alarm
8. they movie a sometimes rented
9. very quickly walks chimney she
10. one city together we are
11. the we vacation program installed
12. lights tum the on city
13. interests they box equivalent have
14. interests we common polite share
15. wrench the adjustable tree is
16. out shopping they are boat
17. are equal all utilities we
18. telephone we all are similar
19. the walked cat by envelope
20. are one we group envelope
21. the one and quickly same
22. we all accepted tree are
23. automobile goals they common share
24. should everyone included mirrors be
25. the she polite award deserved
26. an he ocean onion chopped
27. flowers the beautiful utilities smell
28. minimal differences boat have people
29. for them mirrors everyone applauded
30. are alike very they moment
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Need for Understanding:
Please construct grammatically correct 4-word sentences from the string of 5 words included in each
line as quickly as possible.
1. need comprehend I to falling
2. pointed it on conduct research
3. those lights bright smiling are
4. vacation inquisitive people are most
5. orientation Monday on scarf starts
6. chilly was rounded the wind
7. paper turn off the alarm
8. they movie a rain rented
9. very quickly walks mountain she
10. investigated city that will be
11. the we ·wonder program installed
12. lights turn the on running
13. studying we box time spend
14. understand I to polite need
15. wrench the adjustable leaf is
16. out shopping they are clock
17. examine problems complex utilities we
18. telephone he very is curious
19. the walked cat by plate
20. open to she's ideas envelope
21. to I want quickly learn
22. he'll the truth tree realize
23. automobile information I more need
24. want I know mirrors to
25. the she often award deserved
26. an he eating onion chopped
27. flowers the beautiful over smell
28. the facts boat all consider
29. for them candle everyone applauded
30. analyse now it let's moment
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Need for Change:
Please construct grammatically correct 4-word sentences from the string of 5 words included in each
line as quickly as possible.
1. can great transformation be falling
2. pointed valuable is personal growth
3. those lights bright smiling are
4. vacation exciting is now
5. orientation Monday on scarf starts
6. chilly was rounded the wind
7. paper tum off the alarm
8. they movie a rented
9. very quickly walks mountain she
10. different city I did something
11. the we wonder program installed
12. lights tum the on running
13. needed our box was journey
14. idea what novel polite a
15. wrench the adjustable leaf is
16. out shopping they are clock
17. needed original something utilities we
18. telephone he very is curious
19. the walked cat by'plate
20. wanted more she diversity envelope
21. to I want quickly travel
22. I still developing tree am
23. automobile things we alter can
24. new a start mirrors fresh
25. the she often award deserved
26. an he eating onion chopped
27. flowers the beautiful over slnell
28. something new boat tried I
29. for them candle everyone applauded
30. can creative be she moment
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Avoidance of Decisional Commitment:
Please construct grammatically correct 4-word sentences from the string of 5 words included in each
line as quickly as possible.
1. was hesitant he quite falling
2. pointed fence-sitting just they are
3. those lights bright smiling are
4. vacation decisions avoid making I
5. orientation Monday on scarf starts
6. chilly was rounded the wind
7. paper tum off the alarm
8. they movie a rain rented
9. very quickly walks mountain she
10. undecided city I am completely
11. the we wonder program installed
12. lights tum the on running
13. unsure we box really are
14. flip-flopping we really polite were
15. wrench the adjustable leaf is
16. out shopping they are clock
17. will unresolved remain utilities it
18. telephone he very is curious
19. the walked cat by plate
20. are still we wavering envelope
21. very he's being quickly wishy-washy
22. they so are fickle tree are
23. autom.obile avoidant you being are
24. are they untrusting mirrors quite
25. the she" often award deserved
26. an he eating onion chopped
27. flowers the beautiful over smell
28. quite doubtful boat am I
29. for them candle everyone applauded
30. is waffler a he moment
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Control:
Please construct grammatically correct 4-word sentences from the string of 5 words included in each
line as quickly as possible.
1. can successful transformation be falling
2. pointed rapid is personal growth
3. those lights bright smiling are
4. vacation flawless that is now
5. orientation Monday on scarf starts
6. chilly was rounded the wind
7. paper turn off the alarm
8. they movie a rain rented
9. very quickly walks mountain she
10. gifts city she always gives
11. the we wonder program installed
12. lights tum the on running
13. her I box park normally
14. along he gleefully polite skipped
15. wrench the adjustable leaf is
16. out shopping they are clock
17. needed optimistic someone utilities we
18. telephone he very' is curious
19. the walked cat by plate
20. cleared the he table envelope
21. to I want quickly prepare
22. I still do tree occasionally
23. automobile now please it clean
24. stayed we watch mirrors to
25. the she often award deserved
26. an he eating onion chopped
27. flowers the beautiful over smell
28. sent yesterday boat was it
29. for them candle everyone applauded
30. encourages discussion more she moment
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Appendix Z
Brock University Written Debriefing Form/re-consent form
Project Title: What's the Story? Cognitive Performance and General Attitudes Jan-Dec 2007
Principal Investigator: Becky Choma
PhD Student, Psychology Department
becky.choma(Cl)brocku.ca; 905-688-5550 ext. 4680
Supervisor: Dr. Carolyn Hafer
Brock University Professor, Psychology Dept
chafer@brocku.ca ; 905-688-5550 ext. 4297
PURPOSEIPROCEDURE: The purpose of this research is to examine whether cues in the environment or
characteristics of a situation can influence peoples' endorsement of certain political ideologies. For
example, can characteristics of a situation influence whether a person is more liberal or conservative-not
the political parties-instead general ways of thinking or viewing the world.
Previous research I have conducted has found that people who are more politically liberal tend to
be higher in certain personality traits compared to people who are high in political conservatism.
Specifically, my research has shown that individuals who endorse political liberalism tend to be higher on a
Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, and Fear of Commitment (to making a
decision or course of action).
Although needs and personality traits can explain some of the variation in peoples' political
ideology, they do not exhaustively account for why individuals endorse different political ideologies.
According to one theory, the motivated social-cognition perspective, situational variables - so
characteristics of a situation - also influence why individuals adopt certain political ideologies. Therefore,
the present research is investigating whether situational influences that heighten the four needs found to be
related to political liberalism in our previous research (Need for Inclusiveness/ Understanding/Change and
Fear of Commitment) can motivate people to gravitate in favour ofpolitical liberalism versus conservatism.
The first task I gave you, the "Language Abilities Task" is a task used often is social-
psychological research. The name of this task is the Scrambled-Sentence Manipulation. Researchers use
this task to prime participants with certain concepts. They do this by putting words i~ the sentences that are
related to the concept they are interested in priming. There were 5 versions of the task used in this study;
you were given one of these.
Need/or Inclusiveness: This scrambled-sentence manipulation was meant to prime the concept of
inclusiveness, the first need we found to be related to political liberalism. So sentences including
words such as, universal, one, together, and belonging were included in the scrambled-sentences.
Need/or Understanding: This scrambled-sentence manipulation was meant to prime the concept
ofunderstanding, or wanting to know, the second need we found to be related to political
liberalisln. So sentences including words such as, thinking, investigate, consider, and know were
included in the scrambled-sentences.
Need/or Change: This scrambled-sentence manipulation was meant to prime the concept of
change, the third need we found to be related to political liberalism. So sentences including words
such as, different, novel, fresh, and journey were included in the scrambled-sentences.
Fear o/Commitment: This scrambled-sentence manipulation was meant to rime the concept of
fear of commitment, the fourth need we found to be related to political liberalism. So sentences
including words such as uncertain, ambivalent, unsure and hesitant were included in the
scramb1ed-sentences.
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Control: This scrambled-~entence manipulation was meant to be a control condition, and meant to
prime neutral concepts, so concepts that are unrelated to political liberalism. So sentenc.es
including words such as, exercising, flawlessly, normally, and watches were included in the
scrambled-sentences.
I want to make sure that you understand that the scrambled-sentence task you completed was not a
measure ofyouf language ability, but instead intended to prime you with concepts associated with political
liberalism (unless you were in the control condition, in this case with neutral concepts).
The computer task you completed does measure how you categorize words as I stated earlier;
however, this computer task was intended to measure how you sort words into specific categories, in the
present case, how you sort words into political categories. Therefore, this task measured your implicit or
autolnatic political attitudes. The procedure we used to measure your implicit political attitudes is called the
Implicit Attitudes Test, or lAT. You may recall, the IAT first had you categorize pairs of words -- some of
these words were cancer or sunshine -- into positive and negative groups.. Then, it asked you to categorize
words that were more political in nature, so words such as Bush and Clinton, into conservative and liberal
groups. Next, the computer asked you to categorize whatever words came onto the screen into either
positive or conservative and negative or liberal (and vice versa) groups.
A person's response time to one type ofpairing, so positive or conservative and negative or
liberal, compared to the other type of pairing, so positive or liberal and negative or conservative, is a
measure of their implicit political attitudes. So, if a person is faster to sort words into groups for one pairing
of categories versus another, it is reasonable to infer that the faster pairing indicates associated categories -
in other words, if a person responds faster for the conservative or positive pairing, we could infer that this
participant views conservative and positive as related. Therefore, this individual's implicit political
ideology would likely be conservative.
Now I'll explain the purpose of the questionnaires given to you after you completed the computer
task. The questionnaires were intended to measure general attitudes, beliefs and values as stated before. So,
for example, one of the questionnaires measured your political ideology by asking you more directly
whether you are liberal or conservative. As I mentioned before, we are interested in seeing whether peoples
political ideology - as measured by the computer task and by direct reports on the questionnaire - changes
or shifts as a result ofbeing primed with one of the four needs that have been found to be related to
political liberalism.
Now I want to explain why I didn't tell you everything about the purpose of the research until the
study was oveJ. Ifpeople know everything about the research before they come in here, they may answer
the questionnaires according to what they think I am looking for -- either unconsciously or just to be
helpful and cooperative. Then I wouldn't know if the answers I am getting are people's true and honest
responses or not. I would prefer not to hide anything about the experiment, but I also have to make· sure that
I am getting spontaneous and realistic responses from people.
It is important to remember that there is a range in beliefs and a variety of ways of viewing the
world. For example, people have different political ideologies, or different religious beliefs. And all
viewpoints deserve consideration and respect.
Please do not show this form to other potential participants, this is for your viewing. The reason I do
not want other participants to see this form is so they do not find out about the specific purpose of the
language task, computer task, and questionnaires beforehand; this could prevent them from responding
naturally to the questions. Thank you for your cooperation.
RISKS/BENEFITS: There are no known risks for participating in this study. If you have any questions,
you may contact the researcher or her supervisor. The information from this study will help with the
completion of a PhD dissertation and contribute to research on cognitive performance and general attitudes.
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CONFIDENTIALITY: Your name will only be associated with this consent form. All consent forms and
data will be kept in a locked room at all times. Only Becky Choma, Dr. Carolyn Hafer, and their Research
Assistants will have access to this data. Any information gathered from this research will be anonymous.
All consent forms will be shredded after a period of 5 years. Survey and computer data will be de-identified
and therefore not include any identifying information. These data will be kept indefinitely for the purpose
of future analyses on related research questions about general attitudes, values, and beliefs. When these
data are destroyed, the survey data will be shredded, and the data file containing computer scores will be
deleted.
CONTACT: If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures you may contact the
researcher, Becky Choma, or her Supervisor, Dr. Carolyn Hafer (see above contact information). This
project has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of Research Ethics Board (File
# 06-108). If you have any pertinent questions regarding your rights as a participant, please contact the
Research Ethics Officer at reb@brocku.ca, 905-688-5550 ext 3035.
FEEDBACK AND PUBLICATION: The results from this study will be incorporated into a PhD
dissertation and'may be used in any journal articles, presentations, or books published. The results of this
research study will be available approximately one year from now. If you would like a copy of the results,
please contact the researcher at that time.
RE-CONSENT: Now that you know more about the study you may decide to withdraw your data
immediately from all or certain parts of the investigation. Any data you choose to omit will be destroyed
(electronic files deleted and questionnaires shredded) immediately after this session. Please let us know if
you would like any of your data withdrawn by checking the appropriate box/es below.
o I choose not to withdraw any of my data from this investigation.
I would like to withdraw the following data from this investigation (check as many as apply):
o my responses to the IAT task (i.e., reaction times).
o my responses on the paper and pencil questionnaires.
I have read and understand the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I understand that I
may ask questions in the future.
Investigator's signature _
Date
------
Date
------
o (check if applicable) I am participating in this research project for 1 hour of research participation
in a psychology course and will not receive monetary payment for my participation.
Signature of participant Course for participation Signature of researcher
Thank you for your time and support in participating in this study!
If you have any questions or concerns please feel free to contact any of the following:
Becky Choma (Principle investigator) Dr. Carolyn Hafer (Supervisor)
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AppendixAA
Project Title: What's the Story? Cognitive Performance and General Attitudes
Principal Investigator: Becky Choma Supervisor: Dr. Carolyn Hafer
PhD Student, Psychology Department Brock University Professor, Psychology Dept
becky.choma@brocku.ca ; 905-688-5550 ext. 4680 chafer@brocku.ca ; 905-688-5550 ext. 4297
PURPOSE/INFORMATION: You are being invited to participate in a study. This study is part ofa larger
research study investigating how people's cognitive performance is related to their general attitudes, values,
and beliefs. Vou will be given 2 copies of this consent form to read and sign. One copy will be handed to
the researcher and one you will keep for your own records. Next, you will be asked to complete a one-page
questionnaire asking you to group phrases or words into categories. The entire session should take
approximately 5 to 10'minutes. After you have finished your questionnaire the researcher will provide you
with a debriefing form explaining the specific purpose of the study. You may ask questions about the
research at any time.
RISKS/BENEFITS: There are no known risks for participating in this study. If you have any questions,
you may contact the researcher or her supervisor. The information from this study will provide
complementary data for the larger study and help with the completion of a PhD dissertation and contribute
to research on cognitive performance and general attitudes.
CONFIDENTIALITY: Your name will only be associated with this consent form. All consent forms and
data will be kept in a locked room at all times. Only Becky Choma, Dr. Carolyn Hafer, and their Research
Assistants will have access to this data. Any information gathered from this research will be anonymous.
All consent forms will be shredded after a period of 5 years. Survey data will be de-identified and therefore
not include any identifying information. These data will be kept indefinitely for the purpose of future
analyses on related researc~ questions about general attitudes, values, and beliefs. When these data are
destroyed, the survey data will be shredded, and the data file containing computer .scores will be deleted.
CONTACT: If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures you may contact the
researcher, Becky Choma, or her Supervisor, Dr. Carolyn Hafer (see above contact information). This
project has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of Research Ethics Board (File
# 06-108). Ifyou have any pertinent questions regarding your rights as a participant, please contact the
Research Ethics Officer at reb@brocku.ca, 905-688-5550 ext 3035.
PARTICIPATION: Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate at any
time without consequences to yourself by informing the researcher of this decision. If you withdraw from
the study before you are done the questionnaire or computer tasks, your questionnaire and computer scores
will be omitted from analysis upon your request. Due to the anonymous nature of this study, data cannot be
withdrawn once submitted. You have the right to omit any question(s) you choose.
FEEDBACK AND PUBLICATION: The results from this study will be incorporated into a PhD
dissertation and may be used in any journal articles, presentations, or books published. The results of this
research study will be available approximately one year from now. If you would like a copy of the results,
please contact the researcher at that time.
CONSENT: I have read and understand the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I
understand that I may ask questions in the future. I agree to participate in this study.
o (check if applicable) I am participating in this research project for 1 hour of research participation
in a psychology course arid will not receive monetary payment for my participation..
Signature of participant Course for participation Signature of researcher
**PLEASE KEEP A COPY OF THIS CONSENT FORM FOR YOUR RECORDS***
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Appendix BB
Listed below are short phrases and words. Please indicate by checking the appropriate box, whtch of the
categories you think each word or phrase belongs to. Also indicate how confident you are with your choice.
Please
categorize the Politically Politically
list of words Liberal Conservative
and phrases
listed
Gay rights
Bush 0 0 0
Welfare 0 0 0
Military 0' 0 0
Human Rights D D 0
High taxes D D 0
Pro-Abortion 0 0 0
Individual 0 0 0
responsibility
Universal D 0 0
healthcare
Traditional 0 0 0
Tax cuts D D 0
Pro- D D 0
environment
Big business D D 0
Discipline D D 0
Tax the rich D D 0
Gay marriage D' D 0
Competition D D 0
Paul Martin D D 0
Pro- D D 0
Immigration
Less D D 0
immigration
Abortion D D 0
Security 0 0 0
Anti-war 0 D 0
programs
Anti gay
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Appendix CC
Brock University Debriefing Form
Project Title: What's the Story? Cognitive Performance and General Attitudes
Principal Investigator: Becky Choma
PhD Student, Psychology Department
becky'.choma((Ubroc1<.u.ca; ext. 4680
Supervisor: Dr. Carolyn Hafer
Brock University Professor, Psych Dept
chafer(mbrocku.ca; 905-688-5550 ext. 4297
PURPOSE: This study is part of a larger study investigating how people's cognitive
performance is related to their general attitudes, values, and beliefs. In the larger study
which is beginning mid-January 2006, participants will be asked to complete a Language
Abilities Task, a Categorizing Words Task on the computer, and a paper and pencil
questionnaire measuring their general attitudes, values and beliefs. In order to ensure that
the most appropriate words and phrases are being used in the computer task, we needed
to assess how these words and phrases are typically categorized. Thus, the present study
was intended to do this.
CONTACT: If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures you
may contact the researcher, Becky Choma, or her Supervisor, Dr. Carolyn Hafer (see
above contact information). This project has been reviewed and received ethics clearance
through the Office of Research Ethics Board (File # 06-108). If you have any pertinent
questions regarding your rights as a participant, please contact the Research Ethics
Officer at rebrq)brocku.c.a, 905-688-5550 ext 3035.
FEEDBACK AND PUBLICATION: The results of this research study will be available
approximately one year from now. If you would like a copy of the results, please contact
the researcher at that time.
Thank you for your time and support in participating in this study!
If you have any questions or concerns please feel,free to contact any of the following:
Becky Choma (Principle investigator) Dr. Carolyn Hafer (Supervisor)
Political Stimulus Words:
I Liberal
AppendixDD
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Conservative I
Clinton Bush
Pro-choice Pro-life
Gay marriage Steven Harper
Pro-environment Military
Paul Martin Big business
Anti-war Private healthcare
High taxes Less immigration
Universal healthcare Discipline
Pro-immigration Security
Human rights Religious
Neutral Stimulus Words:
I Positive Negative I
Sunshine Cancer
Rainbow Funeral
Beautiful Toothache
Joy Horrible
Laughter Awful
Hug Demon
Gift Cruel
Comedy Grief
Fun Infection
Delightful Nightmare
170
Appendix EE
Thinking about how you feelright now, please read each sentence and indicate your
response by circling the relevant number.
1. Please indicate the extent to which you desire change.
1
Not at all
2 3 4 5
neutral
6 7 8 9
Extremely
2. Please indicate the extent to which you believe change is valuable.
1
Not at all
2 . 3 4 5
neutral
6 7 8 9
Extremely
3. Please indicate the extent to which you want to understand or know.
1
Not at all
2 3 4 5
neutral
6 7 8 9
Extremely
4. Please indicate the extent to which you feel curious or inquisitive.
1
Not at all
2 3 4 5
neutral
6 7 8 9
Extremely
5. Please indicate the extent to which you believe everyone is similar to one another.
1
Not at all
2 3 4 5
neutral
6 7 8 9
Extremely
6. Please indicate the extent to which you believe everyone should be accepted/included.
1
Not at all
2 3 4 5
neutral
6 7 8 9
Extremely
7. Please indicate the extent to which you feel you would have difficulty making a
decision or choosing a course of action right now.
1
Not at all
2 3 4 5
neutral
6 7 8 9
Extremely
8. Please indicate the extent to which you believe you would be afraid or unsure in
committing to an important decision or course of action right now compared to other
people your age.
1
Not at all
2 3 4 5
neutral
6 7 8 9
Extremely
Appendix FF
Group means, standard deviations, and differences for manipulation checks and dependent variables for Study 3
Avoidance of
Need for Need for Need for Decisional Control p
Inclusiveness Understanding Change Commitment
Manipulation Checks: (n== 15) (n == 16) (n == 16) (n == 15) (n == 33)
Inclusiveness 6.77 (1.61) 6.41 (1.39). 6.44 (1.59) 7.10 (1.20) 6.47 (1.40) .60
Understanding 7.47 (0.88) 7.41 (1.07) 7.31 (0.87) 7.47 (1.14) 7.53 (1.07) .97
Change 6.77 (1.29) 6.75 (1.25) 6.22 (1.16) 6.07 (1.62) 6.98 (1.00) .10
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment 5.10 (2.29) 4.87 (1.94) 5.01 (1.69) 4.10 (1.92) 4.62 (2.03) .64
Dependent Variables: (n == 19) (n == 20) (n == 20) (n == 20) (n == 37)
Political Liberalism 5.99 (2.05) 5.64 (1.66) 5.83 (1.55) 5.98 (1.33) 6.29 (1.92) .73
Social Liberalism 6.34 (2.31) 6.32 (2.05) 6.37 (1.76) 6.56 (2.26) 6.92 (2.26) .81
Economic Liberalism 5.63 (2.04) 4.63 (2.00) 5.16 (1.89) 5.15 (1.53) 5.46 (1.93) .48
IAT 0.33 (0.34) 0.25 (0.30) 0.24 (0.32) 0.28 (0.39) 0.32 (0.28) .81
Note. Means are displayed and standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Political Liberalism is a composite of three items. None
of the results were statistically significant.
Appendix GG
Internal analyses for Study 3: Regression results for manipulation checks predicting political liberalism
Political Liberalism Liberal Social Dimension Liberal Economic Dimension IAT
Steps: 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Sex 1.29** .89t .65 1.19* 1.00 .84 1.53** .83t .59 .11 .08 .07
Effectlnc -.11 -.05 -.26 -.28 -.28 -.52 .27 .33 .22 .03 .03 -.02
EffectUnd -.42 -.51 -.50 -.28 -.33 -.29 -.66t -.84* -.83* -.05 -.07 -.07
EffectCha -.06 -.03 .15 -.19 -.10 -.05 .12 .08 .27 -.01 -.01 .04
EffectAdc .01 .03 -.07 .04 .07 .17 -.17 -.03 -.22 .01 .04 .04
IncMC .12 .22 .16 .21 .09 .18 -.04 -.02
UndMC -.24 -.25 -.08 -.10 -.38* -.38* .02 .02
ChaMC .23 .43* .29 .39 .27 .50* .05 .08t
AdcMC -.13 -.07 -.13 -.10 .10 .17 -.00 .01
Know -.32t -.16 -.10 -.04 -.48* -.29 -.03 -.01
Knowxlnc .37* .44* .27t .04
KnowxUnd -.54* -.41 -.48* -.07
KnowxCha .87** .50 .88** .13*
KnowxAdc -.30 -.49t -.08 -.081'
R2 .13 .19 .30 .08 .10 .17 .17 .29 .37 .03 .07 .14
R2 Change .06 .10* .03 .06 .12* .08* .04 .07
Note. N= 95. ** p < .01; *P <.05; t < .10 (two-tailed). Variables were standardized; unstandardized coefficients are reported. Effectlnc = effects
code comparing Need for Inclusiveness to the control condition; EffectsUnd = Need for Understanding condition compared to control condition;
EffectsCha = Need for Change condition compared to control condition; EffectsAdc = Avoidance of Decisional Commitment condition compared
to control condition; IncMC = inclusiveness manipulation check; UndMC = understanding manipulation check; ChaMC = change manipulation
check; AdcMC = avoidance of decisional commitment manipulation check; PK = political knowledge. Political liberalism is a composite of three
items. Significant interactions were explored; however, they are not reported here. Sex was coded with woman == 1,. men == O.
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AppendixHH
Regression results for needs predicting political liberalism variables in Study 1
Social Economic Liberal Political
Dimension Dimension Attitudes
Steps: 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Age -.04** -.04** -.04** -.021" -.02* -.021' -.03** -.02* -.02*
Need for Inclusiveness .29** .26** .27** .26** .32** .30**
Need for Understanding .06 .02 .09 .05 -.07 -.04
Need for Change .30* .29** .171" .16t .45** .43**
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment -.00 .00 -.07 -.05 .01 .03
Political Knowledge .15* .14* .06 .05 .03 -.03
PK by Need for Inclusiveness .15 .13 -.10
PK by Need for Understanding .07 .04 .11
PK by Need for Change .04 -.02 .02
PK by Avoidance of Decisional Commitment .18* .20* .18*
R2 .06 .17 .20 .01 .09 .11 .03 .14 .17
R2 Change .11** .03 .07* .03 .11** .03
Note. N == 190 for social and economic dimensions; N == 195 for liberal political attitudes. ** p < .01; * p <.05, t P < .10.
Unstandardized coefficients are reported. PK == political knowledge. Scores for social dimension, economic dimension, and liberal
political attitudes were standardized.
Appendix II
Regression results for needs predictingpolitical liberalism variables in Study 2
·Social Economic Liberal Political .
Dimension Dimension Attitudes
Steps: 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
Sex -- -- -- -- -- -- -.41 ** -.42** -.42**
Need for Inclusiveness .03 .05 .04 .03 .19** .19*
Need for Understanding .33** .33** .11 .11 .14t .14t
Need for Change .16t .12 .17* .19* .23* .20*
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment .09 .11 t .14* .14* -.07 -.06
Political Knowledge .10t .08 -.08 -.08 .01 .01
PK by Need for Inclusiveness .16* .13 t .17*
PK by Need for Understanding -.02 .01 -.00
PK by Need for Change .29** .06 .12
PK by Avoidance of Decisional Commitment -.04 .17* .03
R2 .14 .22 .06 .10 .04 .17 .20
R2 Change .08** .04 .13** .03
Note. N== 193 for the social dimension; N== 191 for the economic dimension; N== 168 for liberal political attitudes. ** p < .01; * p .
<.05, t p < .10. Unstandardized coefficients are reported. PK == political knowledge. Scores for social dimension, economic dimension,
and liberal political attitudes were standardized. Because sex was correlated with liberal political attitudes (r == -.20, p == .009), it was
controlled for in the regression analysis predicting liberal political attitudes. Sex was coded with women == 1, men == O.
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Appendix JJ
Zero-order andpartial correlations among political liberalism variables and composite
needs for Studies 1, 2 and 3
Political Social Economic Liberal
Liberalism Dimension Dimension Attitudes
Study 1:
Need for Inclusiveness .17** .12* .26** .13*
Need for Understanding .23** .22** .16* .13*
Need for Change .21 ** .20** .09 .24**
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment -.04 -.02 -.09 -.07
Study 2:
Need for Inclusiveness .11 t .14* .04 .25**
Need for Understanding .25** .32** .10t .24**
Need for Change .19** .18** .13* .18*
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment .11 t .04 .16* -.08
Study 3:
Need for Inclusiveness .22** .32** .02 .19*
Need for Understanding .14t .24** -.03 .10
Need for Change .17* .22** .06 .13 t
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment -.04 -.08 .04 .07
Note. N== 192 (Study 1), partial correlations controlling for age. N= 197 (Study 2) andN
== 195 (for economic liberalism), and for partial correlations controlling for sex with
liberal attitudes only (N == 169). N == 116 (Study 3), partial correlations controlling for
sex. ** p < .01; * p <.05; tp <.10 (one-tailed).
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AppendixKK
Project Title: General Attitudes: What's the Story? Jan 07- Sept 08
Principal Investigator: Becky Choma Supervisor: Dr. Carolyn Hafer
PhD Student, P~ychology Department Brock University Professor, Psychology Dept
becky.choma@brocku.ca; 905-688-5550 ext. 4680 chafer@brocku.ca; 905-688-5550 ext. 4297
PURPOSE/INFORMATION: You are being invited to participate in a study investigating people's
general attitudes and beliefs. You will be given 2 copies of this consent form to read and sign. One copy
will be handed to the rese~rcher and one you will keep for your own records. Next, you will be asked to
complete a paper and pencil questionnaire measuring your general attitudes and beliefs. The entire session
should take approximately 15 minutes. After you have finished your questionnaire the researcher will
provide you with a debriefing form explaining the specific purpose of the study. You may ask questions
about the research at any time.
RISKS/BENEFITS: There are no known risks for participating in this study. If you have any questions,
you may contact the researcher or her supervisor. The information from this study will help with the
completion of a PhD dissertation and contribute to research on cognitive performance and general attitudes.
CONFIDENTIALITY: Your name will only be associated with this consent form. All consent forms and
data will be kept in a locked room at all times. Only Becky Choma, Dr. Carolyn Hafer, and their Research
Assistants will have access to this data. Any information gathered from this research will be anonymous.
All consent forms will be shredded after a period of 5 years. Survey will be de-identified and therefore not
include any identifying information. These data will be kept indefinitely for the purpose of future analyses
on related research questions about general attitudes, values, and beliefs. When these data are destroyed,
the survey data will be shredded.
CONTACT: Ifyou have questions at any time about the study or the procedures you may contact the
researcher, Becky Choma, 'or her Supervisor, Dr. Carolyn Hafer (see above contact information). This
project has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of Research Ethics Board (File
# 06-108). If you have any pertinent questions regarding your rights as a participant, please contact the
Research Ethics Officer at reb@brocku.ca, 905-688-5550 ext 3035.
PARTICIPATION: Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate at any
time without consequences to yourself by informing the researcher of this decision. If you withdraw from
the study before you are done the questionnaire or cOlnputer tasks, your questionnaire and computer scores
will be omitted from analysis upon your request. Due to the anonymous nature of this study, data cannot be
withdrawn once submitted. You have the right to omit any question(s) you choose.
FEEDBACK AND PUBLICATION: The results from this study will be incorporated into a PhD
dissertation and may be used in any journal articles, presentations, or books published. The results of this
research study will be available approximately one year from now. If you would like a copy of the results,
please contact the researcher at that time.
CONSENT: I have read and understand the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I
understand that I may ask questions in the future. I agree to participate in this study.
Please check appropriate box:
o I am participating in this research project for 1 hour of research participation in a psychology
course and will not receive monetary payment for my participation.
o I am particip'ating in this experiment for $2. This experiment will not count toward research
participation hours in a psychology course
Signature of participant Course for participation Signature of researcher
**PLEASE KEEP A COpy OF THIS CONSENT FORM FOR YOUR RECORDS***
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Appendix LL
Brock University Written Debriefing Form
Project Title: General Attitudes: What's the Story?
Principal Investigator: Becky Choma
PhD Student, Psychology Department
becky.choma((Ubrocku.ca; 905-688-5550 ext. 4680
Jan 07-Sept 2008
Supervisor: Dr. Carolyn Hafer
Brock University Professor, Psychology Dept
chafer@brocku.ca ; 905-688-5550 ext. 4297
The purpose of this research is to examine whether cues in the environment or characteristics ofa
situation can influence peoples' endorsement of certain political ideologies. For example, can
characteristics of a situation influence whether a person is more liberal or conservative-not the political
parties-instead general ways of thinking or viewing the world.
Previ0l:ls research I have conducted has found that people who are more politically liberal tend to
be higher in certain personality traits compared to people who are high in political conservatism.
Specifically, my research has shown that individuals who endorse political liberalism tend to be higher on a
Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, and Fear of Commitment (to making a
decision or course of action).
Although needs and personality traits can explain some of the variation in peoples' political
ideology, they do not exhaustively account for why individuals endorse different political ideologies.
According to one theory, the motivated social-cognition perspective, situational variables - so
characteristics of a situation - also influence why individuals adopt certain political ideologies. Therefore,
the present research is investigating whether situational influences that heighten Need for Inclusiveness can
motivate people to gravitate in favour of political liberalism versus conservatism.
Need for Inclusiveness was manipulated by having participants write about how similar they are to
everyone in the world. Those in the control condition wrote a paragraph on the differences between web-
based and television-based news media. We expect that those who wrote a paragraph about how similar
they are to everyone in the world will be more likely to endorse a more politically liberal ideology in
comparison to those in the control condition.
It is important to remember that there is a range in beliefs and a variety of ways of viewing the
world. For example, people have different political ideologies, or different religious beliefs. And all
viewpoints deserve consideration and respect.
Please do not show this form to other potential participants, this is for your viewing. The reason
I do not want other participants to see this form is so they do not find out about the specific purpose of the
paragraph you wrote and questionnaires beforehand; this could prevent them from responding naturally to
the questions. Thank you for your cooperation.
Thank you for your time and support in participating in this study!
Ifyou have any questions or concerns please feel free to contact any of the following:
Becky Choma (Principle investigator) Dr. Carolyn Hafer (Supervisor)
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AppendixMM
1. How liberal or conservative (meaning your general outlook) do you tend to be in general?
1
Extremely
Liberal
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Extremely
Conservative
2. H~w liberal or conservative (meaning your general outlook) do you tend to be when it comes
to economic policy?
1
Extremely
Liberal
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Extremely
Conservative
3. How liberal or conservative (meaning your general outlook) do you tend to be when it comes
to social policy?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Extremely Extremely
Liberal Conservative
4. How liberal do you tend to be in general?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Extremely
Liberal Liberal
5. How liberal do you tend to be when it comes to economic policy?
1
Not at all
Liberal
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Extremely
Liberal
6. How liberal do you tend to be when it comes to social policy?
1 2 345 6
Not at all
Liberal
7 8 9
Extremely
Liberal
7. How conservative do you tend to be in general?
I 2 3 4 5
Not at all
Conservative
6 7 8 9
Extremely
Conservative
8. How conservative do you tend to be when it comes to economic policy?
1 2 345 6 7 8
Not at all
Conservative
9. How conservative do you tend to be when it comes to social policy?
1 2' 3 456 7 8
Not at all
Conservative
9
Extremely
Conservative
9
Extremely
Conservative
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AppendixNN
Items used in Studies 1 and 4:
1) The law should be changed to make divorce much more difficult.
1
Strongly
Disagree
2 3 4 5
Strongly
Agree
2) The Canadian health-care system should involve a mixture ofpublic and private
initiatives.
1
Strongly
Disagree
2 3 4 5
Strongly
Agree
3) The Canadian government needs to spend more money on the military.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
4) What is your attitude toward abortion?
1 2 3 4 5
It should never It should never
be allowed be forbidden
5) Gay men and lesbians should be allowed to marry.
. 1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
6) A good way to improve life for Canadians is for the government to lower taxes.
1
Strongly
Disagree
2 3 4 5
Strongly
Agree
7) The government ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and poor.
1
Strongly
Disagree
2 3 4 5
Strongly
Agree
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Items used in Studies 2 and 3:
Listed below is a series of general policies that you mayor may not support. Please
consider each policy and indicate your personal attitude toward it using the scale
below.
Extremely
Unfavourable
1 2
Moderately
Unfavourable
3 4
Neutral
5 6
Moderately
Favourable
7 8
Extremely
Favourable
9
1. Lower taxes for large businesses and higher 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
income individuals
2. Allowing private management of health care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
facilities
3. Repealing of legal recognition for same-sex 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
marrIage
4. Increased spending on military 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5. Laws guaranteeing easier access to abortion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Appendix 00
Regression results for needs predicting liberal political attitudes in Study 3
Liberal Political Attitudes
Steps:
Sex
Need for Inclusiveness
Need for Understanding
Need for Change
Avoidance of Decisional Commitment
Political Knowledge
PK by Need for Inclusiveness
PK by Need for Understanding
PK by Need for Change
PK by Avoidance of Decisional Commitment
1
5""*• j
2
.47*
.17*
.05
.13
.14t
.01
3
.18*
.11
.13t
.14t
.06
.20*
-.14t
.05
-.00
R2 .04 .1 0 .16
R2 Change .06 .16
Note. N= 116 for liberal political attitudes. ** p < .01; * p <.05, TP < .10. Significance
tests were one-tailed. Unstandardized coefficients are reported. PK == political knowledge.
Scores for liberal political attitudes were standardized. Sex was coded with women = 1,
men == O.
